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Introduction 
In Europe during the 1970s and 1980s educational science became one of 
the most developed disciplines in the humanities and social sciences. In 
Germany this development involved moving beyond the humanist tradition 
(which had dominated until this period) by drawing on the empirical tradi- 
tion as well as on the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. These new 
developments were to bring educational 'science new and more complex 
dimensions, which were further amplified as a result of developments in 
the educational system and also thanks to institutional recognition of the 
discipline of educational science itself. 
There is no doubt that it is in Germany that educational science devel- 
oped as a scientific discipline in its own right when humanist pedagogics, 
empirical educational science and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt 
School merged. Indeed, these three different paradigms have played such 
an important part in shaping educational science that it is essential that their 
convergence be reconstructed and critically reflected. Such is the purpose 
of this present book. In examining the main currents within educational 
science, we aim to help the reader gain an overview of the different ap- 
proaches in this field. 
In addressing the various controversies internal to educational science, 
questions relating to sensitive issues in other fields of the humanities and 
social sciences will be raised. Every field of research possesses its own 
paradigm with particular problems, questions and a particular relation to 
discourse andlor practice. These dimensions have been explored in a par- 
ticular way by each of these currents. Thus, pointing out the specificity of 
each paradigm brings us to reflect upon the constitution and identity of 
educational science. 
An inventory of the kind proposed addresses two audiences. Firstly, it is 
intended for students of educational science. It is essential for them to ap- 
proach educational science from the start with a defined position, grasping 
the theoretical rudiments needed for a critical evaluation of this discipline. 
Indeed, knowledge of the theories and controversies inherent to a particular 
field is a prerequisite for developing a personal point of view ,and deter- 
mining a particular position. The second potential audience that this work 
addresses are professionals, that is to say, teachers and educators of various 
academic as well as out-of-school institutions. This book could incite them 
to reflect upon the theoretical concepts they use in their educational activi- 
ties and to examine the validity and limits thereof. Such an evaluation re- 
quires confronting the numerous new points of view that are relevant to an 
understanding of educational practice. 
Our present time may be particularly well-suited to engage in a similar 
endeavour, reflecting upon the locations of educational science. Pedagogi- 
cal theory's precedent reference system (which was relatively self-enclosed) 
has come under questioning from different angles in the past few decades. 
A clear shift has occurred with diverse orientations replacing traditional 
positions. But things have not stopped there. The field of educational sci- 
ence has been increasingly confronted with various theoretical positions 
and controversies ranging clearly beyond its traditional scope. In this proc- 
ess, educational science has lost its monolithical character. Different ori- 
entation~ have developed, which have been distinguished through increas- 
ingly marked confrontations. The more engagement in these confrontations 
has intensified, the less space there has been for an objective, critical vision 
encompassing the whole field covered. These confrontations have certainly 
not completely disappeared today. But we are in the midst of a certain 
clarification process which justifies our attempted inventory. One of the 
principal objectives of such an inventory is to draw up the strengths and 
weaknesses of the theories and concepts that emerge in the confrontation 
between the differing positions. This book offers a comprehensive survey 
fiom which one may conceive the future evolution of educational science. 
The historicity of education (and its relevance for an understanding of 
educational practice) was originally charted within the framework of hu- 
manist pedagogics (GeisteswissenschajilichePadagogik). This ran parallel 
to a realization of the importance of hermeneutic methods for understand- 
ing educational reality which helped to emphasize the necessity for a rela- 
tive autonomy of education and educational science in relation to other so- 
cial institutions. Education was first conceived following a model of the 
pedagogical relationship as a process of interaction between an adult and a 
youth. Humanist pedagogy defined itself as a theory of education for edu- 
cation. 
Later on, empirical educational science attempted to distinguish itself 
from humanist pedagogics by developing its views on the significance of 
educational practice. Indeed, only in and through practice is it possible to 
differentiate between the various fields of education, and thus define what 
should be found in each one. This differentiation is also necessary to deter- 
mine the limits of educational practice. The development of empirical edu- 
cational science marks a progressive evolution away fiom a straight and 
narrow alignment on the positivist ideal. A more recent orientation brings 
into closer perspective the norms of critical rationalism, which constitute 
the ideological framework of most experimental work. 
Critical educational science emerged in the aftermath of the Critical 
Theory of the Frankfurt School. Following the precepts of the Frankfiu-t 
School, critical educational science emphasizes the social character of edu- 
cation and of educational science. Its aim is to focus education on the 
emancipation of humankind. One of the conditions for this process of 
emancipation is a critical ideological analysis of the social context within 
which education occurs. Such an analysis calls for a rediscovery of the de- 
pendency links from which youths must break free. A constructive guide is 
necessary to accomplish such an educational process: this is what a critical 
theory of education can establish. 
The object of this presentation is to assemble within stages or coherent 
landmarks, and throughout its genesis in Germany, the significant steps that 
constitute the founding debate within educational science. This brief de- 
scription reveals that the positions described not only address educational 
theories or concepts, but also the different lines of thought which underlie 
the social sciences. The controversies between humanist pedagogics, empiri- 
cal educational science and critical educational science echo the discussion 
between hermeneutics, critical rationalism and Critical Theory. An inven-
tory of the discussions initiated by educational science is therefore impos- 
sible without taking into consideration the wider scientific and theoretical 
arguments which are needed to understand the background and foundations 
of the controversies. 
This work not only introduces the reader to a multitude of pedagogical 
issues, it also provides an overview of the main theoretical themes that run 
through the social sciences and are necessary for an understanding of edu- 
cational science. Its overall purpose is to show that the distinctions between 
various positions do not constitute a formal classificatory system but derive 
from the concept ofparadigms developed by Kuhn. Kuhn considers a para- 
digm to be a sum of elements common to the members of a scientific com- 
munity. A paradigm implies that there is a certain unity within particular 
scientific and social approaches, but also an agreement on norms, on the 
content of methodological concepts and on the proceedings and instruments 
of the scientific task. 
The concept of paradigm serves to draw out and thus better understand 
what is most relevant to various scientific systems of reception and regula- 
tion, as well as perceive the contradictions between them. The concept of 
paradigm also offers an important point from which to start the research we 
propose to embark on. It sheds light on the respective systems of the vari- 
ous currents within educational science, and, as such, has great heuristic 
value. But we cannot expect it to explain the transition from one scientific 
current to another, nor the ensuing social developments. In the end, the 
concept of paradigm does not provide sufficient criteria to judge the co- 
gency of these theories. 
What guidelines should be followed for an inventory of the different 
theories and concepts of educational science? How does one acquire a criti- 
cal distance from the different positions currently held? One possibility is 
to list the criticisms immanent to each paradigm. As it is presented here, 
each current is not a doctrine, but rather the result of absolutely non-linear 
thought processes. The discussions inherent to each current can be used as 
a basis for critical evaluation. Moreover, the controversies between the dif- 
ferent currents have led us to identify blind spots and points of rupture in 
each of the theories. A third basis for a critical evaluation of the different 
scientific currents springs from the following questions: How does each 
current respectively understand the link between theory and practice? How 
have the various paradigms contributed to educational practice? Research 
in this direction shows that perspectives for an action-oriented critical edu- 
cational science can be drawn from an analysis of the different scientific 
currents. These perspectives must be systematized and completed so as to 
reveal how they may further the development of educational science and of 
education itself. 
Such a vision of educational science is necessary, since consciousness 
of education's daily realities is no longer sufficient to orient educational 
action. Social and institutional contexts within which education develops 
and which clearly influence the educational process are much too complex. 
A simultaneously critical and constructive educational action will only be 
feasible when both the student preparing for educational practice as well as 
the active teacher or educator become conscious of the conditions of edu- 
cational practice. 
PART ONE 

Humanist Pedagogics 


German humanist pedagogics began to develop in the 1920s, based on the 
works of Schleiermacher (1768-1 864) and Dilthey (1 833-1 9 1 1). As a sci- 
entific current, it was established in the universities and faculties of Ger- 
man pedagogics by 1933. Among its most important representatives were 
Herman Nohl (1879-1960) Theodor Litt (1880-1962), Eduard Spranger 
(1 882-1963), Wilhelm Flitner (1889- 1990) and Erich Weniger (1894-
1961). 
Following the collapse of national socialism, the humanist perspective 
lived on into the 1960s. So there was a continuity between the first period 
before 1933 and the post-war renewal (Klaflci 1971). This tradition was 
maintained by Otto Friedrich Bollnow, Fritz Blatter, Elisabeth Blochmann, 
Georg Geissler, Hans Wenke, all of whom had a profound influence on the 
development of post-war educational science. The Gottingen school, repre- 
sented by Nohl and Weniger, trained a great number of academics in edu- 
cational science (such as Wolfgang Klafki, Henvig Blankertz, Klaus Mol- 
lenhauer). However, in order to understand these authors, it is necessary to 
refer back to the works of the precursors of humanist pedagogics. 
In the first decades of the twentieth century, humanist pedagogics 
emerged in the works of Dilthey and, above all, Nohl. Both were strongly 
opposed to normative education. Humanist pedagogics tried to distinguish 
itself fiom Herbart (1776-1841) and his disciples (including Ziller, Rein, 
Stoy, Waitz). If one considers pedagogics as belonging to the humanities 
(as a science of the peculiar, in opposition to natural science which is only 
interested in the universal), it is no longer possible to let the problems of 
practice rely on general ethical norms. "Education can only be deduced 
fiom the aims of life; and morality has not been able to define these aims in 
a manner universally recognized" (Dilthey, Complete Works, vol. 6: 57).' 
The constitutive elements of humanist pedagogics can be characterized on 
the basis of this demand for a solid definition of education's objectives 
(which Dilthey opposed to normative pedagogics). From this demonstration 
of the primacy of "life" over ethics, Dilthey deduced the primacy of educa- 
tional practice over moral discourses. For humanist pedagogy, this definition 
of the relation between theory and practice (which supports the primacy of 
practice over theory) has remained valid. It has led to the deduction that the 
foundation of all scientific and theoretical knowledge has always been edu- 
cational reality and educational practice. Educational science was thus de- 
The quotations from Gennan sources in this book have been translated by G. Barill6 
and A. Lagaay. 
l 
fined first and foremost not as a theoretical discipline but as a practical 
discipline. 
As such, it was a theory ofpractice for practice which deduced its ob- 
jectives from the problems of practice. Educational practice was considered 
a part of the social practice by stressing its historicity. For educational sci- 
ence, this implied renouncing the tendency to view all periods and peoples 
in the same manner and along the same criteria, as was still the case in tra- 
ditional pedagogics. Educational science today accepts that its historic va- 
lidity is relative and variable according to situations. 
By casting itself as a historico-social theory of practice at the service of 
this practice, this new educational science wants to contribute to the im- 
provement of the practice. This self-affirmation has taken the shape of a 
critique. The new educational science defines itself as an independent in- 
stitution in charge of educating children and in opposition to other social 
powers seeking to intervene in this education, such as the church, the econ- 
omy, or the state. If humanist pedagogics was unable to thoroughly follow 
through this claim and did not sufficiently defend its autonomy, this is be- 
cause it could not yet rely on a critical social theory which would have jus- 
tified the worthiness of its intentions. 
Focused on educational practice and aware of its historicity, humanist 
pedagogy is concerned with the specificity of each educational situation. 
For Dilthey, the task of pedagogics as a human science resides in compre- 
hending the unique and individual aspect of any historico-social reality, in 
recognizing the laws that affect its homogeneity, and in defining the aims 
and rules that govern its development. 
Thus, humanist pedagogics set out to recognize distinctive conditions in 
a general context and find support for educational practice through its re- 
search. Its use of hermeneutic procedures (which aim at the comprehension 
of particular situations) renders possible a satisfactory interpretation of the 
specific and singular concrete conditions of practice. 
Humanist pedagogics also developed a theory of the pedagogical rela- 
tionship, experiencing within this interpersonal relationship the "core" of 
education. It concentrated on an analysis of this unbalanced relational sihla- 
tion between a youth and an adult, the ultimate aim of which is the youth's 
autonomy. 
In this section, we propose an extended inquiry into some of the ele- 
ments of this theory of humanist education that was to have such a pro- 
found influence on educational science. 
I 
The Historicity of Education and Educational Science 
Once Herman Nohl, Max Frischeisen-Kohler and Georg Reichwein had 
transposed Dilthey's thoughts on the historicity of humanist pedagogics 
within educational science, recognition of education's historicity became a 
nodal point of scientific pedagogics. The generation that followed referred 
to it with the works of Spranger, Litt, Weniger and Flitner, as well as their 
disciples. 
Dilthey emphasized the significance of history on several occasions, as 
for example when he writes: 
"Man only recognizes himself in history, never through introspection. We are all search- 
ing for him in history ... The significance of the human sciences and their theories 
resides in the fact that they help us to see what we have to do in the world, what we can 
do with ourselves, what we can do with the world, and what the world can do with us" 
(Complete Works, vol. V :279 ff.). 
Dilthey explains how man can only affirm himself through the interpreta- 
tion of history, that he can only recognize his own historicity by examining 
the finality and reality of each historical phenomenon. It is only with the 
help of the human sciences, directed towards history and the comprehen- 
sion of human history, that man can achieve self-definition. Through the 
importance given to history and the huinan sciences in helping man to de- 
fine himself and act, the decisive function of history in the shaping of man 
becomes evident and achieves a central position in humanist pedagogics. 
This idea of history's hnction is put forth in Dilthey's thesis on The 
Possibility of a Universal Educational Science, in which he writes: 
"The meaning of education can only be deduced from the meaning of life. Ethics has 
prefened not to define this meaning of life in universal terms. Yet it can be found in the 
history of morals. What man is and what he strives for is something he comes to learn in 
the development of his being through time; but it can never be defined once and for all, 
universally. Man can only see the experiences of life that arise from the deepest level of 
his existence. But every attempt to formulate the ultimate meaning of man's life has 
been defined historically. No moral system has ever achieved universal recognition" 
(Complete Works, vol. VI:57). 
According to Dilthey, the meaning and goal of education can only be rec- 
ognized by starting with "life" and its"history. Ethics and moral history can 
offer no more than partial knowledge. To Dilthey, such a thing as timeless 
knowledge which does not take into account its own historicity seems im- 
possible. The meaning and goal of education can only be defined histori- 
cally, in conjunction with a given historico-social situation. This discovery 
of the impossibility of finding a final explanation, and therefore of finding 
an answer to the classical question of justification, must not be misunder- 
stood. Dilthey does not place himself in a perspective of absolute relativism 
and historicism. Rather, Dilthey's goal should be understood as the search 
for a theory of science, education included, which would avoid the preju- 
dices of universal values as well as absolute relativism and decisionism. 
The acknowledgment of education's historicity developed by Dilthey, 
and in line with Schleiermacher, is reasserted by all the representatives of 
humanist pedagogics, but they draw different conclusions and their ap- 
proach to the problem also diverges from that of the master. Thus, Nohl 
clearly embraces the Diltheyan tradition when he writes: 
"Educational reality, with its dual aspect of actual pedagogic experience and pedagogical 
objectification, is the phenomenon benefirndatum (the well-founded phenomenon) upon 
which epistemology must be established. From it springs forth the significance of the 
history of pedagogics: it is not a collection of pedagogical curiosities nor an interesting 
presentation of great pedagogues, but it presents the continuity of pedagogical thought 
through its progression. We understand what it has made of this, what in fact education 
is, if we refuse to stop at personal experience, which is always limited, and engage in a 
systematic analysis of its history" (Nohl 1949a: 119). 
For Nohl and humanist pedagogics, the knowledge of educational reality's 
historicity implies examining the historicity of the educational process both 
within educational institutions as well as in the concepts, methods and in- 
struments of educational science. The structural elements of education 
which, according to Nohl, are pertinent for the present and the future, must 
be deduced from the historical analysis of educational reality. 
The basis for this historical analysis is a direct interest in the acquisition 
of a capacity for educational action and therefore in the accomplishment of 
a historical educational practice. 
However, Nohl provides absolutely no answer to the following question: 
how and to what extent can a historical analysis of educational reality de- 
termine and evaluate the pertinence of the goals for practical educational 
action, and the forms and processes of education that one encounters in 
educational reality? 
Is the historicity of education and of educational science really conse- 
quential in Nohl's work? For him, a reference to 9he continuity of the 
pedagogical idea" must be drawn from a historical analysis with educa- 
tional ends. Does this not amount to a "super historic" ontological grandeur 
posited as an invariable rather than understood in its'hi~toricit~? This doubt 
regarding Nohl's conception of educational historicity is further reinforced 
by some of his formulations which bring to mind the Platonic ideas. In these 
formulations, for example, a "universal theory of education" is mentioned, 
which "is valid for all times and peoples, as it brings into evidence the vari- 
able structures of educational life, and renders all its historical forms com- 
prehensible and usable" (Nohl 1949a: 120 S.). 
Such developments lead us to the conclusion that Nohl certainly con- 
sidered himself in Dilthey's line, especially with regard to the historicity of 
education, yet without radically integrating it. Weniger, Litt and Flitner 
have pointed out that Nohl did not achieve a complete examination of the 
historical relativity of educational reality. On this issue, Weniger went fur-
ther than Nohl. There are three reasons for turning to his work: firstly, 
Weniger showed a constant interest in the issues of historicity in education; 
secondly, as far back as 1926, he was dedicated to aspects of the historicity 
of teaching in the field of history teaching; finally, in Weniger's work, hu- 
manist.pedagogy reaches the "end of its era", as the pragmatic title of his 
manifest indicates (see DahrnerMafki 1968). 
Weniger has shown, more clearly than other contemporary representa- 
tives of educational science, the possibilities and limits of a philosophy of 
history for educational science and its theory. The most pertinent example 
of his contribution is his research on the teaching of history. In this 1926 
post-doctoral thesis, he speaks of the historicity of history teaching, and not 
of the science of history, the philosophy of history, or of the theory of edu- 
cation. 
' 
His conclusions on the historicity of education within the framework of 
humanist pedagogics again interest us: 
"Important reasons justify the attempt to find the basis of a hermeneutic didactic for the 
teaching of history. The historicisation of all the social sciences has given history a pre- 
dominant position. It may just as well appearas 'the' social science, according to the 
strict definition of the word, and all the other social sciences would then be simple ele- 
ments of an enlarged science of history. Furthermore, historical elements partake in the 
image that modem man has of the world, and have profoundly transformed him. Every 
conception of the world is determined by history and a comprehension of the context of 
these world visions is possible only through history. Not only is science historical but 
life itself is part of this process of transformation" (Weniger 1926: 5) .  
For Weniger, the educational value of history, in the context of school, has 
not yet been discovered. On the contrary, history continues to be exploited 
only for "functions unrelated to its essence". It is therefore important to un-
derstand the significance of history for education and to let it bear its fruits 
for school and for life. Furthermore, teaching, history, life, conceptions of 
the world and education are perceived in their historical dimension. He 
links this knowledge to present-day pedagogical problems. What he expects 
from this historical analysis is not to acquire immediate props for action, but 
a solution to the theoretical and practical problems of education. Although 
he gives a powehl  meaning to history in education, Weniger is neverthe- 
less critical. He puts the historical tradition under continuous criticism: 
"A criticism which aims to found and legitimise theory on the premise of history cannot 
avoid being reproached decomposition. It puts the present into perspective with the 
depth of the historical dimension and thus distinguishes itself fiom a simple progressive 
thought. But this criticism is also opposed to the naive belief that historical action would 
be moral by itself, that it would make positive actions possible" @ahmer 1968: 59). 
Weniger was right to recognize that educational science must proceed from 
the historicity of education and that a historico-hermeneutic analysis of 
historibally defined educational contexts can reveal important aspects of the 
educational problematic. Such a perspective gives no precision regarding 
the concrete tasks of educational science. Educational science is, according 
to humanist pedagogics, an autonomous discipline. Based on its historical 
context, it must define its own problematics and its objectives in theory and 
practice. The historical and contextualised character of this perspective ex- 
clude any idea of a general educational science, outside time, decontextu- 
alised and pertinent to the present day, as could have been imagined by 
Nohl. 
Historical analysis of educational reality contributes to the resolution of 
pedagogical questions by shedding light on the origins of contemporary 
questions and problems. The autonomy and specificity of educational sci- 
ence can be grasped in its relation to its own origins. Today, the principle 
of education's historicity is recognized. Emphasis is laid upon the political, 
economic and social conditions for a comprehension of education within a 
given historical time-frame, as well as upon the history of mentalities. In a 
way, this extension constitutes a reorientation of interest in the history of 
education. This results fiom the fact that educational science is understood 
first and foremost not only as a hermeneutic science but also as a social 
science. This new approach to educational science includes an analysis of 
concrete social conditions of -education, teaching and training within the 
context of a global social system. Besides, an analysis of the socializing 
processes, which are only comprehensible in a historically defined context 
of social mutations, in order to be understood, must be complemented by a 
socio-historical and comparative perspective: 
"Historical pedagogy interrogates the factual conditions of socializing processes from 
the perspective of the construction of man. Its aim is to reconstruct the historical subject 
in the perspective of his hture; it criticizes the self-definition and functioning of educa- 
tional science, of the educator, as well as of the socializing and pedagogical instances; it 
analyses the factual and ideal conditions of the person's genesis in their historical con- 
text" (Hermann 1971:285). 
Thus, a programme is given shape to for educational science as a historical 
social science. Many new perspectives for a social history of education are 
found in this programme, the development of which can lead, in the long 
term, to a new, more realistic comprehension of the historicity of education 
and of educational science. In order to start applying this programme, his- 
torical pedagogy must be envisaged as a historical search for socialization. 
It must lead to an analysis of the socializing processes within the institu- 
tions of the educational system. 
The elaboration of this programme could contribute to orienting educa- 
tional science towards a historical perspective and thus remedy the lack of 
interest which can sometimes be observed, to this day, regarding the history 
of education and the historical dimension of educational science. 
The Sigmificnmce off Werrme~tneuntics 
ffor IEduncatiomnII Sciemce 
Within humanist pedagogics recognition of the central significance of his- 
tory points quite naturally to the importance of hermeneutics2. Following 
the works of Schleiermacher, Droysen and Dilthey, humanist educational 
science became interested in the hermeneutic process of comprehension. 
The objects of study of this current consisted, above all, in the sources of 
language, whose theories and past educational programmes had to be inter- 
preted. This current also studied educational reality with its contemporary 
problems. An understanding of the historical background allowed for a 
better comprehension of educational reality. Historical analysis was to give 
rise to systematic formulations which could then solve the problems of the 
moment. In this context, reality was sometimes considered reality that had 
become historical, and sometimes a field of practice for the "educational 
act". Both of these frameworks for the utilisation of the hermeneutic proc- 
ess are still valid today. 
Schleiermacher influenced humanist educational science through his 
understanding of hermeneutics. It did not suffice, in his view, to consider 
the core of hermeneutics to be rules of interpretation. He also called into 
question the grounds of these interpretation rules. Schleiermacher recog- 
nized that the simple historicity of a work offered no guarantee as to its 
comprehension. 
He placed at the centre of his research the subject who does or does not 
understand. For in his mind, the "right object" of study was not the com- 
prehension of others, but their incomprehension. With this affirmation, 
contradicted by Gadarner, Schleiermacher contributed to the relativisation 
of the knowing subject. Since then, the importance of individual subjectiv- 
ity in the process of comprehension has been recognized. 
Dilthey never quite clarified what he meant by hermeneutics. He uses 
the term in two main ways. On the one hand hermeneutics is considered as 
2 	 Hermeneutics can be defined as the theory of the interpretation of signs as symbolic 
elements of a culture. 
a way of scientifically grounding the human sciences within social practice. 
Thus, Dilthey successively speaks of the self-reflection of human science, 
of the introduction to human science, the hermeneutics of human science, 
and the hermeneutics of life. On the other hand, he understands hermeneu- 
tics as "the science of interpreting texts". In both cases, hermeneutics was 
to transform the dialectical relationship between subject and object. This 
process is described as a "hermeneutic circle". This means there is an inter- 
action between subject and object: 
"Comprehension implies experience, and experience becomes experience of life only 
when comprehension passes from the narrow and subjective level of experience to that 
which is global and general. In order to better understand a particular character, a cer- 
tain systematic knowledge is needed, which depends on a vivid understanding of every 
unity of life. Recognition of inorganic nature is achieved through the construction of a 
science in which the inferior layer always depends on that of which it is the basis. In 
human science, all is defined from the start through the relation of reciprocal depend- 
ency between subject and object" (Complete Works, vol. VII:143). 
And, further on: 
"Thus there is here a free relation between hypothesis and progress. Novelty does not 
derive formally from hypothesis. Comprehension moves from that which is already un-
derstood to that which is new and can be deduced from it. The internal relation is de- 
fined within the possibility of ulterior reproduction. This becomes a universal method as 
soon as -understanding leaves the realm of words and signification and no longer seeks 
the meaning of signs but the more profound meaning of the manifestations of life" 
(Complete Works, Vol. VII:234). 
These texts indicate some hndarnental features of Dilthey's understanding 
of hermeneutics, which focuses on the concept of "mimesis" (imitation, re- 
production) in the expression of life. The latter is part of the methodologi- 
cal context of the construction of the hermeneutic concept in the sense of 
the hermeneutic circle of mediation between subject and object. 
Dilthey's attempt to develop hermeneutics as a science of text interpre- 
tation and of the comprehension of intellectual objectifications (e. g. institu-
tions, school programmes, educational action, etc.) was M e r e d  by huma- 
nist educational science. In this context, there is a double link between 
hermeneutics and humanist education. 
On the one hand, humanist pedagogics focused on historical texts as a 
source of scientific knowledge. Amongst these texts are the rules, school 
regulations, biographies and works of the "great" pedagogues. These were 
considered objects of interpretation. The aim was to grasp their meaning in 
relation to their original contexts and to the history of their effects up to the 
present day. Insofar as these texts constituted a codification of intellectual 
objectifications, their interpretation was expected to yield a contribution to 
the comprehension of objectification which could be applied from the 
originating period up to the present day. 
On the other hand, educational reality, perceived as the result of intel- 
lectual objectifications, can be conceived by applying the hermeneutic 
process to historical texts. This process has been described in humanist 
pedagogics as the "hermeneutics of educational reality". 
Educational reality is a reality that springs from the history of life. It 
must be understood by taking into account its historical past and the con- 
temporary forces at play within it: 
"The true starting point of a universal theory of education is the fact of educational re-
ality as a significant whole. Basing its development on life, its demands and ideals, the 
educational practice is a set of contributions; it runs through history, is constructed 
within the services, institutions and laws, and simultaneously defined on the basis of 
these processes, these ends and means, these ideals and methods within theory. It is a 
great objective reality, independent of the individual subjects that act inside it. It is gov- 
erned by its own idea, that comes into effect in each properly educational act, and that is 
nevertheless only comprehensible in its historical unravelling" (Nohl 1949a: 1 19). 
Humanist educational science was to set itself historical reconstruction and 
interpretation as an objective, as well as aim to achieve an understanding of 
educational reality as a significant whole. Both with Nohl and humanist 
educational science, comprehension of educational reality is achieved 
through historical analysis and the immediate comprehension of meaning 
(the two tasks of the hermeneutic process). 
Bearing in mind these two constituent dimensions of hermeneutics in 
the field of educational science, one may note that humanist pedagogics 
privileged the interpretation of historical texts instead of turning to the in- 
terpretation of educational reality in keeping with hermeneutic research. A 
link between these two dimensions would have facilitated the development 
of educational science in the realms of the theory of knowledge, methodol- 
ogy and practice. It could have shown, for example, to what extent every 
piece of research, even empirical, and every interpretation of educational 
reality depends on historico-social conditions. Above all, this would have 
prevented certain short-cuts on the part of humanist pedagogics. But this 
field of (hermeneutic) research applied to educational reality has remained 
largely unexplored in relation to the field of (hermeneutic) interpretation of 
historical texts. 
Nohl, who can rightly be considered the founding father of humanist 
pedagogics, focused his interest on exploring the historicity of education 
and the necessity of historical studies for a better understanding of educa- 
tional reality. He understood the limits of historical analysis in the quest for 
solutions to the problems of contemporary educational reality. Historical 
analysis can only contribute to outlining certain questions. But as historical 
analysis, it can only construct the genesis and reveal the evolution and 
change of reality in education. 
Let us underline at this point one of the problems that arises with hu- 
manist pedagogics: the autonomy and specificity, that pedagogics has 
always claimed in relation to other disciplines such as theology, political 
science or economics, go against its own history. Based on the idea that 
historical analysis can solve present educational difficulties, one discovers 
that educational science, by taking into account the historicity of educa- 
tional reality, can seize this educational reality as a principle open to the 
future and likely to change. 
Later on, the works of Weniger take on and link together the relative 
autonomy of educational science and the theorylpractice relationship. In-
deed, Weniger tries to liberate humanist pedagogics from its symbiotic 
links with history-oriented hermeneutics. Flitner, too, tries to relativise the 
significance of historical research for educational science. This leads him to 
distinguish historico-hermeneutic research from pragmatic-hermeneutic re- 
search. Despite different orientations, either in relation to history, or in re- 
lation to educational reality, these two postures are both constructed against 
normative and abstract systems. Flitner favours the pragmatic-hermeneutic 
comprehension of educational reality. This is made possible only if one un-
derstands the existential and normative elements which exist in any given 
historical situation. Flitner clearly sees that every pedagogical interpreta- 
tion of educational reality and of educational action upon this reality is de- 
termined by a normative position. He then demands, moving beyond Nohl 
and Weniger's hermeneutic comprehension, that educational science inte- 
grate an "engaged reflection": 
"Reflection on responsibility is the crux of pedagogical science. It sums up all of the 
principles that are recognized as valid by the practising community. It gathers them into 
a universal pedagogical thought, evaluates it, ties it to scientific reflection in general, 
criticizes pedagogical principles and minimizes mistakes. From this point of view, 
pedagogical science is clearly an engaged science" (Flitner 1963: 18). 
In the framework of humanist pedagogics, based on an interpretation of 
educational reality seen in its historical and pragmatic aspect, educational 
science is conceived as engaged in the social practice; this dimension will 
later be developed under the influence of the Frankhrt School. 
Thus, we may note that hermeneutic understanding moved from history- 
oriented hermeneutics (Nohl) to a hermeneutics more focussed on the 
structure of the educational process (Weniger), and finally, to engaged 
hermeneutics (Flitner). 
Having presented the hermeneutic understanding of humanist pedagog- 
ics, let us now return to the distinction, still relevant today, between the two 
tasks of hermeneutic analysis: the historico-hermeneutic examination of the 
(historical) texts pertinent to educational science and the hermeneutic study 
of educational research. At present the discussion has evolved, expressing 
more subtle points of thought. 
Regarding the evolution of historical pedagogics, the discussion today 
has led towards a historico-hermeneutic methodology. We here refer to an 
example where Klafki (1971a) convincingly presents the work methods of 
hermeneutic research through the interpretation of a text by Humboldt. For 
historico-hermeneutic research, this is a "rational evaluation of the signifi- 
cant documents, studied in a methodical and verifiable fashion". In the 
course of his exemplarily interpretation, Klafki distinguishes certain criteria 
for historical methodology: 
"-	Perception of the conditions of each interpretation and the necessity of bringing to 
light that which is implied by the interpretation; 
-	 Continual verification of pre-comprehensions based on the text; 
- Critique of the text, based on the context of its writing; 
- Consideration of semantic aspects of the interpretation; 
-	 Development of the specific character of the position expressed in the text through 
an evaluation of the different positions of interpretation; 
- Consideration both of the contexts immanent to the text and of those beyond it; 
- Fair evaluation of the text's syntax in its interpretation; 
- Clear development of the text's articulation; 
-	Verification of the text's argumentative structure; 
- Interpretation of the text as a hermeneutic spiral; 
-	 Consideration of the ideological perspective of interpretation" (op. cit.: 134ff.). 
Finally let us point out that within the context of Gadamer's philosophy 
(Truth and Method 1989) and the debate on hermeneutics to which Gada- 
mer's works gave rise (Ape1 et al. 1971), a new discussion was born (see 
Kamper 1974; Bubner 1975; Uhle 1976) which was to define more clearly 
the question of the significance of hermeneutics for the comprehension of 
oneself and the world. 
The Auntormommy off Eduncatiom amd Eduncatioma~ Sciemce 
Humanist pedagogics examined the question of the relative autonomy of 
education and educational science from two starting points. On the one 
hand, Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Nohl tried to liberate educational science 
from its dependence on ethics and psychology, and thus to define it as a 
specific and autonomous discipline. On the other hand, the relative auton- 
omy of pedagogics had to be defined in order to uphold children's rights in 
relation to adults and the social groups influencing education. In this area, 
Dilthey, Nohl, Spranger, Litt, Weniger and Flitner were in agreement with 
the historical movement that took sides for the autonomy and the specific- 
ity of childhood, youth and education. 
This movement dates back to Rousseau who considered education to be 
a specific and autonomous social practice, and a necessary human right. In 
Emile, Rousseau contends that we do men do not properly appreciate the 
significance of childhood and that the further progress, the more we follow 
false ideas. He explains that the wisest of men see what is good for an adult 
to know. But even they fail to think about what children can make of it. 
They always look for the adult in the child without considering what a child 
is before becoming an adult. Rousseau's claim (which must be seen in the 
context of the emancipatory movement of the rising bourgeoisie) to use the 
specific rights of children as the starting point of education was to have a 
major influence on classical pedagogy in the eighteenth, nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, "first with Pestalozzi, Frobel and Diesterweg, Herder, 
Humboldt, Herbart and Schleierrnacher, then in the cultural critique of the 
nineteenth century's closing years with Nietzsche, Lagarde and Langbehn, 
and finally in the youth movement and the reform movement which was 
closely tied to it: the rural boarding-school movement (Landerziehungs- 
heimbewegung) and the artistic education movement (Kunsteniehungs- 
bewegung), 'child-centred pedagogics', 'pedagogics of experience and 
spontaneity', the policies of the work school and the movement for com- 
munity school, the movement of the open university, and the movement of 
modem social pedagogics, including the efforts for a fimdamental proce- 
dure in the execution of juvenile sentences" (Klafki 1971 :359). 
It is under the premises of this new pedagogical movement, that still in- 
fluences humanist pedagogics, that the notion of "relative autonomy" must 
be understood. Weniger studied this issue, which remains relevant to the 
present day. The title of his collection of articles published in the 1920s and 
1930s (The Autonomy and Specificity of Education in Theory and in Prac-
tice) is of particular interest. In this collection of articles, Weniger tries to 
define in two ways "the autonomy and the specificity of pedagogics". On 
the one hand, he underlines the incapacity of the other sciences to grasp 
educational reality and the pertinence, in education, of the 'world of chil- 
dren and youth. On the other hand, he directs his research towards the de- 
pendency of educational practice on educational theory, the development of 
which he sees as one of the central tasks of educational science. Practice 
cannot properly reach its aims without referring to theory: 
"Pedagogics as a social science has a double origin: on the one hand, the other sciences' 
insufficiency to take into account educational reality and to understand the conditions of 
its achievement, on the other hand, the incapacity of simple practice to l l f i l  pedagogi-
cal tasks in a tangible and adequate manner, for every practice needs such theoretical 
securities. But the autonomy of pedagogical behaviour does not depend on pedagogy's 
situationas a science. It is only either favoured or hampered by it" (Weniger 1953a: 76). 
Furthermore, education's autonomy is recognized because of the educa- 
tor 'S responsibility for the being who is under his charge. The teacher must 
defend.the child's future, without loosing himself in the "demands of the 
moment". He must also take into account the child's past against the de- 
mands of the present and the future, which are constantly referred to by the 
state, culture, family, work ... Finally, Weniger notes that "the forces of 
life want to appropriate the youth as a relief force, that is to say that youths 
become servants, civil servants. They claim man, body and soul. Educa- 
tion's autonomy is to dare insist on man's liberty, on his profound identity 
and on his will." The aim of "pedagogy's 'autonomy" is to allow educa- 
tional action. But "its specjficity and autonomy can only be very relative" 
(Weniger 1953a: 154ff.). 
Weniger's argument for the relative autonomy of educational action 
rests mostly on the practice of pedagogics, but also refers to corresponding 
institutional conditions. "The autonomy is therefore both autonomy of the 
institutions and autonomy of behaviour and pedagogical action" (Weniger 
1953a:76). The close tie that exists between educational action and the the- 
ory of educational action in humanist pedagogics, as well as the other sci- 
ences' short-comings in defining the tasks of education, justify both the 
relative autonomy of pedagogics and that of educational science. 
Due to its responsibility towards the rights of childhood and youth to 
self-fulfilment, educational science must remind teachers of their moral 
duty towards pupils. From this, a critical distance can be deduced in rela- 
tion to social reality and to dominant social pressures. An educational cri- 
tique of the world then becomes possible. "World" is here to be understood 
as the institutional conditions of education, the conditions of individual 
lives and the general social conditions. By taking into account the historical 
context in which it occurs, educational science is obliged to help the child 
towards self-fulfilment. When the given social conditions are unfavourable 
to this self-fulfilment, educational critique must alert public opinion to the 
existing tensions between what ought to be and what is. Having said this, 
humanist pedagogics has never been able to conceive this critique as a self- 
critique of education, notably in relation to the processes and institutions of 
education. Only in marginal terms has this critique become a critique of the 
obligations proposed to education by science or by influent groups in soci- 
ety. Thus, the relation between education and power, economy and politics 
remains poorly explained by humanist pedagogics. 
The movement of ideological critique allowed further opposition to the 
forces that wanted to limit the relative autonomy of education and of edu- 
cational science. This critique helps pedagogics explain its understanding 
of society. The drawing together of ideological critique and the theory of 
education allowed one to think out the relative autonomy of education and 
educational science, but it remained to be put into practice. For the auton- 
omy of educational science also places itself in terms of the organisation 
and of the institutionalisation of educational science. 
How can educational science be organised and institutionalised in order 
to gain independence from the various social groups? The issue of the rela- 
tive autonomy of educational science becomes even more pressing when 
one bears in mind the ties between educational science and the'other social 
sciences. Humanist pedagogics has been able to justify the existence of its 
discipline in relation to the other sciences, based on its problematic specifi- 
cally linked to practice. Due to increasing interdisciplinary research in the 
field of education, educational science today can be considered a discipline 
cooperating with other social sciences to produce the research that society's 
development requires. Educational science is often considered a science of 
integration which strives to apprehend and integrate into the framework of 
social science the numerous facts of knowledge pertinent to education. 
l 
The Pedagogical Relationship 
Nohl wanted to develop a theory of education based on the personal rela- 
tionship that structures the encounter between teacher and pupil. In the 
same spirit, Dilthey had already emphasized that the science of pedagogics 
can only start with a description of the educator in relation to the student. 
Dilthey, Nohl and humanist pedagogics as a whole saw in the pedagogical 
relationship the core of education. Nohl's theoretical reflections on the 
pedagogical relationship are as follows: 
1. Nohl describes as the basis of education a "compassionate relationship 
between an adult and a developing being who attains his life and shape 
on his own" (Nohl 1949a: 134). Education therefore occurs in the con- 
text of a relationship that exists "for the youth". In this relationship, the 
educator must defend the youth's individual right to development and 
self-realisation against unjustified external interventions. Above all, he 
must help him accept the influences of society which are themselves not 
always justified. From here stems the imperative of accepting pedagogi- 
cal responsibility for youths, allowing the safeguard of their interests. 
2. 	Educational action that exists for "the youth" has consequences which 
can only be defined in the egsting historico-social context and not once 
and for all. 
3. The pedagogical relationship is interactive; the adult educator and the 
youth have a relationship of exchange. The pupil is not only the object 
of an educative intervention, but is also considered a subject whose right 
to act on the pedagogical rapport is recognized. The relationship between 
the educator and the youth is one of trust. 
4. 	The educative relationship cannot be the product of coercion and ma- 
nipulation. When successful, it is spontaneous. Furthermore, it is partly 
defined by phenomena such as sympathy or antipathy, which, to a 
certain extent, elude rationality. 
5. 	The link between the youth and the adult, that constitutes the pedagogi- 
cal relationship, must be understood from the start as temporary. "The 
pedagogical relationship strives from both sides to ultimately become 
superfluous and dissolve" (Nohl 1949a: 153). It is only when the pupil 
learns to untie once and for all his links to the adult that the aim of edu- 
cation, that is to say, the capacity for autonomous action, is achieved. 
Coping with this tension between the need to bond and that of inde- 
pendence calls for a particular style and ability, a certain "tact". 
6. 	The adult's pedagogical effort towards the youth is difhse. On the one 
hand, the educator must examine the youth's present situation, his inter- 
ests and momentary needs; on the other hand, he must concentrate his 
pedagogical efforts on "the youth's still unrevealed possibilities". Nohl 
writes: "The educator's rapport to the child is always double: love for 
him in his reality and love for his goal, the ideal of the child, the two 
being not separate but united; to make a child based on what is feasible 
in him, stir in his heart the superior life, lead him to performances that 
are related to it, not because of the performance but because man's life 
is accomplished through it" (Nohl 1949a: 135ff.). 
These ideas of humanist pedagogics have influenced the science of educa- 
tion up to this day. Insofar as the model of the "pedagogical relationship" 
represents one of the first attempts, within the framework of educational 
science, to explain the "pedagogical rapport", it deserves attention even if 
research on pedagogical interaction has partly gone beyond it. How can this 
pedagogical rapport be evaluated within educational science as a whole? 
To answer this question, certain points of view must be discussed, in the 
light of which we will evaluate human science's theory of the pedagogical 
relationship. 
1. 	 The concept of the "pedagogical relationship" implies trust between the 
adult and the youth. This is an important condition of the educative 
process. A positive climate is necessary for the processes of interaction 
and communication, as has been underlined by social psychology as 
well as the theory of communication. In human relationships, a certain 
' 
level of relation determines the significance of the interaction. 
2. 	Humanist pedagogics fails to take into account the fact that the quality 
of the relationship between the adult and the youth is not only defined 
by their arbitrary will. Rather, it is largely determined by the role they 
play in the context of institutions such as school or the family. Thus, the 
educational situation is asymmetrical. It limits the teacher and the stu- 
dent in their communication possibilities. The teacher's social and in-
stitutional power over the student can but influence their relationship. 
For indeed, the teacher must, for instance, enact certain bc t ions  (such 
as the evaluation of performances) which helshe may not always appre- 
ciate, as they go against Nohl's claim that one must act "for the child" 
and take into account the youth's interests with regard to the institution 
of school as well as with regard to the social influences that can effect 
hislher development. 
3. 	 The theories of humanist pedagogics were not scientifically verified. 
Humanist pedagogics failed to help teachers put their model into prac- 
tice. It did not take into account the historical and social conditions of 
education. 
4. 	 The pedagogical relationship is studied as a binomial one, which is in- 
sufficient to explain the complexity and the transversality of school 
education as it is developing today in the context of classrooms with 
large groups of students, etc. 
5. 	 We may wonder if this model of education does not. belong specifically 
to the middle classes. There is perhaps amongst them an expectation for 
a certain type of behaviour between adults and youths, which does not 
always take on the same importance in the other strata of society. 
6. 	One may also question the fact that this view of education is thought 
solely in terms of an intense (and dynamic) personal relationship. A less 
compassionate relation between adult and youth may also offer possi- 
bilities for self-realization. The "pedagogical relationship" described by 
humanist pedagogics runs the risk of creating types of dependency 
which do not allow the youth to become independent and autonomous. 
7. 	 In this model, the meaning and the aim of education are placed too 
exclusively on a personal educational rapport. The relationship "in it- 
self' becomes the aim of education. But other factors influence the edu- 
cational process. The social functions of education must, for instance, 
be considered. Thus we are witnessing an over-investment in the "edu- 
cational relationship". The educational process therefore demands a 
critical discussion of the model based on this vision of the "pedagogical 
relationship". 
Theory nnnd Practice inn IEduncntionn 
In our historical presentation of the problems with humanist pedagogics, 
we have addressed the issue of the relationship between theory and practice 
in education and educational science several times. To thoroughly under- 
stand how humanist pedagogics conceived the relation between theory and 
practice, we shall now turn to the work of Herbart. Indeed, his understand- 
ing of this relationship constitutes the basis for both Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey's reflections, as well as for humanist pedagogics. 
In General Pedagogics, Herbart bases his understanding of the theory1 
practice relation on the following theory: 
"What we strive for in educating and in demanding of education certain things depends 
on the horizon we set ourselves" (Herbart 1968: 28). "From the educator, I expect sci- 
ence and the capacity to think" (Herbart 1968: 32). "Pedagogics is the science that the 
educator himself needs. He must also have a science to transmit. And I here confess that 
I am unable to conceive education without teaching" (Herbart 1968: 33). "Humanity 
continually educates itself through the thoughts it generates" (Herbart 1968: 41). 
These few quotes indicate that Herbart, dominated by the Enlightenment, 
starts with the idea that the educator's primordial task is to decrypt thought 
through science. This entails a differentiation between pedagogics as a 
"science" and pedagogics as an "art". The preoccupations of pedagogics as 
a "science" are the aim and object of education and its field of work: prac- 
tice. Pedagogics as an "art" is concerned with developing the skills that are 
necessary for teaching. This distinction between pedagogics as a "science" 
and pedagogics as an "art" corresponds to the distinction between a peda- 
gogics that is oriented towards theory, and a pedagogics that is more ori- 
ented towards practice. Between the two there is a gap that is not easily 
breached. To find a link between the two constitutes the educator's "tact" 
(the know-how), which is acquired progressively through "praxis": 
"There is, therefore, a preparation to art through science. It is only in action that one 
learns one's art and develops one's tact ... But even in action, only he who has first 
learned the science will learn the art" (Herbart 1964, vol. 1: 127 E.). 
Through these considerations, Herbart gives priority to the objectives of 
education: 
"It would suffice to orient the tact, which is naturally created during practice, according 
to conceptions regarding the content of education in order to have this tact act simulta- 
neously as servant to the theory and as regent of the practice, so that it may move, by 
decisions and rapid judgement, from the concrete relations of practice closer to the ide- 
als of conceptions" (Schmied-Kowarzik 1974: 144). 
Thus, for Herbart, theory has the upper hand over practice. Schleiermacher 
does not accept this domination of theory over practice. For him, the the- 
orylpractice relation is defined by a dialectics whereby the practice of edu- 
cation tends to have the advantage. The theory of education is linked to the 
practice of education on two levels. Firstly, practice is always preliminary 
to any theory, and secondly, theory is always based on historico-social re- 
ality, without renouncing the realization of its intentions: 
"In becoming particular, every theory needs to be linked to the facts without which 
there is no theory. Theory of education is the application of the speculative principle to 
certain given facts" (Schleiermacher 1965: 19). 
A theory of education which does not refer to concrete historico-social 
data, something that still seemed possible for Herbart, is thus relegated: 
"we therefore always return to the fact that a universally valid theory is im- 
possible" (Schleiermacher 1965: 22). Every educational practice needs a 
theory for the educator who takes on the normative and ethical claims of 
society. Through this appropriation, he can develop his educational art. 
Such an educational responsibility "rests on a moral perception that is part 
of a whole life context which includes pedagogics" (Schleiermacher 1965: 
27). 
In theory, the moral responsibility of pedagogics is influenced by its 
historical conditions. Through theory, the educator becomes conscious of 
an increasing tendency to moralisation, thanks to which he can then control 
educational action. And so, for Schleiermacher, life, or the pedagogico-so- 
cial practice, wins over theory. Whose task is it then to define the develop- 
ment tendencies of educational practice? 
"We now have nothing more to do in the theory than to expose pedagogical activity as 
the control or assistance of the child (and the combination of both these dimensions). 
We must leave to life itself the responsibility for what must be done in every moment. 
Theory only provides the service of a conscience thought out in practice, for where true 
conscience lies, there is also perception of the complexity of the educational task, which 
always goes beyond the present moment" (Schleiermacher 1965:53). 
Schleiermacher reduced the theory/practice problematic by taking for 
granted the increasing moralisation involved in the process of life. As a re- 
sult of this hypothesis and the priority of practice over theory, Schleier- 
macher failed to find a critical position in relation to social practice. This 
would have allowed him to question and verify the notion of a morality 
supposedly independent from life. Instead, his point of view excludes the 
idea that education, as a science, can be critical towards social practice. A 
similar reduction is found in Weniger's work on the theorylpractice rela- 
tionship. 
Weniger's 1929 Theory and Practice in Education linked him directly 
to the debate over the theorylpractice relation initiated, by Theodor Litt in 
Das Wesen des padagogischen Denkens (The Nature of Educational Think- 
ing). For Weniger, a study of the theory/practice relation should serve a 
better understanding of educational action, its theoretical and political con- 
ditions and the practical accomplishment of education. Pedagogics as a sci- 
ence holds the same responsibility towards the pupil as scientific pedagog- 
ics does towards educational action. For Weniger, the aim is to build a 
pedagogical theory that includes practice and its development. Such a the- 
ory is the result of pedagogical practice and formulates its development. 
The fact that pedagogical theory takes pedagogical practice as its starting 
point, &d that it interprets and determines it as has been described, demon- 
strates the specific scientific character of educational science. For a science 
of education which takes into account the practical problems of education, 
a classification of the rapport between theory and practice is necessary. 
Weniger therefore tries to differentiate his concept of theory along three 
lines: 
Firstly, he defines a theory of the first degree that describes the latent 
theory in practice. This cannot be conceptualised by the practitioner. It op- 
erates in his subconscious, affecting his perception of the field of education 
and the tasks achieved there. It is the result of forgotten socialisation proc- 
esses. Moreover, since this is a theory that one is not conscious of, it is very 
difficult to control. It is "the hidden rationality that exists in intellectual be- 
haviour, a force that summons, and an instance that has always existed 
within man" (Weniger 1953:16). 
From this, Weniger deduces a theory of the second degree which in- 
cludes the practitioners' know-how. Even if latent, it is not always expli- 
cated. One can become conscious of it, with the help of an explanatory ef- 
fort, and point out its function as a guide for educational action. For Weni- 
ger, it is "everything that is formulated in one way or another, that is at the 
disposal of the practitioners and that they use", even if it is not "conscious 
in the sense of a direct utility" (Weniger 1953 :17). 
Finally, Weniger develops a theory of the third degree whose object is 
the theorylpractice relation in practice. Its purpose is to highlight the the- 
orylpractice relation in the context of educational action. Starting with a 
basic definition of the theorylpractice rapport, this third degree theory aims 
to clarify and enlighten the theory applied in the educational field. To do 
so, it must refer to practice, since the theorylpractice relation is such that 
the theory depends on each given practice. "But it is not the sole function 
of the scientific theory of pedagogics to explain the state of things; its place 
is also the context of practice. It takes on the function of theory in practice 
as an active conscience, a clarification of the theories inherent to practice, a 
conscious pre-knowledge and an ulterior acquisition of consciousness. Fo- 
cusing, as the theory of theory, on the explanation of the relation between 
theory and practice, the theory of the third degree can be self-sufficient; 
when it observes from far and above what is happening in the field of edu- 
cation, it is intimately linked to the practice, it simply depends on it" (We- 
niger 1953: 19ff.). 
In order to properly understand the theory/practice relation in Weniger 
and in humanist pedagogics, one must realise that in this perspective, what 
is at stake is the construction of a theory of educational science that is only 
distinguishable from the direct educational act through its increasing ra- 
tionalisation. It is important that one understands that educational experi- 
ences are "in truth always the result of a questioning, that is to say, of a 
theory, even if inexplicit" (Weniger 1953: 11). This means that one must 
reach a theoretical enlightenment of theory in order for experiences to in- 
fluence the educational act. This can occur on different levels in the theo- 
retical elaboration. The theory of the first degree (which stems from the 
educational practice) defines the type and possibility of experiences which 
are transformed by the practitioner into principles, into rules of life, rou- 
tine, know-how, that is to say, into a theory of the second degree. However, 
since the practitioner's experiences are not always determined by second 
degree theories, a real theory must be expected to transform in a satisfac- 
tory manner first degree theory into second degree theory. 
Thus, according to Weniger, one of the central tasks of educational sci- 
ence is to allow a concordance between the theories of the first and second 
degree. But one wonders if this is possible, for the very difference between 
the two types of theory suggests that one cannot make them coincide: the- 
ory of the first degree cannot be verbally articulated; it cannot therefore be 
compared to that of the second degree. For if it were possible to articulate 
it, it would no longer be separable from the theory of the second degree. 
Numerous studies on the behaviour of teachers have brought to light the 
fact that educators tend to act on the basis of defined theories, but judge 
their acts on the basis of other theories. However, this does not provide any 
criteria to judge the superior validity of one or the other theory. To do so, 
one must consider Weniger's theory of the third degree, the "theoretician's 
theory". This assumes the function of theory in practice. It directly attaches 
itself to educational reality and tries to help the practitioner evaluate the 
practice in a satisfactory manner through a "pre-elucidation" and an "ulte- 
rior elucidation". To this extent, the third degree theory is more valid than 
the other two with whom it shares an engagement in practice while at the 
same time distinguishing itself from them. 
According to the master of this "traditional" hermeneutics, recognition 
and clarification of practice stem from a theoretical pre-comprehension 
through practice and the reflection that ensues (theory of the third degree). 
Weniger then goes on to demonstrates that the purpose of the third degree 
theory is to provide an explanation "of the state of theory and practice". 
This theory thus plays the role of a meta-theory. It develops a meta-theo- 
retical regulatory system for humanist pedagogics in which the issue of the 
theory/practice relation holds a central position. 
According to Weniger, "the pedagogical act ... is embedded in theory 
and protected by it. Practice contains theory as  the condition of its acts and 
becomes 'experience' through theory seen as the consequence of action" 
(Weniger 1953:16). The primacy of practice over theory is clearly under- 
lined here. Theory is conceptualised as an aide for the explanation of prac- 
tice, that is to say, primarily as an aide for 'the improvement of educational 
reality and the educational actions inherent to it. 
Long before H. Garfinkel or P. Bourdieu, Weniger explained the the- 
ory/practice relation using the model of a circle between theory and prac; 
tice. He realized that the necessity for a scientific theory only appears when 
the continuity of this circle is called into question. As long as the practice 
and its inherent norms are not called into question but are handled in the 
traditional framework of representations and models for the resolution of 
problems, only a given theory of practice is really necessary to direct and 
perfect this immanent practice. If, however, the inherited practice, with its 
norms and goals themselves inherited, is called into question, if theory can 
thus no longer be tied to the pre-given practice, then it must attempt to 
evaluate practice and give it new forms using new criteria. This means, in 
other words, that theory must first have a critical, and then a constructive 
function. Otherwise it can do nothing but sanction the given educational 
practice. When Critical Theory considered traditional educational practice 
as part of the bourgeois society and therefore as a practice to change the 
role of educational theory for the improvement of the educational practise 
was reconsidered and re-evaluated and led to a "revalorisation of theory", 
even though the primacy of educational practice within social practice has 
never been questioned. 
1. By opposing the traditionally normative gesture of pedagogics, the cur- 
rent of pedagogics influenced by human science (humanist pedagogics) 
claimed that education and educational science must take into account the 
historicity of their field. The purpose of this development was to move 
away from the idea that educational science could be independent from 
given historico-social conditions. This conception is still pertinent today. 
An understanding of history based on the history of ideas must be comple- 
mented by a socio-historical comprehension of the socialization of men- 
talities. 
2. For humanist pedagogics, educational reality is part of social reality. 
However, according to contemporary norms, its understanding of the struc- 
tures of society is rather undeveloped. It lacks a developed social theory 
upon which it could have then defined the missions of education in the 
context of social practice. Critical Theory later bridged this gap. 
3. Humanist pedagogics defined itself as a theory both of and for edu- 
cational practice. It saw itself as a science of action. As such, it developed a 
certain understanding of educational action. On certain levels this under- 
standing is still valid. 
4. The notion of a "pedagogical relationship" developed by humanist 
pedagogics could contribute to the development of a theory of educational 
interaction in today's education. However, the model is limited to the ex- 
tent that humanist pedagogics idealised this relationship by considering the 
educational situation solely in its terms. 
5. Consideration of the historicity of education and of the particular and 
unique character of each educational practice leads to a hermeneutic per- 
spective which was used extensively for the interpretation of historical 
texts. In the study of educational reality, which humanist pedagogics rec- 
ognized as  having a central function, the hermeneutic perspective was hardly 
used at all. Only recently has it been systematically referred to. Today, we 
believe that the hermeneutic method remained little employed by humanist 
pedagogics because it was not sufficiently enriched by an ideological- 
critical perspective. 
6. Because humanist pedagogics made little use of hermeneutics for the 
study of educational practice, it did not develop as a real "science of ex- 
perience" (following Dilthey's conception of human science as the science 
of experience or Erfahrungswissenschafi). Humanist pedagogics was thus 
undoubtedly incapable of basing its theoretical declarations on concrete 
educational processes as well as of engaging in theory-based practical re- 
forms. On the contrary, it idealised its theoretical declarations and took 
them for solutions to the problems of educational reality. This resulted in a 
distancing in relation to practice. Humanist pedagogics thus failed to live 
up to its ambitions to help improve educational reality. 
7. Humanist pedagogics based its right to autonomy and specificity as a 
science on the fact that no other science or discipline had claimed the re- 
sponsibility to analyse the educational process. Pedagogics thus took on the 
task of defending the individual rights of children against the demands of 
the "social powers". In the light of such clear promises of emancipation, 
the capacity of humanist pedagogics to carry out its claims may well be 
questioned. 
8. It were above all the representatives of critical rationalism who 
pointed out that the language of humanist pedagogics was not precise 
enough due to a lack of differentiation between "descriptive" and "norma- 
tive" affirmations, and due to the inexistence of a metatheory of normative 
principles. Humanist pedagogics did not have sufficient criteria to differ- 
entiate historically-given educational practice and the normative terms 
pertaining to this practice. Due to the fact that the reality of educational 
practice was replaced by normative representations of this reality, an ideali- 
sation .of the educational practice often occurred. This idealisation some- 
times led humanist pedagogics to consider legitimate what had in fact 
merely imposed itself historically. 

PART TWO 

Empirical Educational Science 


From the twentieth century onwards, empirical-analytical research became 
one of the constitutive elements of educational science. The aim of the em- 
pirical thrust was to enrich humanist pedagogics through experimental sci- 
entific research. This research wanted to prove that humanist pedagogics 
was "non-scientific". However, for a long time attempts made by the new 
current remained unsuccessful in challenging the dominant position held by 
humanist pedagogics. As a consequence, empirical pedagogics developed 
at the margins of educational science. 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, empirical educational science gained 
importance in relation to other scientific currents. The empirical tendency 
persistently stood up against humanist pedagogics' methodological naivety 
in describing contemporary educational reality, meaning the analysis of all 
processes, institutions and factors that determine education. On the con- 
ceptual, methodological and instrumental level, this tendency refers less to 
the German works of the twentieth century's first decades (that were at 
times still insuff~cient) than to American empirical research. For it is above 
all in the United States that, Erom the beginning of the twentieth century, 
under the influence of behaviourism, operationalism and positivism, em- 
pirical-analytical research became educational science's privileged per- 
spective. 
In the 1950s, during which German research in sociology and psychol- 
ogy was largely dominated by the Americans, the first empirical-analytical 
works. were produced in the Federal Republic of Germany. These were 
mostly carried out by young specialists in educational science, while the 
representatives of humanist pedagogics maintained a rather expectant and 
critical distance towards them. Contributions Erom other disciplines in the 
social sciences were crucial for the development of empirical-analytical re- 
search in the field of education. Thus, in examining the different issues re- 
lating to education, sociology and psychology were the first to show the 
relevance of empirical-analytical research in this field. Important studies in 
methodology had an influence on educational science, and as a result of 
this evolution, the tasks of educational science were expanded. It is in this 
context that the relevance of sociological, psychological, economical and 
political research was discovered. 
During the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, empirical research 
settled in the field of educational science, where it plays an important role 
today. The evolution of empirical research has been closely linked to 
efforts in educational reform. It was hoped that it would provide support to 
an educational policy in terms of quality, development and valorisation of 
the reforms, as well as from the point of view of research into a kind of 
social science more explicitly oriented towards education. These social ex- 
pectations still apply to empirical research in educational science today. In- 
deed, there is today no field of educational science in which empirical re- 
sults do not play an important role. This development has also affected the 
other social sciences which have increasingly shown an interest in the field 
of education. As scientists from different disciplines have come to examine 
similar or identical issues, the clear boundaries between disciplinary territo- 
ries have gradually disappeared. This has called for a distinction to be made 
between empirical research in educational science (educational research in 
the narrow sense) and research in education in a broader sense. The Ger- 
man Council (Deutscher Bildungsrat) for education formulates this distinc- 
tion as follows (1974): 
"Research in education can be approached in a broad sense or in a narrow sense. The 
narrow sense has always concerned research in teaching. The broad sense can refer to 
education as a whole and its reform in the context of the State and society, as well as to 
extra-curricular educational processes. Though one may squabble over the extent to 
which these borders are open, one may only speak of research in education when the 
task to be accomplished, which is the object of the research, refers, either theoretically 
or empirically, to formative processes (apprenticeship, teaching, socialization or educa- 
tional processes)." 
With reference to this distinction, it can be said that empirical research in 
educational science is present above all in educational research that is 
pedagogically oriented. According to this statement, the tasks and methods 
of educational science cannot be better defined than in the context of re- 
search from the perspective of social science. 
At present, about fifteen per cent of the members of the German Society 
for Educational Science (roughly three hundred people) work in an empiri- 
cal mode. The complexity of the object of research and the theorylpractice 
relation in the field of education raises numerous particular problems which 
have not to this day been successfully solved. Further difficult issues are 
the institutionalisation, organisation and financing of research, which re- 
veal the dependency of research on politics and the planning of education. 
After rather hesitant development in the first half of the twentieth cen- 
tury, becoming swifter in the '50s and '60s, empirical research represents 
today an uncontested field of educational science. Our presentation of em- 
pirical educational science must take into account this evolution. We shall 
therefore present the most significant moments of the evolution of this re- 
search by distinguishing educational science research in the narrow sense 
from educational research in a broader sense. This distinction will above all 
be made in relation to theoretical reflection, where the meta-theoretical 
system of principles that validate empirical research is defined. The scien- 
tific paradigm of critical rationalism is inherent to this research. Although 
the influence of critical rationalism on the practice of research can be called 
into question, it must be taken into account from an epistemological point 
of view. The encounter between critical rationalism and empiricism allows 
for a better comprehension of the epistemological situation of educational 
science. 
Tllne Empirical Approach to EdancaUionnal Science: 
BIistorical PerspecUives 
The paradigm of empirical pedagogics emerged in Germany at the turn of 
the twentieth century and struggled until into the 1960s to be recognized. 
During these seventy years, the current went through different, sometimes 
contradictory approaches. Four phases characterize this evolution until the 
arrival of critical rationalism and the dispute over positivism: 
1. 	The work of the two founding fathers of experimental pedagogics, W. 
August Lay (1912) and E. Meumann (1920). 
2. 	 The efforts of Else and Peter Petersen (1965) to found research on peda- 
gogical facts. 
3. 	The work of Aloys Fischer (1966) and Rudolf Lochner (1927; 1963), 
who sought to establish a descriptive educational science. 
4. 	 The efforts of Heinrich Roth to found a "realistic turn" in educational 
science. 
This evolution culminated in critical rationalism. 
l. ]Lay's and Meumann's IExperimentaP Pedagogics 
Right from the start of his career, W. August Lay, who published in 1896 A 
Guide to Writing and in 1898 Elements of Calcullrs in Small Classes, tried 
to verify through experiments the efficiency of specific teaching tech- 
niques. This work was completed by Lay's experimental didactics and the 
new, shortened version of his Experimental Pedagogics with a Particular 
Interest for Education through Action (1908). Central to these publications 
are experimental pedagogics and the new teaching-oriented research meth- 
ods, whose tasks are defined as follows: 
"We will demonstrate theoretically and practically that we are able to apply the experi- 
mental research method, experiments, statistics and cautious or systematic observation, 
with best results, in the pedagogical perspective, to obtain solutions to the questions of 
teaching and education" (Lay 1912: 1). 
Realising that experimental research is the most eMicient method in the 
natural sciences, Lay applied this method to pedagogics. Thus, he distin- 
guishes paedology, oriented towards questions pertaining to the body and 
soul of the child, and experimental pedagogics, interested in the practical 
questions relating to teaching and education. Experimental pedagogics 
must make use of experiments, statistics and systematic observation to 
solve practical questions. Lay describes the relationship between the two 
fields as follows: 
"It is not always easy to distinguish a 'paedological' exploration from an exploration in 
experimental pedagogics: both are experimental and deal with the development of 
youths, children, schoolboys and schoolgirls. Whereas 'pedological exploration' is only 
directed from a theoretical and not practical perspective, research in experimental peda- 
gogics aims to resolve practical questions, questions pertaining to education and teach- 
ing" (Lay 1912: 2). 
Experimental and empirical pedagogics are attributed the mission of solv- 
ing the practical questions of education. Lay and Meumann are committed 
to emphasizing the competence and responsibility of empirical-experimen- 
tal pedagogics in educational practice which constitutes, with its questions 
and problems, the field of empirical research. For them, there is no doubt 
that a reference to humanist pedagogics is necessary in order to anchor ex- 
perimental research in the educational practice. 
We have already described the efforts of humanist pedagogics to ac- 
quire relative autonomy and a scientific character; likewise, Meumann 
notes: 
"There is nothing missing in pedagogics for it to be a strictly systematic science: it has a 
homogenous system of concepts unified in the concept of education. Pedagogics has its 
own empirical foundations in experimental pedagogical research. It defines the aims of 
education itself, as no other science has done ... The aim of educational science is to 
establish a homogenous system of educational aims and rules or normative principles 
which must be followed. Knowledge of these aims can only be constructed on the basis 
of empirical experimental research anchored in life and humanity's engagement, above 
all in the present, but also in understanding the ways and means through which these 
aims may be attained . . . Pedagogics as a whole rests on empirical foundations . . . Ex-
perimental pedagogics reveals these empirical foundations only in as much as exact re- 
search becomes accessible" (Lay 191 2: 9-1 1). 
In experimental pedagogics, the following aspects are considered: 
"1. Everything that is defined through the nature of the child in education .. . 
2. 	 All that is decided directly in relation to educational work . . . 
3. 	 All the means, materials and topics of education .. . 
4. 	 The experiment ... as the strictest form of empirical research" (Lay 
1912: 11). 
The object of experimental pedagogics is "knowledge of the youth" in a 
wide sense. It creates the necessary conditions and tools for educational 
work. Educational work, from this point of view, rests on systematic com- 
. parative trials in the experiment. The purpose of the experiment is to obtain 
a vision of the "psychological causal context" and the global network of 
causes of precise phenomena in the educational practice. Furthermore, veri- 
fication and improvement of the means, educational tools and topics of 
study, as well as the development of experiments as a central element of re- 
search in empirical pedagogics belong to the tasks of experimental peda- 
gogics. Also belonging to the empirical research process are: the genetic 
method, collection of childhood memories and childhood performances, di- 
rect observation of procedures, and the development of experimental peda- 
gogical work. According to Lay, experimental pedagogics is a science 
which defines "each pedagogical phenomenon as the effect of certain 
c a u s e s h d  he concludes that the results of experiments "require judgement 
and pedagogical measures that must be confirmed in practice by scientific 
experimentation in relation to reality" (Lay 1912:12ff.). 
This perspective of empirical educational science supposes that herme- 
neutical analysis based on the significance of contexts in the field of edu- 
cation cannot be admitted as scientific. This limitation of the scientific 
paradigm to the validity of the causal principle is not acceptable in educa- 
tional science. From empirical results, data is drawn that is not directly 
pedagogical. For it to become pedagogically relevant, the empirical results 
must first be interpreted. Constructive conclusions are thus required that are 
based on these interpretations of the acts of research. Such constructions 
are no longer part of an empirical process. Indeed, most crucial to this ap- 
proach is the ability to criticise and verify hypotheses by means of induc- 
tive methods. Moreover, normative determinations and the assumption that 
scientific experiments can be verified on the basis of educational practice 
also play an essential role. However, scientific experiments are not always 
verified through educational practice, and the concordance between cause 
and effect is not always established in experimental situations or in daily 
practice. As a result, a number of simplifications were to be made in ex- 
perimental pedagogics which were later criticized in the context of critical 
rationalism. 
2. Else and Peter Petersen's Study of Pedagogical Facts 
(Padagogische Tatsachen forsch ung) 
Another significant moment in empirical research within educational sci- 
ence was marked by Else and Peter Petersen and their research into peda- 
gogical facts which started in 1927-1928. Their methods and procedures 
only became operational at the beginning of the 1930s. Their aim was to 
elaborate a methodology for educational science based on the empirical 
method developed in psychology or sociology. Peter Petersen began by no- 
ticing that available studies were unable to answer certain pedagogical 
questions. Approving the ideas of the new school, the Petersens tried to de- 
velop these in their research at the university school of IBna. In their study 
of pedagogical facts, they found the means to carry out their ideas on 
teaching, social learning, the organisation of school and the training of 
teachers. 
To reshape and improve school education, the Petersens used the 
method of observation. Else Petersen introduced an "analysis of adequately 
planified and articulated observations" (E. and P. Petersen 1965: 102). 
Within this framework, data to be observed is selected. The observation 
activity concentrates on actions and behaviour that are relevant to educa- 
tion. It is oriented towards the pedagogical situation and its description, 
which is central to the study offacts in pedagogics. It is defined as 
' l  ...problem situations (from which questions arise), constructed according to a plan, are 
destined to offer the best environment for the maturation of purely human constructions 
and the intellectual powers of children and youths. Problem situations stimulate youths 
and give them a variety of tasks through which each and everyone of them must express 
himself as a whole being, a whole personality, and must be active, that is, act and re- 
spond by taking and expressing sides quite completely" (E. & P. Petersen 1965: 109). 
Examination of the above-defined pedagogical situation is difficult as the 
envisaged problems are very complex. Numerous elements are involved in 
the pedagogical situation. In the context of the university school of IBna, 
one must count among others: the organisation of teaching and apprentice- 
ship given through comprehensive teaching, group work and getting be- 
yond the principle of annual promotion, the ensuing roles played by teacher 
and pupil, and the insistence on evaluation of oneself and one's school- 
mates. 
One of the objectives of observing the pedagogical situation is to help 
teachers improve their educational sensitivity. Observation must essentially 
be carried out by the teachers themselves, and have its place in the training 
of teachers, as well as in continuous in-service training. According to Else 
and Peter Petersen, the teachers' disposition and capacity to explore their 
educational practice must be developed in order for them to attain a knowl- 
edge that can help them improve both their behaviour as teachers as well as 
the social position of education. 
At the centre of the study of pedagogical facts is the written account of 
the observations arising fiom a pedagogical situation. E. Petersen has de- 
scribed this process as a recording. The concept of "recording" is used in 
three ways. It can be: 
a) a written description; 
b) the use of an observation grid; 
c) a definitive recording. 
On a methodological level, three processes are thus distinguished: individ- 
ual recording (observation of a pupil, for example), the recording of the 
teacher and the recording of the whole, described as follows by P. Petersen: 
"1. Singular recording, which means the recording of a single child or at most two or 
three children. 
2. 	Recording of the teacher, that is to say, what the teacher does in relation to his stu-
dents and to his environment, how he acts and what he says, how he expresses him- 
self and behaves. 
3. Comprehensive recording, that is to say, the global pedagogical situation, 'every- 
thing that is incited by the teacher and the pupil on the pedagogical level, from the 
hour-long lesson in an over-crowded state school classroom to the optional lesson 
with few children as found in the new schools' " (Petersen 1965: 135). 
The goals these methods aim at are diverse. 
In the study of individual cases, the first aim is to understand a particu- 
lar child's relationship to the world of school, the relationship between 
teacher and child, the relationship between the children themselves, and to 
discover the positive and negative effects of educational influences on the 
child. 
In recording the teacher the aim is to "record" the teacher as a singular 
person in all his actions and communication references. 
Comprehensive recording of the group is particularly significant to un- 
derstand the pedagogical situation, but it is also the most challenging on the 
methodological and technological level. It captures the different cornrnuni- 
cations as they unravel. In each recording, "every significant unit must be 
recorded". 
What this definition of the objectives clearly suggests is that the study 
of pedagogical facts is a preamble to comprehensive social research. In this 
context, facts will be recorded, not just mechanically as behavioural data, 
but also as constituted social situations, organised by a meaning. 
For all forms of recording, the following criteria must be taken into ac- 
count: 
"1. The pedagogical situation must be authentic. 
2. Recording must be target-oriented. 
3. The description of the situation must be detailed, if possible word by 
word. 
4. The recording must be continuous. 
5. Transcription of the situation must be clear. 
6. The transcription must be pure" (Petersen 1965: 244). 
Four further elements must be taken into account: 
1. time 
2. the evaluation of what is to be recorded 
3. the recording performance itself 
4. interpretations (comments, supplementary remarks, etc.). 
The information thus gathered must then be organised, systematized and 
interpreted. Petersen distinguishes: 
1. a descriptive method 
2. a phenomenological method 
3. a logical method 
4. a numerical method 
5. a causal method. 
Finally, there are five different ways of presenting the acquired and organ- 
ised information: 
1. 	 geometric presentation 
2. 	 graphic presentation 
3. 	 presentation through image or book 
4. 	 the static or dynamic observation mode 
5. 	 the differentiation between cause and effect. 
Numerous points of criticism could certainly be formulated in the context 
of a comprehensive evaluation of this qualitative pedagogical research. 
They would in part apply to the specific situation of the university school 
of IBna, its exclusive focus on questions of organisation, and the insuffi- 
ciency of interpretative criteria. Nevertheless, E. and P..Petersen's study of 
pedagogical facts certainly constituted an interesting enlargement of em- 
pirical research in educational science because it tried to link directly the 
research and its results to the people concerned, and thus to improve their 
active competences. This can be facilitated by the use of the hermeneutic 
method of interpretation which results in more concrete annotations and in 
the improvement of educational practice. 
The use of these methods of observation and the results they produce 
allow for a reflexive attitude towards educational practice. This reflexive 
relation is far less possible within empirical-analytical procedures which, as 
in Lay's and Meurnann's experimental pedagogics, only allow for causal 
explanations and corresponding prognoses. Finally, the relative ease of 
procedures allows them to be engaged in the initial and in-service training 
of teachers. This comprehensive research of teaching has been the object of 
particular interest in recent years. In the context of the development of ac- 
tion-research and the use of qualitative or ethnographic research, a renewed 
esteem for the study of pedagogical facts is apparent. 
3. 	 Anoys Fischer's and Rudolf ILochner's 
Descriptive Pedagogics 
Neither Lay's and Meumann's experimental pedagogics nor the Petersen's 
study of pedagogical facts were to have a large influence on educational 
science. This is equally true of the work of Aloys Fischer and Rudolf Loch- 
ner who developed the foundations of a descriptive educational science in 
1914 and 1927that were illustrations of positive educational science. In his 
1914 article on descriptive pedagogics in which he describes his pro- 
gramme, Fischer speaks of a distinction between education as a fact, and 
education'as a mission. In Fischer's words: 
"Whoever teaches, educates and attempts to improve is not engaged in the production of 
knowledge. The educator's task does not involve knowing the child who is being taught, 
or knowing the topic that is being transmitted through teaching, or even the methods 
being used. The educator must of course master the discipline that he wishes to trans- 
mit. It also goes without saying that he necessarily acquires other types of knowledge 
while performing the educational activity, such as for instance regarding the particulari- 
ties of each child. Furthermore, the educator will necessarily acquire experiences with 
regard to the effects of his pedagogical initiatives and make use of them again instinc- 
tively" (Fischer 1966:83). 
What is interesting here is the extent to which'the practitioner is described 
negatively, and his ability to think contested, although he is forced to act. 
Recognition and understanding of educational practice and research is at- 
tributed solely to the theoretician who must here be distinguished clearly 
ffom the practitioner. It rests on the theoretician to achieve the "decisive 
task of a pure pedagogical theory, as disinterested as possible, to serve 
knowledge". This theory is prepared through an objective description, 
without theory, presenting the starting point for a systematic theoretical 
formation. Fischer explains: 
"At the beginning of any science, one must expose, that is to say question what consti- 
tutes the things and factual content that are described with the words of the given field; 
that is, question this factual content in its natural and pre-theoretical constitution, as the 
facts that make the problems of the science called into question at all possible" (Fischer 
1966: 91). 
What Fischer expects of pure description is clear. Inspired by Husserl 
(whom he does not seem to understand very well), he infers that recogni- 
tion of an object is possible without the invocation of theory and without 
referring to hermeneutical and analytical procedures. However, since the 
emergence of critical rationalism, this vision of an objective knowledge de- 
void of pre-established theory is no longer defendable in today's social sci- 
ences. What is described as a pedagogical fact or as a pedagogical situa- 
tion depends on a preconception, which is itself determined historically, 
socially and linguistically. In fact, the distinction between normative and 
descriptive pedagogics amounts to a step backwards in relation to humanist 
pedagogics which had demonstrated the shortcomings of normative peda- 
gogics. Furthermore, descriptive pedagogics can also be criticized for 
claiming to be the only scientific pedagogy. 
In a similar manner, Lochner describes educational science as a descrip- 
tive science devoid of value judgement: 
"Educational science is theoretical, autonomous, pure science . . . based on educational 
phenomena as a whole. It observes and describes them based on the abundance of other 
phenomena in life, and explains, tries to understand and interpret them. It sets out to un- 
derstand, visualize and cast light on selected pieces of reality with the help of previously 
acquired provisional concepts. From this point of view, educational science is a pheno- 
menological discipline or a literal search for meaning, and nothing more. Thus, with 
regard to its positive, descriptive, empirical and explicative character, pedagogics can 
hardly be distinguished from other similar sciences, such as economics, psychology, or 
biology" (Lochner 1963:415).  
In accordance with Fischer's conception of educational science, this scien- 
tific perspective represents the clearest incarnation of a positivist position 
in educational science. It comprises the demand for a unity and independ- 
ence of science in relation to values, and a formalism to describe the sci- 
ence of education and the establishment of facts. 
0. 	 The "Realistic Turn" in IEducatiomal Science 
qWeinricUn Roth) 
A reorientation of educational science, opposed to humanist pedagogics, 
imposed itself in the 1960s as the "realistic turn in educational science". 
Humanist pedagogics, which again had become dominant after the Second 
World War, excluded the realm of experimental scientific research, which 
was no longer accepted. Humanist pedagogics thus remained far beneath its 
claims to being a theory of educational practice for educational practice. 
On the contrary, humanist pedagogics had set itself the objective of 
historico-idealizing research and had transformed the hermeneutic-histori- 
cal method into the only method of educational science. It therefore be- 
came necessary to recognize what could be important for educational prac- 
tice. 
Finally, another consequence of this exclusivity was that educational 
science was failing to integrate the bulk of empirically-obtained knowledge 
which was nevertheless important for pedagogics. A variety of sciences 
such as psychology, sociology but also psychoanalysis and the economics 
of education had elaborated useful information. 
With Roth's critique of his era's humanist pedagogics on the one hand, 
and with the realisation, on the other hand, that with the development of 
knowledge in the social sciences the danger of educational science being 
dissolved into these close disciplines had increased, the "realistic turn" of 
educational science established itself as: 
1. 	 an attempt to go against the tendency of pedagogics to disintegrate into 
a multitude of independent sciences (e.g. sociology, psychology ...), 
2. 	 an effort to avoid losing a pedagogic interest in educational action, 
3. 	 an attempt to remedy the rupture between theory and practice in action. 
For Roth, the idea was not only to replace humanist.pedagogics with a 
practical educational science or by welcoming the increasingly important 
results of empirical research being carried out in other social sciences. 
Rather, his efforts were to focus on constituting a new educational science 
as a discipline in its own right. 
Against pedagogics' tendency towards disintegration into a multitude of 
independent sciences, Roth always remained faithhl to his idea of educa- 
tional science as an "integrative science" that should incorporate into an 
educational problematic the knowledge accumulated in the sciences (most 
of which were the product of empirical work). Because, in his view, only 
through integrating them could one prevent such knowledge and facts re- 
maining without effect. This could be achieved thanks to a "pedagogical 
anthropology" which looks at man's capacity to both learn, evolve and to 
give his life meaning (Roth 1965: 215). But is such a possibility of integra- 
tion at all feasible? Especially considering the fact that the knowledge ac- 
quired in other fields results fiom different questions. Indeed, an interest in 
knowledge does not necessarily imply an interest in pedagogics. 'Such an 
attempt at integration, insofar as it believes itself capable of correcting the 
social and historico-scientific conditions which have led to this specializa- 
tion and to this disintegration of modem science, is more than dubious. 
To avoid the loss of pedagogical interest in educational action, the unity 
between theory and practice mist be reaffirmed (notably in relation to hu- 
manist pedagogics which often disregarded practice). But this is valid above 
all for empirical research which sometimes does not take into account the 
interest for pedagogical action. It is only when educational science takes 
into account the interest for pedagogical action that it can contribute to the 
improvement of practice (an issue which does not arise in the other disci- 
plines). 
Finally, in the context of a "realistic turn" of educational science, a new 
definition of the relationship between theory and practice is needed, which 
Roth (1965) and Thiersch (1966) tried to find. They agreed that in the in- 
terest of providing a solution to the practical problems of educational real- 
ity, cooperation between hermeneutical and empirical procedures in educa- 
tional science must be established, as they are complementary. Indeed, both 
postures have a similar object even if they differ in terms of their form and 
results. Hermeneutics must contribute to the formulation of questions and 
the interpretation of empirically-obtained results. Its field of action is there- 
fore the control of practice. Practice then takes on the issue of collecting in- 
formation on educational reality which can contribute to elaborating more 
precise knowledge on education. 
Roth and Thiersch hoped to find a common ground between pedagogi- 
cal theory and an empiricism that is "blind" to the significance of practices. 
Aware of the difficulties of conciliating theory and practice, Thiersch 
wanted his work to be considered as an attempt to develop "medium term" 
theories. Although this idea of the complementarity of hermeneutics and 
practice is indeed interesting, the legitimacy of this attempt must be ques- 
tioned, for with it hermeneutics becomes functionalised and objectified in a 
way that seems contradictory to its original vocation. 
VII 
Critical Rationalism in Educational Science 
Before analysing the scientific foundations of critical rationalism, let us 
present the work of Brezinka, which is very much oriented towards critical 
rationalism. It is the most interesting model of an educational science based 
on the scientific programme of critical rationalism. Brezinka considers edu- 
cational science to be a "sub-science" of the universal science that he pos- 
tulates. A series of exemplary elements characterising critical rationalism 
can be established on the basis of his work: 
- the distinction between context of discovery and context of justification 
- the contradiction between the normative decisions that affect value bases 
and science's claim to independence from values in the field of objects; 
- negation of the inductive principle that remains valid in positivism; 
- the deductive construction of theories that are confirmed by the fact that 
there is no falsification; 
- intersubjective falsification when it comes to the verification of affirma- 
tion~. 
Critical rationalism imposed itself within the social sciences in the mid 
1960s. Brezinka drew on it largely in his 1971 presentation of his pro- 
gramme for the "development of pedagogics towards educational science". 
His starting point is the dispute over positivism, which was gaining ground 
at that time. Beyond the controversies over positivist works (such as Lay's 
and Meumann's experimental pedagogics or Fischer's and Lochner's de- 
scriptive pedagogics), the controversy originating from Brezinka's pro- 
gramme finds originality in the radical and dogmatic character of his argu- 
mentation. 
Influenced by Lochner, who said that "the goals of educational science 
are not to influence action but the knowledge of facts'' (c. f. Brezinka 1972: 
25 f.), Brezinka developed the problem of a science whose purpose would 
be the acquisition of knowledge and whose mission is not to question the 
conditions of data production or the conditions of its evaluation. He writes: 
"The makers of science are expected to produce knowledge, not to shape 
the world or influence men. They behave theoretically, not practically. The 
goal of science is knowledge. The goal of a science of reality is the knowl- 
edge of reality" (Brezinka 1972: 20). And fi.uther on: "The unity of science 
can be defined by two sets of questions: on the one hind, definition of the 
objectives and tasks of science, and on the other hand, the general rules of 
the scientific method. It is then possible to differentiate science from the 
other fields of human activity such as politics, economics, education, art, 
and religion" (Brezinka 1972: 20). 
Science is thus defined as an activity of research oriented towards the 
knowledge of reality thanks to the scientific method. Can such a conception 
of educational science be employed for all the tasks that are taken into ac- 
count in the field of educational science or in pedagogics up to the present 
day? Certainly not. Brezinka must therefore extend his scientific programme. 
In accordance with analytical philosophy, he supplements educational 
science (1) with the philosophy of education (2) and practical pedagogics 
(3). He then divides educational science in the broad sense into a theoreti- 
cal educational science (a) and a historiography of education (b). The latter 
is essentially conceptualised on the basis of theory. The field of educational 
philosophy is also divided into the epistemology of pedagogical statements, 
and moral philosophy. Practical pedagogics is defined following the con- 
cept of apprenticeship. 
1. IEducaaiounan Science 
The basic scientific principles on which a theoretical educational science 
and the historiography of education are founded, are defined within the 
framework of educational science in general. 
The central task of educational science, applying also to the sub-divi- 
sions we have just defined, is to uncover the conditions for attaining the 
object of education. Educational science describes facts, but it is oriented 
above all towards a search for causality (Brezinka 1972:31). "Regarding the 
problems which must be solved within the framework of educational prac- 
tice, educational science is primarily a technological science" (ibid.,32). "It 
can be said that educational science searches for the conditions for realising 
educational objectives which are influenced by action or are relevant to 
action" (ibid., 33). From this derives the fact that the object of educational 
science constitutes an essential element of education. "Educational science 
is described as the system of intersubjectively verifiable statements in the 
field of educational reality (field of objects)" (ibid., 34). 
"Educational science can thus be defined as a special discipline, as a 
sub-science of the integrated science of social behaviour or of the psychic 
objectifications of man" (Brezinka 1972: 38). Thus the tasks of educational 
theory and the historiography of education are defined: to explore the ob- 
ject of educational science on the basis of different proceedings. 
a) Educational Theory 
The aim of educational theory, which Brezinka simply describes as educa- 
tional science, is to acquire nomological knowledge. In this process educa- 
tional science cannot avoid making use of so-called facts and predefined 
hypotheses about educational reality. On the contrary, it is grounded in its 
own questioning and the effort to solve the issues raised. As Brezinka says, 
"science does not begin with fact, but with problems and the quest to solve 
them" (Brezinka 1972: 50). 
Following Popper and Albert, the purpose of research can be described 
as the acquisition of theories. Theory here is understood as "the set of no- 
mological hypotheses which are tied to one another, and to which one ap- 
peals in order to explain and justify the behaviour of a phenomenon in this 
realm" (Albert 1973: 76). These hypotheses must be formulated in state- 
ments of the type "if . . ., then ..." (conditional sentences). As scientific 
propositions, they can be verified intersubjectively. In contrast to classical 
positivism, according to which one could verify theoretical propositions in- 
ductively, Brezinka appropriate~ Popper's falsification principle. Accord- 
ing to him, science cannot demonstrate the veracity of its affirmations from 
the inside. It can only confront the hypotheses or phenomena with experi- 
ence. According to Popper, an empirico-scientific system should be able to 
be falsified when faced with experience. But if the falsification fails, the 
hypothesis or the theory can be considered to have been validated. 
For example, the statement "all swans are white" can be formulated as 
"there are no swans that are not white". But if one happens to see a black 
swan, one can use the formula 'Were are", that is to say, %ere are black 
swans". This is a basic statement which rejects and falsifies the basic state- 
ment "there are no". One then points out the contradiction between the two 
affirmations and deduces fiom it the falsehood of the general rule on the 
basis of a specific experience that contradicts it. 
Brezinka thus requires that within educational science a language be 
used in which a distinction can be made between the language of observa- 
tion and the language of theory, in order to avoid the "information gap" (as 
critical rationalism calls it) which characterizes the language of traditional 
pedagogics. 
Furthermore, Brezinka holds to the distinction, which is characteristic 
of critical rationalism, between the context of how a situation is described 
and the context of how scientific statements are justified. The question of 
the origins of questions and hypotheses belongs to the realm of psychology. 
One can only determine whether an affirmation can be considered scientific 
by falsifying it with the scientific method in the context of justification. 
Regarding the system of scientific propositions, still with reference to Al- 
bert, the need for science's independence in relation to value judgements is 
also underlined. 
Compared to positivism, the scientific statement system integrates an 
important relativisation of the claim to independence in relation to values. 
We will examine further below the distinction between description and ex- 
planation of facts. This differentiation is pertinent in education, and is nec- 
essary in the realm of educational science. The use of scientific knowledge 
(constructed in this way in educational science) in the field of educational 
practice will, finally, and most importantly, be examined in the context of 
the use of theories for technological ends or for forecasting. 
b) The Wistoriography of Education 
Educational theory must draw on the results of the historical science of 
education or the historiography of education in order to be able to fully 
grasp its object, that is, educational reality. Without this historical approach, 
important dimensions of educational reality would be ignored. In contrast 
to a theoretical object, the complexity of the object of historical science 
means that it can only ever be partly or indirectly comprehensible. 
The difference between the goals of these two spheres of research is 
more important: "In the realm of theory, one tries to find universal laws, to 
construct a systematic theory of one's field of work. At the forefront of 
historical science is an interest in reconstructing past events intellectually" 
(Brezinka 1971: 91). According to Brezinka, emphasis on the uniqueness of 
the historical phenomenon goes back to the influence of historicism. Early 
in his work he became increasingly interested in the study of phenomena 
and regularities in addition to his interest in a science of historical reality. 
Historical research relies on the need to base its theories on as large a 
body of experiences as possible. Historical research is also u se l l  to educa- 
tional theory. "It is necessary to be able to choose, describe in a differenti- 
ated fashion and explain relevant historical phenomena" (Brezinka 1971: 
95). Regarding the historico-systematic mode of observation of humanist 
pedagogics, Brezinka explains that Dilthey's disciples "do not use the word 
systematic in the same sense as theoretic in rationalist theory, but rather as 
a synonym ofphilosophic, in a world-vision inspiring itself fiom a philoso- 
phy of life" (Brezinka 1971:96). For him, the historical writings of hu- 
manist pedagogics are thus non-historical. They are even, he claims, non- 
scientific insofar as they claim an ability to propose norms for education. 
This claim remains a task for the moral philosophy of education. For his 
project of a universal science, Brezinka also refuses to distinguish explana- 
lion from comprehension and thus to admit hermeneutics as a method for 
educational science. Furthermore, he requires that one differentiate be- 
tween the history of pedagogical ideas and the history of educational real- 
ity. It is on the latter that a historiography of education must concentrate. 
We shall criticize Brezinka's theory at a later point. Let us now, how- 
ever, emphasize the following: Brezinka's definition of history, which he 
presents as a "conceptual reconstruction of unique past events" seems lim- 
ited, for such a reconsuuction is only a moment of the historical work. The 
fact that interpretation of the past is always linked to interpretation of the 
present, which is in turn explained by its own past, is essential to the his- 
tory of education as a science. 
This process, according to which interpretation of the past is at the cen- 
tre of present issues sends us back to interpretation and to what is specific 
about historical writings. Fundamentally, it is essential to reconstruct the 
past as the sum of past events. What is possible, is to try to recognize the 
past on the basis of existing sources and to interpret these in the present. 
Benner continues this reflection as follows: "We admit that historical 
facts, as past realities, are given to us specifically through the present con- 
tinuity of their significance" (Benner 1973: 257 @. 
To reduce the historical perspective as Brezinka does, or to underesti- 
mate historical writings in educational science, has the effect of making the 
scientific programme of the discipline a-historical. 
To justify the need for a philosophy of education we must start with the 
following question: "What problems arise within educational action and re- 
flection on education, which cannot be addressed by an educational science 
oriented towards practice?" (Brezinka 197 1 :117). The following are among 
such issues: 
- defining the goals of education; 
- the philosophical foundations of educational science; 
- the hermeneutics of educational reality; 
- the philosophy of education and ideological pedagogics. 
In order to systematically address the issues which. arise within these 
realms, Brezinka distinguishes two main fields of intervention for the "phi- 
losophy of education": a) "moral philosophy of education", and b) "theory 
of pedagogical statements". 
a) Epistemology of Pedagogical Statements 
Epistemology of pedagogical statements includes logical analysis of con- 
cepts and pedagogical statements, the methodology of knowledge in edu- 
cational science, and the critique of the theory of the knowledge of educa- 
tional systems. Logical analysis of pedagogical concepts begins with "an 
explanation of the concepts through definitions and analyses of meaning, 
explores everyday language and tries to shed light upon the concepts and 
statements. The epistemology further rests on the critique of educational 
systems. Its aim is to distinguish the different methods that are used and it 
must differentiate normative statements from empirical statements" (Bre- 
zinka 1971: 142ff.). 
b) Moral Philosophy of Education 
Brezinka's definition of educational science as a technological science free 
of all values, the task of which consists in examining the possibilities of 
attaining given goals, calls for a moral philosophy of education to build and 
insure the choice of goals. Its mission is defined as follows: "To examine 
ethical value judgements that relate to a duty in the context of education, 
and to justify them, here is the task of a moral philosophy of education" 
(Brezinka 1971:151). According to Brezinka, moral philosophy must ac- 
complish that which educational science cannot. It must help education af- 
firm itself in the face of dominating power struggles and - as humanist 
pedagogics had indicated - defend the rights of children against other so- 
cial powers. According to Brezinka, this task is the responsibility of moral 
philosophy which must allow scope for the advantages of a normative re- 
flection in the field of education to be developed. This is necessary to the 
extent that Brezinka shows the ethics of educational goals remain rather 
undeveloped, and the norms of educational behaviour are unclear. Brezinka 
recommends a better distinction between moral and practical issues, and 
between "ethical" points of view and "questions touching upon ethical is- 
sues". He then develops a way of solving the normative problems of edu- 
cation, for which the background was defined by Albert as follows: 
"The central task of a critical moral philosophy is not the analysis of ethical texts, but 
the critical verification of moral principles, and the critique of predominant ethical sys- 
tems and dominant ethics" (Albert 1971, quoted by Brezinka 1972: 157). 
The "solution to the normative problems of education" thus defined must 
take into account the following points: 
"1. 	One must try to justify the normative formulas through intelligent argumentations 
(or good reasons) and not by referring to any arbitrary authority. 
2. The rules of logic must be followed. 
3. The educational goals demanded by the person to educate, as well as the norms and 
tasks of the educator, must be clearly formulated. 
4. The pedagogical demands must be verified with regard to their feasibility. 
5. 	The pedagogical demands must be verified in relation to their expected effects" 
(Brezinka 1972: 159-1 62). 
Brezinka's work thus constructs a moral philosophy of education that 
stands in contrast to a neutral educational science fiee of values. This phi- 
losophy must make explicit the issues of norms and values, which are es- 
sential in the field of education. Yet this perspective can be criticized, for 
the issues regarding the moral philosophy of education are only addressed 
analytically. The normativity of the mentioned contexts is only envisaged 
in terms of given norms which are the object of a rational analysis. It re- 
mains impossible to play upon the evolution of the normative representa- 
tions themselves. A moral philosophy defined in these terms is therefore 
unable to push back the limits of educational science. It remains tied to 
things as they are, and only has a limited scope in which to stand back, as it 
were, and develop criticism. Moral philosophy of this kind thus tends to be 
affirmative. A second shortcoming of the moral philosophy of education is 
that it is developed in an a-historical fashion and without any link to soci- 
ety. Normative representations can, however, only be interpreted ade- 
quately when the given historical context is properly taken into account. 
Science must reflect a given social context, and be considered in its rela- 
tionship to the dominant structures of the existing social order. 
Finally, concerning certain values not already questioned: 
"Our world and our lives have always been perceived as having an immanent meaning 
and value. We cannot escape this. They cannot even be described as value-free; every 
description and every explhation is always founded on the hypothesis that meaning and 
value are admitted" (Bollnow 1971:702). 
Ultimately, and in contrast to hermeneutics and to the philosophy of lan- 
guage, Brezinka does not allow any room in his moral philosophy for a 
confrontation between normative hypotheses and any action or particular 
social knowledge. 
3. PracQicaU Pedagogics 
Practical pedagogics is defined by Brezinka as a "normative theory of edu- 
cation, applicable to action or to the explanation of action" (Brezinka 
197 1 :189). Brezinka thus associates himself with a model of teaching and a 
teaching of education such as have been developed in various manners 
throughout the history of educational science. Teachers cannot wait "until 
social research has become more accessible" (Brezinka 1971: 202). Educa- 
tional practice, according to Brezinka, cannot be defined in parallel to 
practical psychology, as a science of applied education. Neither should it be 
developed any fiuther as a science. Its task is not to separate practice from 
educational directives. On the contrary, it must exercise a motivating influ- 
ence on the educator to prompt him to fiuther his own development. In the 
German-speaking countries, humanist pedagogics is considered the repre- 
sentative form of educational practice. In its confrontation with reality, it 
becomes aware of theory's limits and encourages examination of the prob- 
lems caused by practical theories of education. This refers to the issue of 
educational science's sphere of validity as a theoretical science of the real, 
following Brezinka's definition, but also to the following question: To what 
extent, in order for it to attain its goal, can educational practice be ap- 
proached scientifically? In the context of a practical pedagogics free of sci- 
ence and of philosophy, the following points must be taken into account: 
1. Information about the educational reality must be provided for the peo- 
ple concerned, and access facilitated to orientation advice for action or 
educational policy. 
2. 	 The meaning of the propositions must be clear. 
3. 	 The rules of logic must be followed. 
4. 	 In value judgements, the perspectives fiom which one judges must be 
defined. 
5.  	The content of norms must be formulated as clearly as possible. 
6. 	The language of the pedagogical practice must be clear and easy to 
understand. 
7. 	 The emotional use of language should not dominate or replace its cog- 
nitive use, but serve to emotionally defend rational moral judgements. 
A critical observation must be made in relation to this concept of practical 
pedagogics: it is clear that Brezinka does not believe in the possibility of a 
practical science. In his view, for reasons relating to epistemology, one 
must distinguish science, educational teaching and practical theory. Science 
cannot direct practice. This task falls to educational practice as the link 
between practice and science. To the extent, however, that educational prac- 
tice is defined as a field that must be conceived as separate from science, it 
is not the object of scientific knowledge, but remains in the antechamber of 
science. As a consequence, the field of educational practice remains en- 
tirely unexplored. Educational practice is not one of the priorities of sci- 
ence. It offers few opportunities of change for the better. In our opinion, 
yielding autonomy to a separate field of educational science that is respon- 
sible for the educational action of practical pedagogics can be in the inter- 
est neither of practice, nor of educational science, which would thereby 
elude its field of intervention, namely the field of practice. This distinction 
is at the origin of a reductionistic conception of both science and practice. 
It prevents the issue of practice fiom being envisaged as the constitutive is- 
sue for educational science. Satisfactory reflection on this constitutive issue 
for educational science supposes that educational science be considered a 
practical science of action. 
4.Critique 
Brezinka's project ought to have been to justify his three-fold division of 
pedagogics into educational science, philosophy of education and practical 
pedagogics; yet this justification never occurs. Such a division is difficult 
to justify, even in relation to the objectives of critical realism. Indeed, these 
different dimensions are too tightly interdependent. In the scientific prac- 
tice of concrete educational science, there is an interpenetration of norms 
and descriptions. Further, since a verification of the descriptions' validity is 
impossible, and the researcher's choices precede such descriptions, the 
logical pre-eminence of descriptions in relation to norms is not as clear-cut 
as Brezinka would hope. his demonstrates that the system developed by 
Brezinka would lead to a loss of recognition for each element and its con- 
text, rather than constitute a further explanation of its value in the compre- 
hensive social programme. 
Brezinka's distinction is also problematic in that it introduces hierarchy 
between the different sub-domains. Thus, he grants science a greater social 
value. He judges dishonest the fact that philosophers and pedagogues wish 
to benefit from science's social prestige. 
As Brezinka never tries to bring together, through synthesis, fields that 
are analytically separate, his comprehensive educational theory utterly 
fails. This is due to the ideology of critical rationalism, according to which 
there is only one scientific paradigm. Brezinka's project of a comprehen- 
sive educational theory would encounter another difficulty: it would con- 
tradict science's claim to being a science of synthesis and a union of all the 
sub-sciences. Critique could also be applied to the ideological assumption 
that science can be thought independently of its objects. 
Finally, Brezinka's stance is not pertinent with regard to his own objec- 
tives. By reducing educational science to a scientific comprehension of the 
unity of science, the causal-analytical methods become the only recognized 
scientific procedure. Ever since the debate over positivism, the idea of a 
unique and unified epistemology has been challenged by dialectical thought 
and comprehensive scientific research. Regarding educational science, to 
recognize educational reality as a science is not pertinent, as this paradigm 
only allows for the acquisition of a certain scientific knowledge. Further- 
more, this process only allows one to make use of the results of a science of 
educational practice on a technological level. It is only following the acqui- 
sition of scientific knowledge that is independent of values that the results 
of science can be applied to elaborate technologies that can help educa- 
tional practice. Thus, it is important to guarantee a distinction between the 
acquisition of knowledge and its application in practice. To the extent that, 
applied to technologies, scientific results are used to influence and change 
practices, the relationship between science and practice can be character- 
ised in terms of the inferiority of practice in relation to epistemology. 
We can see that the theory-practice relationship is defined differently 
here than from the perspective of humanist pedagogics (Geisteswissen- 
scha$liche Padagogik), which placed practice above theory. The conse- 
quence of Brezinka's position for educational science is that educational 
practice is defined as the achievement of a science and its corresponding 
technology. Brezinka overestimates the scientific perspective. Thus, the 
relationship between science and practice, defined in this way, remains to 
be questioned, since technologies would exercise a domination over prac- 
tices without one being clearly aware of them. 
WlnI 
The SciemUific Programme off Critical RaUiormalLm 
Having sketched out the evolution of empirical educational science, let us 
now introduce the central elements of critical rationalism. Several aspects 
of the ideology of critical rationalism are relevant to empirical research in 
educational science, even if they have not been integrated into a compre- 
hensive system thereof. For it is above all through its ideology that critical 
rationalism has influenced educational science. 
Seven central elements can be distinguished within critical rationalism: 
- definition and explication of concepts, 
- the operationalisation of concepts, 
- scientific afirmations, 
- theories, hypotheses, and their falsification, 
- technology as fields for the application of theories, 
- value judgements, value bases and evaluations, 
- new developments in critical rationalism. 
1. Definition and IExpnication of Concepts 
Critical rationalism is based on the fact that science cannot grasp reality di- 
rectly but that the latter is always related to the former through language, 
and becomes its object as a "world of experiences more or less intentionally 
pre-constructed through concepts", of which the direct consequence is that 
"this intellectual mediation between object and subject of experience is a 
sine qua non condition for the processes of scientific knowledge" (Mayntz et 
al. 1972: 9). Thus, it is necessary to define words and the content of repre- 
sentations. With the help of this effort in definition, one can arrive at simple 
and unambiguous propositions. Every definition is constructed through 
language, which implies certain values. This reference to values that are a 
priori embedded in language cannot be avoided. However, such values are 
to be distinguished from the evaluations that occur in value judgements. 
Behind the notion of definition, one can distinguish either a real or a 
nominal definition. In the first case, the aim is to define a things' "being". 
In the second case, the aim is to formalize a "situation" in which a given 
formulation A1 must have the same meaning as another formulation A2, of 
which the meaning is presumed to be known. A nominal definition is thus 
composed of two parts: 
1. 	A first formulation, the meaning of which is assumed to be understood, 
is referred to as Definiens. 
2. 	A second formulation, which must be synonymous to the Definiens, is 
called DeJiniendum. 
Depending on the objective of knowledge, each definition has different ad- 
vantages and drawbacks. Critical rationalism often grants greater impor- 
tance to the nominal definition due to its greater precision in defining the 
themes examined in empirical research. 
In the context of an empirical research project, concepts are defined by 
taking into account historical contexts and by the choice of signification 
given to the concept. During the definition process, the three following as-
pects must be considered: 
1. 	The definition must not be circular, that is to say, the DeJiniens must be 
definable without reference to the DeJiniendum. (Counter-example: 
comprehension = the fact of allowing thought; thought =proof of com- 
prehension) 
2. 	The definition must not, as far as possible, be negative. 
3. 	The concepts used in the Definiens must have as precise and univocal a 
meaning as possible. 
The form and definition of concepts must be clarified. One can then see 
how, for empirical research, the type and function of applied concepts may 
vary. For example, concepts can serve to claisify propositions, evaluate 
them, orient individual action or render communication possible. In these 
cases the function of the concepts is respectively, to affirm, evaluate, act 
and communicate. Three conditions must be met for concepts to fulfil these 
functions: 
Firstly, there must be correlation and continuity in the classification of 
the relation between concepts and words (i.e. the content of defined words). 
Secondly, and in close bearing to the precedent, concepts must have been 
defined precisely and accurately. Thirdly, the concepts applied to empirical 
research must have an empirical dimension. 
Apart from reflection on the definition of concepts, critical rationalism 
calls for clarification and explanation of concepts with a broad bearing. 
Here a strong reference to language must be emphasized. Concepts must 
refer to contents of representation without ambiguity, in order to facilitate 
an intersubjective verification of the propositions. Concepts used in every- 
day language often have a different meaning in a scientific context. There 
are a variety of ways according to which the precise meaning of concepts 
can be clarified in the context of research. The pertinence of a concept can 
be judged with the criteria of similitude and exactitude. We speak of si- 
militude when there is but a marginal difference between a word's meaning 
in the scientific context and its usage in everyday life. Exactitude implies 
that the meaning of a given concept is constant and invariable. However, 
despite the need for precision in concepts, one must avoid excessively sim- 
plifying a complex state of affairs by supplementary clarifications that are 
"artificial". Popper himself condemned the "exaggerated" demand for con- 
cept clarification when he explained that although to him the idea that the 
exactitude of science or of scientific language could depend on the exacti- 
tude of concepts was certainly completely plausible, he still considered it to 
be no more than a simple preconception (Popper 1992). 
2. The Operintiounalisintionn of Concepts 
The demand for conceptual exactitude extends to the application of concepts 
used in the context of empirical research. Explicit concept definitions are 
thus further developed as a consequence of their application to the extent 
that "an application is used for a research operation, and with its help one 
can decide whether the phenomenon described in this way is satisfactory ... 
An applicable definition is therefore the result of a translation process that 
is necessary in technical or research operations" (Mayntz et al. 1972: 18). 
An applicable definition supposes an empirical application, though one must 
distinguish concepts that have a direct empirical application from those that 
have an indirect empirical application. The fmt are characterized by the 
fact that the described phenomena are directly usable, whereas the second 
are only indirectly usable. Included among the latter are processes of politi- 
cal education, and the fostering of social skills, etc. The usual definitions of 
these concepts offer no help in verifying their empirical applicability. 
In order to confirm their applicability empirically, certain indicators 
have been conceived. If the phenomena that are taken as indicators can be 
demonstrated empirically, the phenomena described by the original concept 
can also considered as given. A full examination of the concepts and their 
operationalisation as required by "operationalism" is certainly no longer 
possible in the light of modem knowledge of the philosophy of language, 
but the demand for a correlation between concept and application is main- 
tained. "Interpretations and conclusions remain uncertain between the ap- 
plication (i.e., that which is really measured) and the phenomenon that the 
concept evokes" (Mayntz et al. 1972: 22). The use of indicators thus de-
pends on their validity, that is to say, their ability to account for a non-per- 
ceptible phenomenon, and their reliability, that is to say, whether or not 
they resist repetitive usage. The difficulties involved in applying concepts 
through chosen indicators have already been mentioned. In educational sci- 
ence over the last few years, this problem has been encountered in the 
context of the development of school curricula. But the. indicators' reliabil- 
ity itself necessitates the exactitude and precision of processes and instru- 
ments, which is what one is trying to establish through the standardisation 
of processes and instruments. 
There is no doubt of the necessity to make the object of research opera- 
tional in the context of empirical research. However, the danger of trans- 
forming objects of research through their application is underlined fi-om 
various angles. There is indeed a sense in which reality may not amount to 
the sum of the sub-aspects into which objects of research are divided. 
3. Scientific Affirmations 
What we have just spoken of refers to different types of statements, which 
are employed in the classical social sciences. The following are to be dis- 
tinguished: 
1. logical statements whose meaning or value can be examined in terms of 
the very signs used in the affirmation; 
2. 	 analytical statements; 
3. 	 contradictory statements (true logical phrases, false logical phrases); 
4. 	 prescriptive statements (those which introduce indications, implications, 
or positions held in relation to events or phenomena); 
5. 	 empirical statements (affirmations made about objects and relations to 
reality. In contrast to prescriptive statements, these constitute factual as- 
sertions). 
In specific cases, empirical statements are divided into a) descriptions of 
unique events, which can be defined precisely in time, and b) hypotheses 
that are based on isolated facts and used to build definitions. Different phe- 
nomena are put into relation here, so that one can define interdependencies. 
Hypotheses are particularly significant to empirical research, for they con- 
tain presuppositions that can mostly be formulated according to the models 
Tf . . . then ..."or "the more .. . the more ...". 
Furthermore, different statements must be distinguished from one an- 
other according to their respective validity claim, relation to reality, and 
field of validity, as well as according to their respective evaluation and in- 
formation content. 
A validity claim can be established a priori or a posteriori. In the first 
case, a claim is made that cannot be verified in reality. In the second case, 
validity is possible through confrontation with reality. 
&other characteristic of statements is their pertinence to reality. 
Regarding the evaluation of statements, a logical and an empirical level 
are to be distinguished. The linguistic symbols contained in statements re- 
late to logic. They must obey the rules of logic. The possibility of contra- 
diction is evaluated; the statements' deduction must be correct. Empirical 
evaluation of a statement is formulated on the basis of its relation to reality. 
Three conditions must be taken into account: the realism of the statement, 
logical correctness, and the information content of the statement. This last 
level is of great importance to critical rationalism. According to Popper, it 
is one of the most central characteristics of the empirico-analytical system. 
It is only to be found in those statements that have a bearing on reality, i.e., 
in ones that have empirical content or explanatory force. 
In empirico-analytical research in social science "if-then" affirmations 
play an important part. Their purpose is to find affirmations that offer: 
a) as precise consequences as possible for as big a number of events as 
possible, 
b) as precise qualities as possible for as large a quantity of objects as 
possible. 
Hypotheses are functional when they fulfil both these conditions. 
Following Popper's falsification principle (Popper 1992), a hypothesis 
is rehted as soon as a single element appears that should not appear ac- 
cording to the hypothesis. The hypothesis' information content is all the 
stronger if the latter exclude more affirmations. From here arises the fol- 
lowing question: how are we to conceive a statement in order to increase its 
information content? The "if' leads to greater precision the more it reduces 
the statement's information content. 
Critical rationalism proposes an epistemology based on the theory of 
language. Wittgenstein underlined the notion that isolated statements are 
only valuable in the context of a defined "language game". Indeed, lan- 
guage must constitute the basis of any definition of the criteria of "validity" 
and "realism". 
4. The Falsification of Theories and Hypotheses 
According to Popper, theory represents a net which we cast to catch "the 
world" - in order to rationalize, explain and dominate it. We are always 
busy tightening the net's mesh. 
Theories are thematically oriented towards different fields of study. 
They constitute the logical link between hypotheses and the statements that 
are logically deduced from axioms. Theories are considered falsified when 
a single statement contradicts the hypothesis. In order to verify a theory it 
must therefore be transformed into hypotheses. Through such theories or 
hypotheses, statements can be further generalised. These explain an in- 
creasingly wide field of reality. 
The main problem here is to grasp the truth value of empirical theories. 
It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the context of discovery and 
the context of justification. In the first case, issues relating to the existence 
of theories must be explained, and in the second case, the intersubjective 
truth of the hypotheses in their relation to reality must be proven. Popper 
neglected the context of discovery. Indeed, he writes: "A study of the con- 
text of theory construction seems neither possible nor desirable for the pur- 
pose of a logical analysis." Popper prefers to insist on logical analysis 
which is primarily concerned with questions of legitimacy, such as whether 
a statement can be justified, and if yes, how? Does it logically depend on 
other statements, does it contradict them, etc. At the centre of critical ra- 
tionalism, there is a methodology which helps one to avoid logical errors 
and thus bring us closer to truth. 
In the positivism of the past, truth had to be deduced from affirmations 
with the help of the induction principle. One was thus able, through the de- 
scription of observations and experiences, to construct them into hypotheses 
or theories. Hypotheses thus had to be verified in their relation to reality. In 
practical terms this implied a full examination of reality. However, since 
this is rarely possible, verification of a hypothesis with universalistic claims 
is in fact impossible. Hypotheses are not verifiable; as Popper showed, they 
can only be invalidated. Accordingly he defines the method of critical veri- 
fication of theories, which can lead to their inference or confirmation: 
"Logically speaking, conclusions are drawn from non-founded anticipations of the idea, 
of the hypothesis and of the theoretical system. Deductions are compared with one an- 
other and with other statements in order to put into perspective the logical ties (e.g., 
equivalences, conclusions, links, contradictions) that exist between them" popper 
1992: 7). 
The logic of the conclusions must be verified, for it can reveal contradic- 
tions. Verification must also bear on the legitimate character of the theory. 
It must compare the evaluated theory with other theories to see if it allows 
progress. It must also evaluate the theory in relation to its practical utility. 
The deductive verification process of hypotheses or theories requires 
one to reduce all statements down to basic affmations, which can then be 
confronted with reality. The logical process of falsification can be de- 
scribed as follows: 
1) 	The drawing up of a nomological hypothesis: "When people fall out of 
a plane in flight, they die." 
2) 	A logical transformation of the nomological hypothesis into a "there is 
no" type sentence: "There is no-one who has fallen out of a plane in 
flight and who has survived." 
3) 	The drawing up of a second singular statement: "On the 23rd of April 
1995 at 9 PM, John Smith fell out of a plane in flight 10 km South of 
Nairobi and survived." 
4) 	The logical deduction of a general statement of the "there is" type based 
on the original sentence: "There are people who have fallen out of a 
plane in flight and who have survived." 
5) 	Confrontation of statements 2 and 4. If both are in contradiction, the hy- 
pothesis is invalidated. The affirmation "There is no-one who has fallen 
out of a plane in flight and who has survived" is false because there are 
people "who have fallen out of a plane in flight and who have survived". 
This argumentation refers back to the Hempel-Oppenheim model which 
allows the formulation of prognostics. According to this model, prognostics 
have the same structure as explanations. When a universal law binds two 
phenomena to each other, we can formulate a prognostic: the occurrence of 
the first phenomenon guarantees the occurrence of the second. 
The structure of an explanation is characterized by the fact that the re- 
ality that must be explained (Explanandum) is given in the shape of a de-
scription or of several statements, whereas the explicative element (Expla- 
nans) is composed of two types of aflhnations. It must include at least one 
nomological hypothesis or a law, as well as at least one singular descriptive 
statement. We can offer the following schema: 
1. Law + 2. Contextual condition =Explanans. 

Sentences to be explained based on 1. and 2. = Explanandum. 

From an example we can deduce the explicative process: 

Hypothesisflaw: if there is a law according to which all metal is an electri- 

cal conductor. 

Contextual condition: and if a given rod is made of metal, 

Explanandum: then this rod is an electrical conductor. 

Specification of a logical argument must not hide the difficulties that exist 
on the level of the theory of knowledge. Basic hypotheses and statements 
are not on the same level as perception. They are about the labelling of re- 
ality. They refer to a verbally transmitted reality. Concordance between re- 
ality and statement is always but relative, although it is the central objective 
of empirical analytical research. Doubts always remain as to the concor- 
dance between a base statement and reality: this implies that there can be 
no guaranteed verification. For critical rationalism, it is the researcher who 
accepts or refuses the base statement. Truth then becomes a matter of con- 
sensus within the "scientific community". 
The more theories or hypotheses withstand falsification attempts, the 
stronger they emerge, and thus the more efficient. To the succession of ex- 
aminations is added the value of the instruments used and the number of 
falsification attempts. In social science, information is fiuther limited by 
the fact that generalisations cannot be made without being situated in space 
and time. 
Social science uses hypotheses that have non-deterministic validity 
claims, that is to say, problematic hypotheses (= hypotheses with a degree 
of likelihood). Their validity claim is statistical and can only be expressed 
as a percentage. For example: "about ninety five per cent of convicted peo- 
ple will commit a fiuther offence". This statement signifies that there is a 
ninety five per cent likelihood that a convicted felon will commit a fbrther 
offence. For the abstract concept of probability this means that the affirma- 
tion "When objects have the characteristic A, there is a probability P that 
they will have characteristic B" signifies: "in every set N of objects having 
the characteristic A, P xN objects have the characteristic B". 
This affirmation implies that statistical laws are in principle equivalent 
to deterministic laws. There is however a double space for error in statisti- 
cal hypotheses: that one.consider true what is false, and refute true hy- 
potheses because of contradictory experimental data. Due to greater factors 
of uncertainty in probability, it is conventionally the task of the scientific 
community to establish consensus between scientists as to what is to be 
considered valid. 
Due to science's demand for independence in relation to values, critical 
rationalism has few criteria at its disposal to judge the historico-social in-
fluences at play in the construction of consensus. This is one limit to this 
scientific paradigm, which some of its defenders wish to correct by calling 
on the Critical Theory of the Frankhrt School. 
5. TechnnoPogy as a Field for the Applicatioun of Theories 
According to critical rationalism, theories serve to explain, deliver prog- 
nostic~, and develop technologies. The logical structure of these fields of 
application is the same in all three cases. In social science, technology as a 
field for the application of theories is particularly important. It is distin- 
guished from prognostics by its immediate application in practice. Tech- 
nologies are procedures and products that are independent from whoever 
establishes them, and allow an intervention in the field of social practice. 
Logical structure in the processes of explanation and application of the 
technologies is the same, it allows for the extension to the goal-and-means 
model of thought. Technologies (such as teaching methods, for example) 
are used to attain specific goals that have been pre-defined by theory. Proc- 
esses that do not pertain to this godmeans relation are excluded, for they 
do not allow one to reach the goal that has been set. To the extent that one's 
purpose is to educate, technologies are a means to attain this goal. If a 
technology becomes too dominant, we are faced with a danger that has 
been underlined by Critical Theory. 
The relationship between theory and practice is such that practice is de- 
pendent on theory. Practice must be defined according to the goals stated in 
the theory. The possibility of finding foundations, within educational prac- 
tice, to the goals given in the theory is excluded. The theory-practice rela- 
tion is conceived as a dependence of practice on theory, as can be seen 
clearly in the goals-means relationship. 
Due to this dependence of practice on theory, which appears in the utili- 
sation of technologies, the utilisation of technologies in educational science 
- as well as in other social sciences - leads to a contradiction between sci- 
entists and practitioners. 
With the development of the "interactionist" perspective, the limits of 
the classical concept of technology should be easier to overcome. The the- 
ory-practice relationship should no longer be defined according to a linear, 
rational orientation. Rather, it should be seen in the context of an "interac- 
tion" between theory and practice. However, it is by no means clear that the 
criteria developed by epistemology in order for that technology to be put 
into practice are to be found in relation to such a "technology". Does it 
make sense to even speak of "technology" in the way it was understood by 
critical rationalism? It would seem not. For the "interactionist" perspective 
in education leads to a substantial modification of the hermeneutic process, 
which cannot be perceived by critical rationalism. 
6. Value Judgements, Base Values, and Evaluations 
Hans Albert suggests distinguishing "value judgements", "base values", 
and "evaluation" (Albert 1965). By "value judgement", he means the solely 
normative affirmations in scientific language (for example: "teachers must 
be fair"). He fiuther distinguishes science's "base values" as containing the 
normative frameworks of the different sciences (values to which scientific 
works refer, their effects on theoretical scientific hypotheses, the variety of 
research themes, the choice of given techniques or methods as well as the 
choices concerning the application of the research results). Finally, he dis- 
tinguishes those studies in which values are the field of study of a science, 
of which the empirical examination of normative statements springing from 
it are a part, for example: "twenty three per cent of children going to school 
have serious psychosocial problems." 
According to critical rationalism, such an affirmation is not normative 
but descriptive. It can be verified on the basis of critical rationalism's foun- 
dations. This distinction between different types of values allows critical 
rationalism to justify a science independent of value judgements. 
But one problem remains: with the demand for independence from 
value judgements, the problems of social practice remain scientifically un- 
solvable. By remaining faithfbl to the idea of a science free of all value 
judgement, a conscious development of practice through science becomes 
impossible. Criticism of the idea of science's independence from values is 
valid both in positivism and in critical rationalism. In classical positivism, 
normative statements are considered empty of meaning, which excludes 
from the realm of an intersubjective discussion any value-anchored prac- 
tice. The problem is further developed by critical rationalism in which 
statements and norms are made into the objects of research. But their sig- 
nificance in the context of social practice remains undiscussed. 
Albert formulated a series of meta-theoretical rules to be used to verify 
normative statements. On the one hand, the logic of normative statements 
must be analysed and confronted with possible logical contradictions. 
Normative statements must therefore be examined in order to reveal 
whether "in the process of their justification metaphysical statements oc- 
cur". On the other hand, the relation of normative statements to reality must 
be examined in order to verify that the requirements they contain are at- 
tainable. As for the fact that critical rationalism's system of meta-theoreti- 
cal rules can be deduced from the critical verification of statements (both 
descriptive and normative), one wonders what meaning the idea of inde- 
pendence can still have. This question has been raised by positivism. 
Throughout the controversy, one sees clearly how difficult it is for critical 
rationalism to justify its own meta-theory. Albert underlines the irrational 
character of a choice of theory. According to Habermas (1972), this knowl- 
edge is in fact no more than an act of faith. For Albert there is but one al- 
ternative, "between a blind choice and a choice of which the consequences 
have been perceived with open eyes, and constitutes therefore solid knowl- 
edge" (Albert 1972: 297 E). This difficulty shows that even in critical ra- 
tionalism, the opposition between the principle of "critical examination" 
and the principle of "justification'' cannot be maintained throughout. 
7. Further Developments in Critical Rationaanism 
We shall now turn our attention to certain issues relating to the construction 
of theories and critical verification. 
If reality can only be apprehended with the help of theories, Feyerabend 
argued that it is necessary to maximize the evaluation of knowledge. To do 
so, he developed two principles that allow the progress of science: the 
"principle of proliferationyy (Proliferationsprinzip)and the "principle of in- 
sistence/limitation" (Prinzip der Beharrlichkeit). Based on the first princi- 
ple, he inferred that it is necessary to elaborate theories in discordance with 
the spirit of the times (Feyerabend 1965). Feyerabend sought to develop as 
many alternatives as possible, even in the context of well-established theo- 
ries. Such alternatives are necessary, he claimed, since they may reveal 
elements that call into question accepted theories. Thus, the evaluation of 
socially accepted theories is no longer achieved through a confrontation 
with facts or basic statements, but rather through conftontation with com- 
peting theories. For Feyerabend, a pluralism of theories has become neces- . 
sary because it is the condition for any knowledge claiming to be objective. 
But Feyerabend also recognized that it is not sufficient to take into account 
the "proliferation principle" for the critique of theories. He also called upon 
the "principle of limitation". In scientific practice, a theory is not automati- 
cally abandoned when contradictory points of view emerge. This tension 
allows for reinforcement and a progressive analysis. The fact of .recogniz- 
ing or rejecting a theory can only be solved in the course of historical de- 
velopment. Critical rationalism acquires here - as with Popper - a histori- 
cal dimension to complete the structural analysis. Feyerabend thus formu- 
lated two principles necessary to the development of science. 
There remains the question of the link between these two contradictory 
principles. Feyerabend opts for an anarchist theory of knowledge which 
"elevates classical proliferation to the rank of a superior principle", rather 
than for a scientific stagnation which would be the "necessary consequence 
of the limitation maxim". 
Lakatos can be seen to have developed and refined the classical falsifi- 
cation process conceived by Popper. Whereas the verification of theories is 
at the centre of Popper's methodology, Lakatos considers the scientific 
research programme as the encompassing perspective to be studied. As 
opposed to theory taken for itself, the research programme's "why" is char- 
acterized by its continuity. In this context, the theories recognized as unac- 
ceptable are replaced by better ones, without prejudice to the research pro- 
gramme's continuity, which must be maintained in order to guarantee the 
identity and continuity of the research programme and the theories linked 
to it, which are reformulated or modified and established in a new form 
throughout the course of the research programme. In opposition to Popper, 
Lakatos considers it rational and scientifically justifiable to keep theories 
despite their falsification, as moments of a process. 
,Lakatos goes even further in rejecting the validity of Popper's falsifica- 
tion principle by trying to apply it to Popper's own theories. He develops a 
meta-criterion for the verification of scientific methodology. A theory is 
thus to be rejected if it is in contradiction with recognized basic statements. 
But furthermore, a theory of rationality must be rejected if it is in contra- 
diction with the normative statements accepted by the community of re- 
searchers. 
Popper himself had to admit that there are examples in scientific history 
which would be considered non-scientific according to his own scientific 
principles, but which nevertheless remain recognized as being of great sci- 
entific importance by the scientific community today. 
Without developing the discussion any further, let us accept two con- 
clusions that are important for critical rationalism. On the one hand, with 
Feyerabend, the falsification principle as Popper developed it finds itself 
relativised. On the other hand, what is highlighted is the dependence of 
theories on the researchers' community that decides what is to be consid- 
ered "the progress of knowledge and an increasing convergence of our sci- 
entific theories towards truth". 
By attacking the absolutism of the falsification principle, due to the fact 
that scientific theory is moving closer and closer to scientific practice, rec- 
ognition of the importance of the researchers' community allows for recog- 
nition of the part played by the history of science. Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyer- 
abend and Popper all worked towards this end. Today, this history must be 
considered an important part of critical rationalism. For ultimately, the va- 
lidity of theories is decided through a historical process. Rationalism thus 
takes into account an essential argument of Critical Theory. Certain ques- 
tions remaining unanswered in critical rationalism have found an answer in 
scientific practice. The question of the significance of contexts is taken into 
account on the level of scientific practice. One can thus see an example of 
the opposition between epistemology and scientific practice. 
Engaged Empirical Research 
Based on a criticism of the priority granted by critical rationalism to sci- 
ence's neutrality in relation to values, a series of works for the development 
of empirical research in educational science was published between 1965 
and 1975. This research introduced action as educational science's new 
paradigm. 
In this chapter, we shall approach the works of Mollenhauer, Blankertz, 
Lempert and Klafki, who attempted to define the link between empirical 
research and Critical Theory in the context of educational science. Re- 
garding the possibilities and limits of emancipating research in educational 
science, certain questions must be formulated: 
-	 How are we to define the relation between a critical theory of education 
and committed empirical research? 
-	How can research in education satisfy scientific demands and at the 
same time contribute to the development of humanity? 
-	 Finally, how is the relation between the different paradigms (such as 
"empirical", "hermeneutical", "critical") to be conceived in educational 
science? 
1. Mollenhauer (1966) is among the authors in educational science who 
have examined the need to establish a link between empirico-analytical re- 
search and the project of emancipation. The starting point of his reflection 
is the distinction between a) an educational science oriented towards the 
validity of norms and their justification, which he describes as being a sci- 
ence of principle, the purpose of which is to transmit general conceptual 
frameworks for educational action, and b) an educational science that for- 
mulates concrete rules for everyday educational action to be applied within 
defined conditions of space and time. Critical rationalism goes in the direc- 
tion of an experience-based educational science, with its scientific auton- 
omy. Regarding the link between principles and experience, Mollenhauer 
suggests that theoretical statements must be linked to experience. He indi- 
cates that basic conceptions are necessary for an engaged educational sci- 
ence, conceptions which, from the start, do not contradict the logic of the 
statements established on the basis of that which is empirically observable. 
Mollenhauer criticizes the linear method of critical rationalism: he points to 
its "conservative moment" which limits possible questions in order to coin- 
cide with existing methods. All too often, the answers from that which is 
being questioned are induced by the researcher's very questions. 
In the empirical method, the object of research is independent, or con- 
structed as distant. This leads to a reification of the object. This reification 
is in contradiction with the objectives of empirical research, which sets out 
to be a "critical reaction to the existing process of man's reification in 
bourgeois society". Mollenhauer explains that empirical research may in 
fact be led astray from its aim to the extent that the instrument of research 
limits one's capacity to find a theory that is independent from the instru- 
ment of research. The aim of the quested theory would be to establish an 
interest that legitimises empirical research and also carries it out. 
All too often, the empirical approach searches for an application in so- 
cial sciences, which is contrary to its purpose of constituting a critical reac- 
tion to the reification of man. To remedy this difficulty, a superior Critical 
Theory must be elaborated. 
This general theory of education grants a hdarnental role to engage- 
ment and the targets of emancipation that must respect meta-theory. Practi- 
cal research linked to issues in the field must remain in concordance with 
the objectives of development and emancipation. This choice implies re- 
nouncing science's neutrality in relation to those values asserted by the 
partisans of critical rationalism. The aims of empirical research in educa- 
tional science must then, on the contrary, be put into perspective with the 
general aims of an engaged education. 
2. Blankertz (1966) follows the same path. He indicates that theory is 
the tension between possibility and reality. This vision of theory's critical 
character lays the requirement of a theory of education which refers to the 
whole, to totality, and goes beyond empirical theories (which are reductive 
and lack involvement). All practice is thought out in relation to its objec- 
tives. The researcher as well as the practitioner can maintain a dialectical 
tension between theory and empirical research. Pedagogical theory can 
only go beyond the framework of empirical research theories because it fits 
into a normative framework which it must justify. 
Blankertz insists on the link to be established between education and 
the "transcendental" subject. As a social phenomenon, pedagogics finds its 
meaning and orientation in emancipation and action. A theory understood 
in this way criticizes the reification and alienation of human kind. Educa- 
tional theory must therefore be situated on another level than that of prac- 
tice, not out of contempt for practice, but because practice must be founded 
on a project that goes beyond it. 
3. Lempert's work emphasizes the notion of engaged research. His aim 
is to articulate research and action. Lempert's starting point is the issue of 
defining goals and the possibility of developing a practice based on these 
goals, and what the consequences are for research. Three aspects of empiri- 
cal research must be taken into account: 
a) Educational research, like all research, is defined by its aims, i.e., it is 
not a question of choosing between neutral research and engaged re- 
search, but rather between blind research and one that is aware of its 
own engagement. 
b) On an intersubjective level, one must be able to evaluate the research on 
the basis of the legitimacy of its basic principles. 
c) New interests help redefine the tasks of educational research. 
By taking these three aspects into account, Lempert comes to require that 
educational research be engaged: it must be both critical and self-reflexive. 
The goals of educational research must not be limited to an individual or 
group perspective, but directed towards the interests of humanity at large in 
its historical evolution. 
In his formulation of the programme of engaged research: following Ha-
bermas (1969), Lempert distinguishes technical, practical and emancipatory 
knowledge and interests, according to which he defines the following three 
paradigms: the empirico-analytical, the historico-hermeneutical, and the cri- 
tical-emancipatory. These three paradigms are significant in the context of 
research in educational science, but the emancipatory interest is dominant. 
Interest in technical knowledge is closely affiliated with empirico-ana- 
lytical research. It aims at the technical utility of objectified processes, the 
rationalisation of work and the technological utilisation of knowledge. 
Practical interest concentrates on developing the subject in its orienta- 
tion towards action, as well as on improving communication processes. 
Finally, emancipatory interest introduces engaged research in educa- 
tional science in such a way as to help man find autonomy by freeing him 
fiom constraints of all kinds. "Emancipation struggles against constraints 
which are not only due to material violence, but also to the power of preju- 
dice and ideologies. This power must be investigated at its roots and ana- 
lysed critically through self-reflection" (Lempert 1970: 318). 
The link between the first two objects of interest and engagement in 
educational science affects the content of research and requires the trans- 
mission of research results to the subjects implied in it. Educational proc- 
esses thus involve: 
-	 analysing the conditions of dominance rarely taken into account in the 
educational field, 
-	 deducing the knowledge that they contribute to the horizon of individ- 
ual understanding, 
-	 evaluating the results of this second phase. 
4. Klafki conceives educational science as critical and constructive science. 
For him, practice must be incorporated into an educational science that in- 
tegrates the different paradigms outlined above. 
Critical empirical research must define its hypotheses and evaluate its 
results on the basis of its own goals. It must be developed through a critical 
questioning of ideologies, and through an orientation of analysis and criti- 
cism that is based on the idea of man's liberty in a fiee and equal society. 
In the context of a socio-critical educational science, following Klafki, 
one can describe the relationship between empirical research and the her- 
meneutical method as a dynamic and reciprocal process: hermeneutics 
develops problematics and hypotheses; empirical research verifies these 
hypotheses through experiments. Hermeneutics evaluates the results thus 
acquired, and deduces fiom them new hypotheses for new empirical re- 
search. In this process, the complementarity of hermeneutics, empirical 
research and Critical Theory is clearly visible. Empirical research enables 
us to establish new rules or laws. But these laws may be analysed by 
ideological critique, and perhaps modified. 
Summary and Outlook 
1. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, in its critical opposition to 
humanist pedagogics, which by concentrating on the history of educational 
science obscured the dimension of experience in the development of edu- 
cational practice, empirical educational science has shifted the focus of 
educational science onto experimental scientific research. Empirical edu- 
cational science is considered a positive science whose task is to enable the 
transformation of "facts" about educational reality into knowledge. Empiri- 
cal educational science does not, however, recognize that what science con- 
siders "fact" always depends on theories and on a meta-theoretical system 
of rules. 
2. Empirical educational science has evolved through different phases. 
It has essentially followed the orientations of the positivist scientific ideal. 
Without dwelling on the works of Roth and Thiersch, in order to establish 
the link between hermeneutics and empiricism, or on the works of Blankertz, 
Mollenhauer, Lemper and Klafki, in order to establish the link between 
Critical Theory and empirical theory, the substantial contribution of critical 
rationalism to empirical educational science oriented towards positivism is 
clearly visible. This scientific teaching, first and foremost developed by 
Popper, has not only defined empirical educational science, but also, through 
the work of Brezinka, led to the outline of a comprehensive educational 
science based on the scientific comprehension of a unified science. 
3. The global aim of empirical educational science is to describe, explain 
and influence a given social reality in the realm of education. Thus, it is to 
be distinguished - in the light of the scientific teachings of critical rational- 
ism - from the positivist works that consider "educational facts" as given. 
Contemporary empirical educational science, on the contrary, is based on 
the fact that educational social reality can only be grasped in the light of 
'previously elaborated theories, and that it is impossible to access such theo- 
ry without previous conceptualisation. Attempts to find explicit concepts 
precisely and operationally defined, and the verification of theories in rela- 
tion to reality - or in relation to basic statements about the reality grasped 
in the light of theory - thus play a central role in equcational science that is 
inspired by critical rationalism. 
4. Starting with the fact that theories cannot be verified, Popper devel- 
oped the falsification principle in order to evaluate theories. The aim is no 
longer to indicate the truth content of a given theory through its evaluation, 
but rather to invalidate it. A theory is considered valid if it cannot be falsi- 
fied. The more attempts to falsify a theory fail, the more that theory is con- 
' sidered well-founded. This process presents a considerable improvement on 
the method of truth-evaluation internal to theory. But Critical Theory sees 
in this method an unacceptable reductionism, which obscures the extent to 
which the development of epistemology and the history of humankind are 
determined by the value of theories. With the falsification principle, the 
criteria of critical rationalism become the only ones from which to judge 
the scientific character of a theory. This indeed is reductionistic. 
5 .  This claim to hegemony on the part of a unity of science must be 
criticized. Critical rationalism developed a meta-theoretical system of de- 
fined rules, upon which the decision is based as to what can be considered 
scientific or non scientific, without being able to justify this system of 
rules. Critical rationalism must therefore rely on pre-scientific arguments to 
make its reference system acceptable. 
6. The claims of critical rationalism concerning the specification, defi- 
nition, explanation, and application of concepts must also be criticized. For 
it overlooks linguistic analysis as well as the historical dimension. Indeed, 
the significance of scientific concepts can only be seen in the context of 
historical analysis. Further, we may question whether the universal appli- 
cation of basic theoretical concepts in social science is at all possible. Witt- 
genstein's reflection on the failure of his attempts to "justify a universal 
language as the only one which would make sense on the level of linguistic 
criticism", which led him to discover the wealth of real language and to 
recognize that the explanation of everyday languages can only be made in 
everyday language, reveals the narrowness of the extent to which it is pos- 
sible to specify language in the social sciences. However, the circle within 
which any comprehension and explanation of language is limited indicates 
that there is a link between learning to speak and learning to live: language 
constitutes a basic element in the practice of life. 
7. Educational science inspired by critical rationalism sets out to estab- 
lish "quasi-laws". The aim is to point out the regularities at the origin of the 
stability of phenomena and the constancy of evolution. Regularity, stability 
and constancy are interpreted. as the expression of contexts that constitute 
laws. What is not taken into account enough, however, is the fact that in the 
field of social science, the contexts of phenomena are socially defined and 
send us back to experiences of interaction where the social conditions of 
the interaction and the structure of social relations are presented. These 
contexts can, in principal, change at any time (contingency of the quasi- 
laws). 
8. Hermeneutics and systems theory (Luhrnann) have drawn attention to 
the limits of explicative models. According to these two currents of thought, 
interpretation of a system depends on more general reference contexts that 
have not been taken into account by the explicative models. Because of this 
limit, these thought models have created a rift, indeed a total divide, 
between cause and effect. However, the theory of systems underlines the 
interactions between the two and even shows that the separation between 
cause and effect is sometimes insignificant. 
9. This critique of the causal-analytical explicative model, founded on 
the causeleffect relationship, is developed even further by Critical Theory. 
The latter reproaches the unity-of-science model for only allowing for im- 
mediately applicable knowledge that is indifferent to other dimensions of 
knowledge. However, if the acquisition of a solely technically usable 
knowledge constitutes the goal of critical rationalism, the research that 
stems from it also tends to verify the given contradictions in the field of the 
social object. This attitude tends to deny the contradictory dimensions of 
the social, which results in a reduction of the knowledge produced and a 
tendency to reify human relations, which can lead to manipulation and even 
conformism. 
10. Finally, critical rationalism's focus on the founding context of sci- 
entific theories must be criticized, forgetting as it does its contexts of de- 
velopment (who uses it? and why?). Critical rationalism reduces episte- 
mology to the level of methodology. This limit leads to a reduction of the 
issue that is unacceptable to the social and human sciences and which, ac- 
cording to us, cannot be solved by the hypothesis of a neutral science. For 
at stake in social science is not only the acquisition of "pure" scientific 
knowledge, but far more the revelation of the meaning of social practice, 
that is to say, in our case, educational practice. Questions about the con- 
texts of science are thus of central importance to social science. There is no 
way in which they can refer the question of context back to a pre-scientific 
dimension that would not be of concern to science. For already in the con- 
text of a theory's appearance, its quality is affirmed. Relations and contexts 
are set up that define the character and value of the theory. For a practice- 
oriented science such as educational science, this is naturally important, es- 
pecially with regard to the utilisation of science, because the value of theo- 
ries and of knowledge cannot be evaluated without reference to its social 
consequences. 
11. Can a theory only be evaluated in the context of this theory or would 
it not be preferable to take a superior criterion into account, like that of the 
subject or that of the "development of humanity" (Habermas)? Answers to 
this question vary. Critical Theory has reproached critical rationalism for 
its "subjectivism" in assigning the researchers' community the right to de- 
cide on the "social" value of scientific knowledge. 
12. This claim by scientists to be able to decide, individually or in the 
framework of the researchers' community, is in contradiction with the issue 
of the subject being transformed into the object of research. For the scien- 
tist, the living subject is only of interest in view of his theories; it is not 
taken into consideration as a historical subject. In order to be objective, sci- 
ence installs a clear separation between the researcher as the subject of sci- 
ence and the object of research. Scientists distinctly detach themselves from 
the "rest" of society that for them only represents possible objects of 
examination. In this way, critical rationalism constructs a "dualist" social 
. 	 system where divergent social groups have different rights. Critical ration- 
alism forgets that empirical research is only possible in a society that allows 
science the right to research. Consequently, it is of considerable interest for 
science that the social conditions that allow it to exist are maintained. 
13. The limits of this scientific paradigm's theorylpractice relation must 
also be shown. It is characterized by theory's superiority, with the help of 
which technology must be acquired, thus allowing for a different compre- 
hension of the educational practice. The intervention of technologies is 
possible on the basis of previously theoretically defined objectives. One 
thus gains fiom practice the possibility of an action that may modify theory. 
But this means forgetting that scientific theories only appear in the context 
of practices that already have a meaning. The link between the context of a 
theory's appearance and practice is underestimated. These theories are thus 
not reflexive. They remain at a distance fiom the educational practice that 
reifies them. The practical framework of theory is thus forgotten. 
14. According to Critical Theory, critical rationalism reduces theory of 
knowledge to methodology. However, the knowledge acquired through 
methodology often has no more than the appearance of scientific objectiv- 
ity. We remain at the level of appearances without attaining the essence of 
things or of research contexts. A science that does not take into account the 
essence of phenomena can only produce a "semblance of knowledge". This 
knowledge is indeed without contradiction to critical rationalism's internal 
demands, but this is only so because the contradictions inherent to social 
and educational contexts (reality, in fact) are excluded. Since this knowl- 
edge is constructed on the basis of a status quo of the socio-educational 
practice, it is a static knowledge. It is not in a position to grasp historicity, 
and cannot provide orientations for change. 

PART THREE 

Critical Educational Science 


Breaking clearly with the traditions of humanist and empirical pedagogics, 
another current in the educational science developed out of the paradigm of 
the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt school. Opposed to the humanist and 
empirical movements, the new orientation emphasised the social and his- 
torical character of education, and relied on a critical theory of society, sci- 
ence and the subject. According to this perspective, any educational sci- 
ence, in order to. avoid being manipulated, must take into account, in its 
effort towards self-understanding, an analysis of the social conditions that 
exist at the time of its emergence and development. This new critical cur- 
rent allowed for engagement in accordance with the teachings of Critical 
Theory. Here, education is defined as an inseparable part of social and hu- 
man evolution. 
The reference to Critical Theory does not, however, limit educational 
science to a reduced paradigm. Critical Theory originated as a negation of 
traditional thought. Its purpose was to criticize bourgeois society and its 
scientific activity. Thus, Critical Theory did not develop a "positive" theo- 
retical concept. Yet on the other hand, the new educational science stood 
for plurality and variety in its designs and references. It drew from the 
knowledge resources of the social sciences that were closest to Critical 
Theory. Furthermore, one ought not to forget the influence on the world of 
education of social thought developed during the era of the Weimar Re- 
public (1919-1933). 
Despite all these different origins, critical educational science is struc- 
tured around a series of elements that are common to the different sources: 
1. 	 A reflection on the socio-political limits of educational ideas; a rejec- 
tion of the idealist autonomisation of the educational in relation to the 
social. 
2. 	 An understanding of the objectives of educational practices in terms of 
their concrete social conditions. 
3. 	 What is understood as theory is an elaboration based on educational 
practices themselves; technocratic interventions and ideological issues 
are taken into account in the analysis; educational objectives. and "re- 
sponsibility" are evaluated in terms of their effective realisation in prac- 
tice. 
4. 	 The subject in its becoming constitutes the theory's central reference: 
"how to structure the educational field so as to educate the subject, de- 
velop its consciousness and build its historical identity?" 
Critical educational science strives to be a science of educational practice, 
both for and through practice, in which self-reflection and self-criticism are 
constantly active. Its proponents' central aim is to perceive what is possible 
under given social conditions in order to ensure success and a constant im- 
provement of the education process. 
Critical Theory: Historical Perspectives 
Critical Theory had a major influence on the social sciences and contrib- 
uted significantly to the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s. How- 
ever, here are certain perspectives within Critical Theory that, we believe, 
could still influence greatly the development of educational science. In 
what follows we propose to elucidate them. 
1. Traditional and Critical Theory (Horkheimer) 
In the 1930s, Max Horkheimer formulated in several articles published in 
the Journal for Social Research, a "self-definition of the Frankfurt School" 
that was to greatly influence the social sciences after the emigration of its 
first main advocates and their return after the war. For the philosophers and 
sociologists who, before the war, had been part of the Institute for Social 
Research at FrankfurtUniversity, criticism of political economy constituted 
the cornerstone of the theory. In a situation in which fear and mass poverty 
seemed as common as the concrete hope in a revolutionary solution to the 
conflict between the classes, Marxist theorists were still able to define their 
theoretical work in terms of a step towards, or as the critical conscience of, 
the revolutionary struggle. Max Horkheimer clearly formulated the basic 
principals of Critical Theory in his article Traditional and Critical Theory 
(1937). These ideas are still highly relevant today. 
The study in question deals with the incapacity of bourgeois science to 
understand itself. Max Horkheimer demonstrates that theory, within a de- 
fined field, constitutes the incarnation of certain propositions that are so 
interdependent that on the basis of a single one of these propositions, one 
can deduce many of the others. The smaller the number of hndamental 
principals there are, the more a theory is considered perfect. The real valid- 
ity of a theory depends on the relation that exists between scientific propo- 
sitions and facts. If contradictions emerge between a given theory and ex- 
perience, then one of the two must be revised: for either the observation 
was wrong, or something is not right in the theoretical principles. When 
facts are taken into account, then theory becomes nothing but hypothesis. 
' The task of traditional theory is to construct a "universal system of sci- 
ence", the order of which can only be established in the "context of deduc- 
tive thought". Such a theory is linked to the system of labour division. Its 
fimction is determined by the social division of work. But it does not ques- 
tion the contexts in which it exists, or the grounds of its legitimation. It is 
with good reason that Horkheimer pointed out that this vision of theory is 
close to that of natural science and the work of science in that field. In his 
view, it is necessary to develop a vision of the "material basis of knowl- 
edge" with the help of hypotheses. Without this attitude, the technical pro- 
gress of the bourgeois era would not have been possible. This work no 
doubt leads to a continual modification of the natural bases of society. 
'Horkheimer attempts to distinguish between a traditional theory that is 
oriented towards appearances and a critical theory that recognizes the es- 
sence of society. Appearances are defined as the products of social practice 
in general. The world that is for some a given thing that must be accepted 
and taken into account is in fact (as it exists and continues to exist), the 
product of a global social practice (Horkheirner 1970: 21). As such, it must 
be clarified by theory, analysed in terms of its historic origins and inter- 
preted, while the historicity of theory itself must also be taken into account. 
Theory must then grasp the social world as being a product of work and the 
division of labour that is characteristic of bourgeois society, as well as the 
result of certain given conditions of production. 
Critical Theory defines appearances on the basis of their essence. Max 
Horkheimer has demonstrated that critical thought is motivated by a con- 
crete attempt to go beyond the tension that exists between a consciousness 
of objectives, the spontaneity and reason that exist within the individual, 
and the relations within the processes of work that are fundamental for so- 
ciety. Critical thought refers to a conception of man as one who is in con- 
flict with himself. For indeed, if to act according to reason is a specifically 
human condition, and yet contemporary social practice is inhuman, then 
man must live in contradiction with his own being. 
The difference between reality in the bourgeois society and "the idea of 
future society as a community of fiee humans" is thus formulated (Hork- 
heimer 1970: 30). The individual, due to his will to dominate, does not live 
in isolation, and human relations are not reified through the principal of ex- 
change. In taking into account this interest in "reasonable conditions", Cri- 
tical Theory must be opposed to the reproduction of social injustices that 
do not present a problem to traditional theory, for the latter claims to take 
on without restriction "a positive role within a society that hctions" 
(Horkheimer 1970: 37). 
From the point of view of Critical Theory, concepts such as class, ex- 
ploitation, surplus, profit, impoverishment, collapse, etc. constitute parts of 
a conceptual whole that one must not seek to explain through a reproduction 
of society, but rather in its modification towards something more righteous 
and fair. Insofar as Critical Theory refuses the arbitrary and coincidental, 
from the point of view of prevailing thought, it may seem subjective, 
speculative, and incomplete. To the extent that it is opposed to the habits of 
the prevailing attitude that contributes to maintaining the past and is con- 
cemed with the activities of an out-dated order, from the point of view of 
the guarantors of this intrinsically partial world, Critical Theory must act in 
a partial manner. 
Since Critical Theory fights against the exploitation.and oppression that 
never cease to reappear in society, its purpose must be to confront a social 
order that is contented with appearances. Because Critical Theory links the 
reduction of dominion and violence on the one hand, with an interest in the 
evolution and development of humanity on the other, it has often been 
called upon as a theoretical banner in the fight for engagement towards so- 
cial reform. This implies the need for ideological criticism and the devel- 
opment of perspectives to improve social conditions. For in order to move 
from the present social form to a future social form, humanity must first 
develop a conscious system and actively define its own forms of living. 
Although we may already have achieved some elements of the "future cul- 
ture", a transformation of our economic relations is still very much needed. 
And people's "indifferent animosity in relation to theory" constitutes a 
major obstacle towards this development. Horkheimer rightly underlines 
the fact that human fate depends on our overcoming this difficulty. CGtical 
Theory, the social sciences and educational science must take into account 
these conditions if they wish to be involved in directing the course of his- 
tory. 
2. Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectics of Enlightenment 
In Dialectics of Enlightenment (1947) Horkheimer and Adomo show how 
enlightenment and, more generally speaking, any emancipatory movement, 
can revert into its opposite. Enlightenment can no longer be interpreted 
linearly as an increase in freedom. For indeed, certain negative side-effects 
,can be linked to the process of emancipation. Enlightenment can therefore 
no longer be defined either with Katit as "man's release fiom an incapacity 
that he is himself responsible for", or following Hegel, as the dialectic 
movement of becoming, as the Absolute Spirit's coming-to-itself, whereby 
nature is defined as its "relinquishment" (EntauJemng), and history as its 
"acquisition of consciousness". 
The Marxist position is quite different: enlightenment occurs through a 
dialectic process in which a modification of the social practice must be 
achieved. M m  borrowed Hegel's dialectic method, but applied it to real 
history. For it is through man himself and through human labour that his- 
tory accomplishes the effective dialectics of the history of the emergence 
and production of man. In capitalist society, '?he natural production of man 
changes through human labour". The ensuing political-social relations im- 
ply a total negation and alienation of man by man and call for a negation of 
this negation. However, the social conditions of capitalism are still far off 
from this situation. The decisive question is to establish whether enlight- 
enment is at all possible without a complete transformation of the social 
conditions of capitalism. In the eyes of Horkheimer and Adorno, the human 
process of enlightenment is no longer necessarily to be sought within the 
progress of capitalism. 
Horkheimer's and Adomo's dialectics of enlightenment take the shape 
of the following double theory: myth, they say, is itself already a light, and 
light can be diverted into mythology. They show how myth turns into light 
and nature into pure objectivity. Man pays for his increase in power by be- 
ing alienated fiom that which is under his power. Thus, enlightenment be- 
haves in relation to things like a dictator does in relation to man. In this 
process of dominating the world, which the process of alienation is so inti- 
mately connected with, technology and the sciences, as well as traditional 
philosophy, all play an important part. 
As long as the ideal of the unity of science remains the only norm of the 
theory, its practice must follow the clear movement of the history of the 
world. Along the path from mythology to logic, thought has lost an element 
of its reflection, and the world of machines is now disfiguring man even at 
the same time as it feeds him. With the abandonment of thought that takes 
its revenge on man for having forgotten it by reifying himself in mathe- 
matics, in the world of machines, and in organisation, enlightenment has 
put an end to its own realisation. In this very context, however, enlighten- 
ment is transformed and comes to serve the present in complete betrayal of 
the masses. 
On the basis of such a pessimistic view reflecting the aftermath of the 
Second World War, the ability of criticism, such as it was defined in 1937, 
to explain and improve social practice, may seem disturbing and doubtful. 
In the Dialectics of Enlightenment, for the first time, criticism turns against 
itself and attempts to grasp the moment of reflection that it is in danger of 
losing, through the process of criticising the reifying process, in which 
criticism becomes itself reified. 
3. Negative Dialectics (Adorno) 
Adomo's Negative Dialectics (1966) can be seen as an attempt to re-ex- 
amine systematically the issue approached in the Dialectics of Enlighten-
ment, that is to say, the inversion of enlightenment. Adomo believes the 
word dialectic to mean at first no more than the fact that things are not 
equivalent to their concepts; they contradict the traditional norm of equiva- 
lency between a thing and its concept. It follows that contradiction is the 
non-identical from the point of view of identity. To the extent that this 
principle confronts the limits of thought, thought overtakes them. Dialectics 
is first of all the logical consequence of non-identity. It does not concern a 
preconceived point of view. Its inevitable insufficiency creates the dialectic 
movement (Adomo 1966: 15). 
Dialectical thought is defined as the principal task of contemporary 
philosophy. Only through dialectics can thought avoid reification and the 
reversal of its content. It is only in the context of "negative dialectics" that 
thought can escape the reification of its concepts and keep its subject ac- 
cessible to philosophical experience. The task of philosophical thought is to 
comprehend that which, withii a concept, remains non-conceptualisable. 
This, at least, is valid for contemporary philosophical thought, whose "real 
interest is that which is without concept, unique, specific", that which must 
be defended against seizure and overthrow, through the reification of posi- 
tivism's traditional theory. "Negative dialectic" thought must protect itself 
from reification, as it is the only available means to cancel reification. The 
main quest of "negative dialectics" may thus be summarized, as well as its 
engagement against the "fury of identification in positive science", in the 
interest of a "differentiation between that which is conceptualisable and 
that which is non-conceptualisable in the thing itself ', 
In order to escape enlightenment's dialectics of inversion, it is neces- 
sary to go via "negative dialectics" of knowledge, which rehse any con- 
ciliation between concept and reality, and remain open to the experience of 
a "non-identical" objective which is non-identifiable by thought. Adomo 
sees the origin of '?he illusion" in the presumption of a concrete subject. 
The establishment of thought categories, constitutive of bourgeois society, 
has been such a radical failure that the "sovereign" subject finds himself 
defeated, deformed and divided. The logic of the domination of ignorance 
against which thought wanted to fight, has resulted in a "domination of 
logic", which occupies the mind of contemporary man as a dominant ideol- 
ogy, and causes the history of living men to stop (Kamper 1974a: 81). 
Adomo's radicalisation of dialectics and reflexive thought constitutes a 
provocative challenge to philosophical thought. In the context of a science 
of action, it is of central importance to know whether the "negative dialec- 
tics" of social practice can still become conscious of, or indeed, protect 
themselves against, their own reification. The view that social practice lies 
outside the field of reason suggests that rational thought can substitute the 
role of human action. In this movement, the subject can escape the reifica- 
tion of society as well as its own reification. 
For educational science, the inclusion of practice into theory leads to the 
destruction of the practice in itself. It is the consequence of the "negative 
dialectics" which can be understood as the rejection of a science of action. 
As an educational practice, however, educational science must remain true 
to its responsibility for action. Without this responsibility in relation to prac- 
tice, the exploitation mechanism in today's society would be abandoned 
without resistance, which would squander any room for even the slightest 
measure of improvement. And yet, an educational practice that succeeds 
carries in it the development of humanity. Furthermore, an educational 
practice is tied to society, whether thought acknowledges it or not. The idea 
of abandoning practice in order to avoid the reification of thought does not 
make sense here. In the context of educational science, thought, even at the 
risk of being partly instrurnentalised, must attempt to make educational 
practice more conscious by drawing attention to its possibilities of emanci- 
pation. Indeed, emancipation depends upon educational and political action. 
4. One-Dimensional Man (Marrcunse) 
Recognition that the creation of all social existence is so complex that we 
do not have the possibility to perceive the totality of this process, plays a 
central part in the work of Marcuse as well. Indeed, this topic is expressed 
by Marcuse both in an article entitled Philosophy and Critical neoly,  
published in 1937 in the Zeitschrifijicr Sozialforschung (Journal for Social 
Research), as well as later, in One-Dimensional Man (1967). However, in 
this work, which was published in the same year as Horkheimer's Tradi- 
tional and Critical Theory, Marcuse begins with the fact that the totality of 
social phenomena can only be correctly understood as the result of capital- 
ist production. As a consequence, Critical Theory of society is intimately 
tied to materialism. Marcuse demonstrates that social theory is an analysis 
of the economic system rather than a philosophical approach. Foremost at 
stake are two moments binding materialism to the right theory of society: 
concern for human happiness, and the certitude that this happiness cannot 
be achieved without a modification of one's concrete mode of existence. 
Marcuse sees the path to happiness in economical and political rela- 
tions. The task of theory or philosophy is not to attain happiness, nor to 
create a new society, that would be "the free work of a liberated individ- 
ual". Thanks to imagination, the task of reason is to sketch out such a soci- 
ety before it is realised. According to Marcuse's definition of the relation 
between reason and social practice, with the concept of reason perceived as 
freedom, philosophy seems to have reached its limits: what remains, the 
achievement of freedom, is no longer philosophy's task. This association of 
reason with "human freedom" is central to Critical Theory. It maintains our 
awareness that the conditions of a reasonable society, outlined through 
imagination, are not always achievable. For it seems that humanity's revo- 
lutionary potential could be paralysed by neutralising mechanisms. The 
possible and the real could in that case merge into one dimension. This is a 
central theme in Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man, just as in Adorno's 
Negative Dialectics. In the contemporary social situation, Critical Theory, 
whose task is to analyse society in the light of its capacities to improve 
humanity's condition, finds itself caught in the grip of a complex social 
structure. 
Society exerts an irrational domination which the majority of the popu- 
lation is willing to accept because it is satisfied with a programme in which 
one's standard of living and freedom of consumption constitute central val- 
ues. This reformist programme conceals from the majority of the population 
their own interests and possibilities for self-realisation. Human technologi- 
cal globalisation and the ideological duty of social progress participate in 
this. In this situation, the difficulty for Critical Theory resides in the fact 
that the irrationality of domination and the total administration of human 
life in the face of the "totality of advanced industrial society's conquests" 
(Marcuse) must be brought to light, and that humans must become aware of 
them. Society incorporates everything, even contradictions; thus, there is 
no space left for criticism. 
Marcuse reveals how magic and science, life and death, joy and misery, 
that is, all the previously antagonistic fields now merge together through 
technology and politics. Beauty reveals its terror in nuclear power plants, 
and laboratories become "industrial parks" in a pleasant environment. 
This integration mechanism is so dominant that it even triumphs over 
criticism, for it gives it an appearance of irrationality whereas in fact it 
takes society's irrationality as a model for rationality. This is a central 
characteristic of the one-dimensional man. 
At present, technological controls are perceived to be the incarnation of 
reason itself, in favour of all groups and social interests - in the sense that 
contradiction seems irrational, and opposition impossible. It is therefore not 
surprising that social controls have been introduced in the most advanced 
fields of this civilisation and that individual protest itself has been smoth- 
ered. The intellectual and emotional refusal to "participate" is considered a 
sign of neurosis and powerlessness. 
In this social situation in which the rational has the appearance of the 
irrational and the irrational that of the rational, the only resort left to indi- 
viduals is the "power of the negative". Refusal constitutes the only possi- 
bility of opposing oneself to the shift of reason towards the irrationality of 
domination. But refusing the irrationality of domination is almost impossi- 
ble, for such a complete domination is exercised over man through technol- 
ogy and its apparent "neutrality", that their thoughts are immunized against 
criticism. One-dimensional life necessitates "one-dimensional thought" 
which must be immunized not only against transcendence, but also against 
criticism. Strictly speaking, it is closed to any reflection. The liberating 
character of technology, according to Marx, has been inverted. Technology 
has become the means to rationalize production processes and production 
relations, but also a means of subjection to the logic of domination, which 
man himself can no longer escape. The relations of domination, which pro- 
duce man's one-dimensionality, have secured their position in society and 
in thought so well, with the help of new forms of control, the exclusion of 
the political and the integration of criticism, that any hope of social trans- 
formation has been weakened. Even if we accept this analysis on the 
whole, one may still question whether the consequences drawn fiom this 
analysis (the refusal to participate and take part) are pertinent for a science 
of action such as educational science. 
5. Knowledge and Human Interests (Habermas) 
Critical Theory has been much stimulated by the work of ~abermas, who 
focused on developing and clarifying numerous questions that have preoc- 
cupied Critical Theory since its origins. Habermas has had a great influence 
on educational science, even more so than Horkheimer, who studied issues 
relating to the politics of education and socialization in the 1960s, or 
Adomo, who studied the h c t i o n  of teaching in society. The reason for this 
is that in the work of Habermas, educational thought that was previously 
implicit in the Frankfiu-t School, and revealed as a rough draft in the writ- 
ings of Horkheimer, Adomo and Marcuse, is finally made explicit. 
For educational science, Habermas' contribution is essential to episte- 
mology, communication, and language, as well as role theory, theory of 
action, theory of socialization and social theory. 
In his first lecture in Franfirt  in 1965, Habermas referred philosophy 
back to its position as the critique of knowledge. A philosophy of knowledge 
and social criticism is aimed at the self-reflection of science. Habermas 
establishes an intimate link between the theory of society, critical philoso- 
phy of knowledge and science. All three fields have a common interest in 
autonomy and emancipation, though they are not aimed solely at the proc- 
esses of individual development, but also at the processes of humanity's 
education. It is only with reference to the species' process of development 
that processes of individual education and emancipation can be suitably 
evaluated. Processes of individual education depend on the historico-social 
state of development in the world and the situation of "the human species". 
For a critical educational science, this idea is central. 
This implies establishing a link between practical, instrumental and 
critical reason, as well as its justifications, on the basis of three different 
interests of knowledge: 
-	 an interest in technology that aims to make its objects as widely accessi- 
ble as possible; 
-	 an interest in practice, oriented towards an understanding of life's cen- 
tral questions; and 
-	 an interest in the knowledge of emancipation, which strives to eliminate 
domination over man. 
Habermas explains what he understands by interest of knowledge: 
"The interest of knowledge is a particular category that is something other than the dis- 
tinction between empirical and transcendental, or between factual and symbolic, or 
again the distinction between definitions, motivations and knowledge. For knowledge is 
neither an organism's simple instrument for adapting to a changing environment, nor 
the act of a being of pure reason. As contemplation, it is far removed fiom the problems 
of life" (Habermas 1973:243). 
Theory does not make the status of these knowledge interests very explicit. 
The typology into three interests is not structural, but circumstantial. The 
fact that the different "interests of knowledge" are defined as distinct con- 
stitutes the expression of a given historico-social situation, in which the 
interest for domination over the world, human comprehension, and eman- 
cipation are distinct. Whereas the interests of technical and practical 
knowledge, deeply founded in the structures of action and experience, find 
themselves closely linked to the constitutive conditions of society, the in- 
terest in emancipatory knowledge has another status: it links theoretical 
knowledge to the practice of life. The practice of life itself rests on a sys- 
tematically deformed communication and a repression that seems legiti- 
mised. 
Unlike Horkheimer and Marcuse, Habermas does not try to go beyond 
this division of reason into three. He accepts it as a given fact. In order to 
illustrate Habermas' approach, we could mention his input to the debate on 
positivism, his contributions to the criticism of hermeneutics, and his criti- 
cism of systems theory. In these epistemological works, Habermas criti- 
cizes the hypotheses of a variety of schools. As a critic of ideologies, he 
raises questions about those hypotheses that are not made explicit in con- 
temporary works, and strives to weaken the claims to universalism of criti- 
cal rationalism, systems theory, and hermeneutics. Insofar as he is inter- 
ested in the function of contemporary scientific theory for capitalist society, 
in which science has become a "productive power" that is instrumentalised 
by the dominating system to firther its own interests, Habermas establishes 
an ideological criticism. The criticism that Habermas formulates against the 
different scientific programmes is always both scientific criticism and 
ideological criticism. It is opposed to the universality claims of the differ- 
ent contemporary scientific fields. 
In a second period, among the many fields he has studied, Habermas 
favours constructive action to a merely critical approach. He enriches sci- 
ence with a self-reflection that always includes criticism in anticipation. He 
complements criticism with "constructive action". When "the idea of a the- 
ory of society sketched out for a practical purpose" (Habermas 1972: 10) is 
taken seriously, it must link its scientific claim to a theoretical structure 
based on practice. For this transmission of theory and practice to succeed, 
reciprocal knowledge of the following three aspects is needed: 
-	 the creation and development of critical theorems that are able to resist 
scientific discourse; 
-	 the organisation of explanation processes according to which these 
theorems may be used and verified in relation to the emergence of proc- 
esses of reflection; and finally, 
-	 the choice of appropriate strategies, the resolution of tactical issues, the 
conduct of political struggle. 
The first of these aspects corresponds to affirmations, the second aspect 
corresponds to verifiable affmations, and the third to judicious choices. 
In distinguishing between these three functions, which a theory drafted 
in view of a practical purpose must take account of, Habermas surpasses 
the negativity of Critical Theory. The goal is no longer simply to criticize, 
but also to organise the Ijrocesses of explication and develop appropriate 
strategies. Critical Theory thus finds the way back to practice as a field of 
action; the relation between theory and criticism acquires a new quality. As 
a consequence, Critical Theory discovers a new interest in educational 
practice. 
Main ConncepUs off Critical Theory 
Throughout its history, Critical Theory developed a range of important ba- 
sic concepts. We have chosen to present the concepts that are useful to 
educational science. To approach the central concepts of Critical Theory in 
educational science does not imply that Critical Theory already possesses a 
theory of education. Rather it can be seen to provide elements towards such 
a theory. A Critical Theory of education must rely on these concepts that 
provide the guidelines upon which to build a theory of education. 
There is a difficulty in presenting Critical Theory's.points of reference. 
The concepts are so tightly linked to each other that a clear distinction be- 
tween them is impossible; one is bound to constantly switch from one con- 
cept to another. We will therefore attempt to structure a chain of thoughts 
so as to interlock the contexts of the respective concepts, so that a global 
' context emerges. However, we do not wish to develop a system of Critical 
Theory, for this would be contrary to its intentions. 
In the course of what has been said so far, it has become clear that Critical 
Theory is closely tied to the European tradition of enlightenment and at- 
tempts to develop it. Indeed, Critical Theory is inscribed within the histori- 
cal movement for human liberation, of which Kant defined the goals. For 
him, enlightenment corresponds to man's effort to break free of the de- 
pendence for which he is himself responsible. Dependence is the incapacity 
to use, by oneself, one's own reason. We are responsible for this power- 
lessness when it originates not in a lack of reason, but in a lack of courage 
to use this reason. To have the courage to use one 'S own reason! is thus the 
motto of enlightenment. 
There is a systematic and a historical aspect to this vision of enlighten- 
ment. Its definition can be interpreted as follows: the movement of enlight- 
enment is considered a historical movement the content of which is human 
autonomy, that is to say, fieedom through self-determination. Thus, the ef- 
fort to achieve reason's emancipation has both a philosophical as well as a 
social character. 
Kant saw clearly both aspects of the enlightenment, but his concept of 
enlightenment is limited because according to him man's capacity to use 
his reason is primarily defined as a performance that must originate in the 
individual himself, and is only partially restricted by the social conditions 
of the moment. To the extent that Critical Theory stresses the dependence 
of people's liberty and self-determination on humanity's historico-social 
state of development, it modifies Kant's vision of the emancipatory move- 
ment of enlightenment. 
Critical Theory claims that the emancipation of reason does not solely 
rest on the good use of reason in education and the development of the in- 
dividual, but that social conditions, against which one must struggle in the 
political field, must also be taken into account. Seen from this angle, 
enlightenment involves challenging any authority and domination which 
cannot be justified rationally, and insisting on autonomy and on liberty as 
objectives for human development. 
Within the present social conditions, the process of emancipating rea- 
son, whilst aiming to establish individual autonomy, can sometimes back- 
fire and result in nothing but the opposite. Horkheimer and Adorno de- 
scribe this danger as follows: 
"The emancipation of reason, meaning the comprehension of evolved thought, has al-
ways pursued the goal of liberating man fiom fear in order to make of him a sovereign 
being; but the world, entirely illuminated by reason, shines under the sign of a trium-
phant disaster" (Horkheimer/Adorno 197 1: 7). 
Horkheimer and Adorno thus underline the transformation of enlighten- 
ment into myth and "madness". Myth and madness threaten enlightenment 
when the individual, through his use of reason, comes to dominate the 
world by the sheer strength of his self-affirmation. Liberation from the de- 
pendence under which man chokes now becomes a new chain, from which 
he must in turn break free. An individual's attempt to a f f m  himself 
against society leads to his isolation and reification. His insistence on the 
rationality of the organisation of human society submits him to the ration- 
ality of domination, which is so completely organised that it totally domi- 
nates him. 
"From this point of view, what happens is in fact contrary to the intention. The logic 
that enlightenment made possible, and which seemed beneficial for the order of human 
relations, became, as the dominant logic of the apparatus of power, a 'logic of domina- . 
tion' that the individual accepts under a rigid constraint. Society can impose this con- 
straint almost without opposition, for the 'one-dimensional individual' is predisposed, 
through his 'one-dimensional thought', to identify with the constraint that weighs on 
him" (Kamper 1973: 102ff.). 
In the face of this situation, three directions have been sketched out, in the 
context of Critical Theory, that aim to attain enlightenment despite the con- 
straining conditions which tend to oppose the process of reason's emanci- 
pation. 
The first direction consists in avoiding the danger of reification of the 
emancipation process, and is outlined in Adomo's "negative dialectics". Its 
concern is to re-establish the truth of reason's emancipation by shining onto 
enlightenment itself the light of the criticism that has always been inherent 
to it. The effect of enlightenment must be to liberate every human being 
from his powerlessness and reification. This work must be made possible 
through a critique of the (apparent) rationality of instrumental action, which 
in fact continually reifies the processes of cognition and conceals the ob- 
jectives that were originally set. From this point on, critical thought must 
examine the processes and events that have not yet been conceptualised or 
that have remained unconceptualised due to the degree of abstraction of the 
concepts, and have therefore eluded the work of reason. Adomo sums it up 
as follows: 
"Philosophy finds its true interest, according to the historical situation, at precisely the 
point where Hegel, as tradition desired, manifested his own disinterest: that is, at the 
level of that which is without concept, unique, and particular, at the level of that which, 
since Plato, has been abandoned because it was considered temporary and insignificant, 
and that which Hegel labelled lazy existence. The object of philosophy is that which the 
concept cannot reach, that which its mechanism of abstraction eliminates, that which is 
not entirely exemplary in the concept" (Adomo 1966: 17). 
According to the second direction put forward by Critical Theory, emanci- 
pation processes must focus on liberation from the pleasure provided by 
reification. The goal is to eliminate social repression. Marcuse placed this 
concept of enlightenment at the centre of his reflection. In the context of 
his work on student protest for example, Marcuse considers the student 
movement to have led the rebellion in two main directions: it associated the 
field of non-material needs (self-education, non-alienated human relations) 
to the political struggle as much as to the physiological dimension of exis- 
tence, that is to say, to the field of nature. The common ground is emanci- 
pation in relation to sensuality. Indeed, according to Marcuse, pleasure 
leads to new experiences of a world that the demands of established society 
violently threatens, and calls for a total transformation. 
In Marcuse, we return to the connection between enlightenment and the 
emancipation of reason. Furthermore, liberation from the powerlessness for 
which one is not responsible must be achieved not only with the help of the 
individual's reason, but also on the basis of "communicative perception" 
that is not based on domination whereby social conditions and the domina- 
tion structures are experienced as chains that one cannot escape from. 
Finally, a third variant of enlightenment can be distinguished that 
Habermas developed by finding inspiration in the model of the "therapeutic 
discourse". Here, self-reflection aims at enlightenment, grasped as the inte-
riorisation of a "therapeutic discourse": 
"The thinking subject must play at least two parts, just as the reflecting subject, when 
the argumentation must not be simply analytical (and replaceable by machines). This 
causes no problem in the context of interiorised discourse. The position of the partici- 
pants is equal and interchangeable, which is why the internal division of dialogue-parts 
causes no problem to thought. It is not so in the case of (interiorised) therapy. In psy-
choanalytical discourse, the partners' position is asymmetrical. It changes often in the 
course of the communication, and only ends at the end of a treatment that succeeds in an 
asymmetrical relationship that exists from the start between the participants in the dis- 
course. An isolated subject's self-reflection thus requires a quite paradoxical perform- 
ance: one part of the self must be detached from the other part so as to enable the sub- 
ject to help himself' (Habermas 1972:34). 
Thus we see how the process of enlightenment becomes a process of re- 
flection, during which reifications and hedges to thought and communica- 
tion are eliminated. It may be possible that the asymmetrical relation of 
communication between analyst and patient that we have just described 
also provides a model for educational processes, which can be defined as 
processes for the emancipation of reason. According to Habermas, teaching 
nowadays has taken on a central role in the realisation of emancipation 
processes. From here on, political struggle, the "choice of appropriate 
strategies" and the "resolution of tactical issues" become possible. 
The concept of emancipation is used in different ways within the context of 
Critical Theory and the social sciences which it has influenced. An impor-
tant dimension of the concept's meaning can be perceived if one refers to 
the distinction made by M m ,  in On the Jewish Question (1843), between 
"pohtical" and "human" emancipation. The starting point for this distinc- 
tion is as follows: 
"It is by no means sufficient to examine the questions, who must emancipate? who must 
be emancipated? Criticism must examine a third question: what type of emancipation 
are we talking about? What are the conditions within the nature of the desired emanci- 
pation?"( M m  1966, vol. 1: 34). 
Marx thus points to two forms of emancipation to be achieved in different 
phases of human development. The bourgeois revolution only achieves 
"political" emancipation. Through political emancipation it succeeds in 
freeing the State from the tutelage of religion, and in the struggle against 
the bourgeois right to property. Regarding the relation between political 
emancipation and human emancipation, Marx specifies: 
"Political emancipation from religion is not the fulfilled and contradiction-free emanci- 
pation from religion, because political emancipation is not the fulfilled, the contradic- 
tion-free form of human emancipation"(Mm1966, vol. l:36 f.). 
Marx explains that to achieve "human" emancipation on the basis of "po- 
litical" emancipation it is necessary to begin by suppressing private prop- 
erty which is responsible for maintaining man's domination over man and 
thus contributes to his reification. But the suppression of private property 
only constitutes one of the conditions for human emancipation. 
The goal of "political" and "human" emancipation is to finally make of 
man a human and universal being, defined as an individual as well as a so- 
cial force, and in whom self-reflection would be linked to an interest in full 
capacity and emancipation. Such emancipation is not possible without the 
modification of social conditions, nor through this single modification 
alone. In addition to the transformation of dominance relations, it demands 
particular educational processes the effects of which are important. We 
must avoid simply replacing one structure of domination by another. 
Emancipation must be regarded as much as a process of liberation for peo- 
ple and social groups, as a phenomenon that concerns individuals and de- 
termines the factors defining human social nature and conscience. The con- 
cept of "human" emancipation thus requires that one take into account the 
subjective factor, that is to say, the given conditions in every individual's 
personality that can be usehl or harmful to their emancipation. This aspect 
of emancipatory movements, which is above all important in the field of 
education, must not lead to a gratuitous inflation of the concept of emanci- 
pation. What is needed is a more precise use of the concept of emancipa- 
tion. Indeed, emancipation is only possible, as a concept and socio-histori- 
cal phenomenon, if it describes the contradictions and content of emanci- 
pation, reflects the field of reference, demands a collective process (action) 
and concerns the social structure as a whole. 
Between 1965 and 1975, the concept of emancipation became the cen- 
tral concept even in educational science where, for a number of authors, it 
actually replaced the concept of education itself. Mollenhauer's Education 
and Emancipation, the work of the "Commissions for the Reform of Edu- 
cational Plans in Hesse", and Lempert's contribution Research on Educa- 
tion and Emancipation set the context for the concept's warm reception. By 
emancipation, Mollenhauer understands "the subject's .liberation .. . in re- 
lation to the conditions that limit his rationality and the action linked to it". 
For Lempert: 
"Emancipatory interest is man's interest in maintaining and furthering the fact of dis- 
posing of himself. Its goal is the suppression of irrational domination, and freedom from. 
constraints of all sorts. Material violence is not the only constraining thing, there is also 
the straightjacket of prejudices and ideologies that can be at least reduced, if not com- 
pletely suppressed, through the analysis of its genesis, criticism and self-reflection" 
(Lempert 1971:318). 
Mollenhauer and Lempert underline the subjective factor in the context of 
emancipation processes, and rely on the concept of emancipation made 
more precise by Habermas, who emphasises these aspects of the global 
process and makes of emancipation a central concept for education. 
Just as in social science, emancipation tends to have a primarily negative 
meaning in educational science. The concept is used to identify situations 
in which there is oppression and violence. To the extent that emancipation 
strives to overcome a situation that is described as negative, it constitutes 
an aim of the hoped-for situation, that is to say, an engagement of the so- 
cially oppressed individuals and groups, and the engagement for the de- 
fence of their interests and in support of their liberation movements. 
One finds in this definition of emancipation a great many points in 
which to anchor educational action. The latter must contribute to the human 
adventure, but is also tied to objective and subjective possibilities. The de- 
gree of emancipation that can be attained varies in the course of history 
from one society to another. 
"It has remained inferior, in those situations where the occasions and potentials for ac- 
tion and the satisfaction of different groups are distinct one from another; that is why 
the improvement of the situation of disadvantaged, under-developed, or psychically 
handicapped groups in their socialization is one of the very first strategies of emancipa- 
tion" (Lempert 1974:14). 
Emancipation can only be specified as an objective in the educational proc- 
ess in the historico-social context of the moment. Under the social condi- 
tions of advanced capitalism, the possibilities for emancipation are other 
than in developing countries where emancipation means first and foremost 
liberation from hunger and material needs. The possibilities for emancipa- 
tion can only be defined in relation to existing emancipatory potentials in a 
given moment, which have not yet appeared in western industrial societies 
as far as "human" emancipation is concerned. ~ o r ' t h e  socialization process 
is still linked, for many people, to a high degree of repression and a lack of 
possibilities for self-fulfilment. 
In the course of the socializing process, the individual is influenced to 
such an extent in his capacities and needs by the effect of social roles (by 
means of a selective requirement) that some capacities (specific to the dif- 
ferent social classes) can be developed whereas others must be forgone. 
The given possibilities and limits of a person's social development appear, 
therefore, under certain social conditions. Overly aggressive socialization 
processes, which prevent the articulation and satisfaction of a person's 
needs; often lead to pathological behaviour which prevents that person 
from attaining self-fulfilment. 
Faced with the intensification of bureaucracy in modem societies, and 
with the control exerted by social life over instrumental action and the 
semblance of reality that is linked to it, it is necessary to break this struc- 
ture in order to allow for "human" emancipation and the humanisation of 
social life. Qualification constraints are too great for the demands of the job 
market, and socialization processes are too one-dimensional. In addition, 
social imagination of a kind that would still allow for thoughts other than 
"normal" remains under-developed. However, if a consciousness of the 
problems were developed with regard to the contradictions immanent to 
society, and if thought were directed towards alternatives, the emancipatory 
processes could still succeed. It is only when humans manage, through such 
processes, to free themselves from isolation and consider themselves uni- 
versal beings that they can nullify the effects of their reification. But reifi- 
cation also threatens when emancipation is defined as the goal of a dog- 
matic and hypostatic process, rather than a reflexive process. 
3. Reification 
One of the principal objectives of enlightenment and the emancipatory 
movement consists in defending humans against reification. At present, rei- 
fication is the result of the production and exchange of goods. Its function 
is to uphold the social order of bourgeois society. The latter cannot be over- 
estimated. Mollenhauer, in particular, studied closely the reification of 
communication processes in the field of education. 
Lukacs describes the relationship between the structure of goods and 
human communication. Reification acts on communication and educational 
processes, and thus on human consciousness. Its effect is to impoverish 
human relations on the basis of a reductive rationalisation of instnunental 
action. Reification limits man's capacity for self-definition, as well as his 
field of action and reflection. Granted, man's capacity to objectify himself 
is .to a certain extent part of his human condition. But this particular type of 
objectification cannot be considered equivalent to the totality of human rei- 
fication, which renders man, in his development, below his possibilities. In 
our society, human reification is furthermore intensified by controls within 
the bureaucratic administration; this results in the individual being included 
in the general, and the "concrete" being considered inferior to the "ab- 
stract". The threat on human life is accentuated by "positive" sciences and 
their orientation towards the acquisition of decisive knowledge. The re- 
sulting. consequences invade social life and lead to an intensification of the 
violence contained in the structure of the social system. When criticism 
fails to avoid the hypostasis of these notions and concepts, the danger arises 
that it could be vanquished by overwhelmingly powerful reification ten- 
dencies. In individual education processes, it is possible to achieve the in- 
dividual's reification through a certain k i d  of communication and interac- 
tion processes. Removing the reifying element in a communication process 
contributes to reducing everyone's reification. Efforts to reduce reification 
and reified communication refer back to each other; they can only be suc- 
cessful in a punctual and limited fashion, the power held by social mecha- 
nisms which work against reification being much too great. The fact of 
constantly struggling against it must be a part of an education indebted to 
enlightenment, emancipation and self-definition. Negation and refusal can 
only be the first phase of the protest against instrumentalisation and reifi- 
cation; to attain a humanisation of human life, one must go beyond them. 
Ever since Horkheimer's Traditional and Critical Theoy (1970), the con- 
cept of criticism has become one of the central elements of thought for 
Critical Theory and the social sciences that are inspired by it. Up to this 
day, this concept has been used to mark a specific orientation that must be 
distinguished from the traditional use of science. A series of works has thus 
appeared in the field of educational science, which places the claims of 
criticism at the centre of their intentions. The question remains as to what 
such a concept as criticism signifies in the context of educational science. 
In order to answer this question, we must first analyse the concept of criti- 
cism within the Critical Theory of the Frankfirt School. 
For Horkheimer, criticism has become the constitutive element of Criti- 
cal Theory for the analysis of society: 
"The dual character of any society in its present configuration evolves, in the subjects of 
critical behaviour, towards a conscious contradiction. As they recognize the contempo- 
rary economic form, and the global culture founded on it, as the product of human la- 
bour, as an organisation that was imposed on the humanity of that time, and that it was 
capable of, they identify themselves with this whole and define it as will and reason: it 
is their own world. At the same time, they realise that society must be compared to non- 
human natural processes, to pure mechanisms, because forms of culture are based on 
struggle and oppression, and are not the proof of a unitary will, conscious of itself, it is 
not their world, but the world of capital" (Horkheimer 1970:28). 
At the heart of social criticism, Horkheimer places the criticism of capital, 
which defines the structures of society in our historico-social situation, by 
moulding the economy's structure according to its interests. Criticism in- 
tervenes by contradicting the claim that this evolution is necessary. Due to 
the fact that criticism attacks society's dependence and therefore the de- 
pendence of science on the laws of capital valorisation, it challenges the 
validity claims of society and science. Through a critical reflection that re- 
veals the laws of economic, scientific and educational movement - that is, 
of society in general - a new understanding of the individual and of the so- 
cial whole should be attained, as described by Horkheimer: 
"Critical thought and its theory clashes with both methods: it is neither concerned with 
the education of an isolated individual, nor with that of all individuals. It is more aware 
of the individual defined in terms of his emotional ties to other individuals and groups, 
in his preoccupations with a defined class, and finally in the interdependence thus 
transmitted between the social whole, nature and the subject" (Horkheimer 1970:30 f.). 
As criticism makes man aware of his dependence, it allows him to take 
hold of his relations with society, other humans and himself. This results 
for humans in a new comprehension of the self and the world. 
Criticism, of which the significant element is social criticism, becomes 
a systematic criticism of knowledge and science, which is primarily op- 
posed to positivism, but also to hermeneutics and the systems theory. Hork- 
heimer defines the link between social and scientific criticism as follows: 
"If the theoretical effort, which, in the interest of a reasonably organised future society, 
reveals today's society in a critical light and builds it on the basis of traditional theories 
elaborated by the different sciences, fails to succeed, then all hope of fundamentally im-
proving human existence is lost" (Horkheimer 1970: 49). 
Next to the reciprocal relationship between social criticism and criticism of 
science, another element of criticism appears here: the intention of improv- 
ing the status quo of society and science in the light of "reasonable condi- 
tions". The criticism of Critical Theory must not be limited to demonstrat- 
ing the insufficiency of conditions or contexts and to letting the "state" of 
criticism provide the method to articulate criticism; it must also strive to 
improve the conditions of social life that it criticizes. Thus it is important to 
move beyond the simple negation, and adopt a constructive method. It is a 
question of becoming practical in order to contribute to the improvement of 
social practice. In view of this knowledge, the "great refusal" (Marcuse) 
leads Critical Theory into a dead end. 
"According to Critical Theory, there is but one truth.The positive predicates of reason's 
sincerity, of the effort for peace, freedom, and happiness, are not understood in the same 
manner in the other theories and practices" (Horkheimer 1970: 40). 
Criticism is a central condition for emancipation. The critical analysis of 
existing social, scientific and educational structures leads to a distancing in 
relation to structures and therefore to a partial liberation from their con- 
straints. If criticism turns towards the existing social structures, it is no 
longer merely social criticism. It must also be critical of deformed commu- 
nication processes. As such, it must, for example, turn towards human self- 
reification in the processes of socialization and education, and try to dem- 
onstrate the backwardness of reality in relation to its inherent possibilities. 
In this role, the capacity for criticism is a primordial element of human ex- 
istence. However, the radicality of criticism in relation to educational ac- 
tion's powerlessness in the face of historical microstructures that bear on 
the lives of youths must not conceal the significance of educational action. 
For this would result in apathy and resignation, the incapacity to act, and 
despair - an abandonment of pedagogico-social practice. Such a develop 
ment would lead to the primacy of practice being made obsolete in the face 
of the apparent impossibility of changing practice (something Critical The- 
ory has always underlined vigorously) and to theory being considered supe- 
rior to practice. Criticism would then no longer be able to fulfil its task of 
contributing to a process of social evolution influenced by an interest in 
reasonable conditions. To avoid this trap, criticism must not be an aim in it- 
self. Criticism based on dialectics must avoid providing alternatives dog- 
matically. That is to say, it must remain reflexive. 
If educational science wants to hlfil its mission towards every young 
person (Educandus), it must be defined as "critical-constructive theory" 
and withdraw from objectives that are thought outside of history or are 
non-didactical. Education must address every educated person in hisker 
personal social situation. 
5. Society 
By "society" we mean primarily the global context of action and social be- 
haviour that is constituted through exchange and in the course of activities 
relating to the division of labour. To the extent that Critical Theory defines 
itself as the theory of society, its aims to analyse and explain the contempo- 
rary social system. A theory of society is critical insofar as it puts into per- 
spective the possible development of society and its actual, real develop 
ment. Critical Theory aims for a knowledge of the totality of society. Social 
development as a whole cannot be properly understood without reference 
to the concept of the division of labour. In the context of an increasing divi- 
sion of tasks and the improvement of productivity, the work force and the 
means of production, as well as their co-operation with the conditions of 
production, become increasingly significant for the development of society. 
The significance of the conditions of production for the understanding 
of social structures and their possibilities of development was, once again, 
underlined in the context of critical social science. "Criticism" in social 
science was therefore understood - as Horkheimer writes - less as an "ide- 
alist criticism of pure reason, than as a dialectical criticism of political 
economy". Criticism reveals the existing tensions between contemporary 
social structures and the virtualities that they are incorporate. It allows one 
to develop strategies to enable society to evolve towards "reasonable con- 
ditions" (verniinfiige Bedingungen, Horkheimer). 
Reichelt (1976:353) noted that Critical Theory remained very attached 
to a criticism of political economy (Marx) seen as a representation of the 
anatomy of bourgeois society. It never really tried to reformulate this the- 
. ory in relation to new conditions, nor to attempt a very concrete examina- 
tion of society in full mutation. 
Under the present conditions of social and scientific development, to 
what extent is the development of a systematic theory of society at all still 
possible? Adorno was well aware of this difficulty when he wrote: 
"The irrationality of contemporary social structure prevents it from flourishing ration- 
ally in theory. The perspective of a passage from the direction of economic processes to 
the political power is certainly a consequence of the dynamic that is deductible from the 
systems, but it too leads to an objective irrationality. This, and not only because of the 
sterile dogmatism of its defenders, should help to explain why for a long time now no 
convincing theory of society has been put forward" (Adomo 1969: 17). 
Despite this scepticism, Adomo maintains that contemporary society can 
only be properly defined when one recognizes that it is, for the most part, 
organised according to the laws of capital valorisation. 
6. Communication -Discourse 
Habermas' "theory of communicative action" is of central importance to 
educational science, as are his numerous works on the theory of language, 
communication and discourse. In his contribution to the theory of commu- 
nicative competence, one of his aims is to reconstruct the system of rules 
whereby speakers with a communicative competence are able to build ut- 
terances out of sentences and at their will transform them into other utter- 
ances. These utterances are considered statements insofar as they constitute 
a "pragmatic discourse unit" that can be reduced to an elementary phrase 
taken as a linguistic unit in the absence of the communicative act. 
In the course of his analysis, Habermas distinguishes two forms of 
communication in everyday language: the communicative act and dis- 
course. 
"Among the conventions that have the h c t i o n  of communicative action, we can recog- 
nize those that are communicative acts in that they are admitted into the context of ex- 
tra-linguistic statements, whereas in discourses only thematic linguistic statements are 
nllowed; the acts and expressions of the participants certainly accompany discourse, but 
they are not part of it" (Habermas 1971: 114 f.). 
Furthermore, in the process of communicative action, validity is presup 
posed by the contexts of meaning, without being thematized. Communica- 
tion occurs through the reciprocal recognition between the people commu- 
nicating and acknowledgement of the validity of what is said. The contexts 
of meaning that apply to the language game of communication can be di- 
vided into four fields that Habermas defines as follows: 
"A language game takes place normally when the utterances of the speaking and acting 
subjects can be understood in such a way that: 
a) They can transmit and properly understand the pragmatic meaning of the interper- 
sonal relationship (that can also be verbalised in the act of speech). 
b) They can transmit and understand intentionally the meaning of the prepositional 
content of their utterances. 
c) They do not call into question the validity of the opinions they communicate. 
d) They can accept the validity claim of the action norm that they wish to respect" (Ha- 
bermas 1971: 116). 
On the basis of these ideas, two counter-effective expectations can be ex- 
ploited for each communicative action: we expect acting subjects to follow 
intentionally the norms they follow (expectation of intention); and we ex- 
pect acting subjects to follow only those norms that seem justified to them 
(expectation of legitimacy). 
In contrast to these elements of communicative action, validity claims 
are questioned within the discourse; one tries to justify the questioned va- 
lidity claims of opinions and norms through a virtualisation of action con- 
straints and the foundation of validity claims. The naive idealisation, made 
in the communicative action, of the communicative situation and the oppo- 
site party, is equally maintained as hypothesis in the discourse. 
Building on the fact that comprehension is impossible without a dis- 
tinction between true or false consensus, Habermas states and then attempts 
to justify the idea that "in every discourse we are compelled to suppose an 
ideal linguistic situation" (Habermas 197 1:122). 
For Habermas, the ideal refers to a distinction between the true or false 
consensus of a linguistic situation where communication is not hampered 
either by external contingent effects, or by constraints emanating fiom the 
communication structure itself. The linguistic situation excludes the system- 
atic deformation of communication. On the basis of a necessary distinction 
between the true or false consensus, an attempt is made to designate the 
elements of a theory of truth consensus that takes on considerable impor- 
tance in the context of the problematic issue of justification in the theory of 
sciences. One can therefore determine the truth of the theories only through 
consensus in the context of a discourse. In a discourse, and in the attempt to 
establish a consensus, the parties involved must be engaged actively. 
To the extent that the ideal linguistic situation, which must be supposed 
or anticipated in every discourse, is characterised, amongst other things, by 
the equal "reciprocity" of attempts to order and to oppose, to allow and to 
resist, to make and break promises, to be accountable and to demand ac- 
counts, the possibility therefore being assured of entering at any moment 
into a discourse, "the counter-effective conditions of the ideal linguistic 
situation as condition of an ideal form of life" are revealed as "giving their 
value to the maxims, so that every time we begin a communication with the 
intention of holding a discourse, and we pursue it for just long enough, a 
consensus, that would be the true consensus in itself, should appear" (Ha- 
bermas 1971: 138f.). In this attempt to found a theory of language and a 
theory of communication in reference to a critical theory of society, by es- 
tablishing close links between an ideal linguistic situation and an ideal kind 
of life, Habermas' efforts to develop a theory of communicative compe- 
tence closely follow the aims of classical Critical Theory, which he M e r  
develops. 
The relation between theory and practice is central to Critical Theory and 
critical social science. This is already apparent in Horkheimer's first publi- 
cations, in which he shows that the critical stance must be directed towards 
social practice: 
"The fitture of humanity depends on the existence of a critical stance that must naturally 
also contain certain elements from traditional theories and the outlived culture. When, in 
imaginary independence, science considers the practice it serves and to which it belongs 
as completely different to itself, and when it is content with the separation between 
thought and action, it has already abandoned humanity. The activity of thinking is 
strongly characterised by the self-determination of what it must achieve and the purpose 
it must serve, not only with regard to the small details, but in its totality. The quality of 
the activity of thinking therefore directs it towards historical change and to the produc- 
tion of a fair situation between people" (Horkheimer 1970:56). 
Critical thought, fiom the point of view of Critical Theory, must not be 
concerned exclusively with the production of knowledge. Theory must 
have an immediate interest in improving social situations. Indeed, it must 
reflect the conditions of its own production and of its own use. In this proc- 
ess, theory must question its own ideological background, its social func- 
tion, and its possibilities to influence social practice. Insofar as Critical 
Theory understands that the strict division of work between theory and sci- 
ence on the one hand, and social practice on the other, is characteristic of a 
particular social situation (i.e., bourgeois society) and therefore change- 
able, the value.of a theory cannot be determined in the context of research 
alone, independently of social practice. Moreover, it must be the duty of 
social practice to decide the value of theories, since it is in social practice 
that theories must demonstrate their validity. 
Under the influence of World War JJ and the social developments of the 
post-war period, Critical Theory changed its assumption of the possibilities 
according to which theory can improve the social practice. Reichelt clearly 
identified this change of perspective: 
"The central ideas of Critical Theory were formulated at a time when the theory could 
be conceived as an element in the revolutionary process: considering the suffering of the 
proletariat, hope for a violent change within society was well justified. The increasing 
integration of the working class into bourgeois society resulted in a growing separation 
between practice and theoretical concerns, and the project of realising a 'total man' was 
forgotten. Ultimately, theory can be understood as the relic of true consciousness in a 
hermetic system withdrawn into itself' (Reichelt 1976:357). 
This change of attitude regarding the social function of theory implies an 
abandonment of the primacy of social practice over theory. This abandon- 
ment became necessary because one came to realize how practice had be- 
come totally determined by the way bourgeois society transformed every- 
thing into merchant value. In this given social context, there was no longer 
any possibility for an improvement of practice towards more "reasonable 
conditions of life". Thus, theory gained importance, for it acquired the mis- 
sion of conceiving the principal virtualities for the &re of social practice. 
The demands that theory addressed to practice sometimes contained ele- 
ments that were dogmatic and a-historical. Some of these dogmatic and a- 
historical aspects can even be found in certain section of such works as 
Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectics of Enlightenment, in Adomo's Nega- 
tive Dialectics or in Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man. There is, in these 
works, a certain dimension of resignation with regard to the evaluation of 
possibilities of action open to the individual, which results in a weakening 
of the subjective factor; this in turn leads to apathy and a demobilising of 
the subject for action. 
At first, it was hoped that theory's contribution would help one to es- 
cape alienation. We now see the risk that this objective back-fire: instead 
achieving the promised freedom, theory can turn into the opposite. Instead 
of accomplishing the rational, it produces fragmentation and the irrational. 
Instead of constituting an aide to practice, theory is reduced to a manipu- 
lative technique. Indeed, these developments seemed to do no more than 
elaborate and restructure the very social situation Critical Theory set out to 
criticize! Although it was possible to achieve resistance through thought, 
contemporary social conditions made it seem impossible to achieve a suc- 
cesshl practice of human life. 
Later on, Habermas thus began to treat the theorylpractice relation in a 
new way. In his book Theory andPractice, he develops the idea of a society 
that would integrate the project of changing practice, and this idea distin- 
guishes him from the other theorists who concentrated on the theoretical 
field alone. With reference to one of Horkheimer's previous books, he 
writes: 
"By reflecting the conditions of its origin and anticipating its context of application, 
theory is understood as a necessary moment within the very social context of life that it 
analyses. It analyses its object as a context of predetermined forces from the perspective 
of its possible supersedence. Theory therefore involves a double relation between theory 
and practice: on the one hand, it examines the historical context of constitution of a so- 
cial interest to which, through its activity of knowledge, the theory itself belongs; and 
on the other hand, theory must take into consideration the context of historical action 
that it influences by anticipating and orienting action" (Habermas 1972: 9 f.) 
In this approach, Habermas tries to link practice to theory, which had been 
separated fiom practice in the work of the late Adorno. In more precise 
terms, what we have is the elaboration of three aspects of the relation be- 
tween theory and practice: 
1. 	 the empirical aspect of the relation between science, politics and public 
opinion in the systems of advanced capitalism; 
2. 	 the epistemological aspect of the relation between knowledge and inter- 
est; 
3. 	 the methodological aspect of a theory of societies, ready to take on the 
role of social criticism. 
,Concerning the first aspect, Habermas presents the relation between theory 
and practice as an issue relating to the empirical dimension in the relation 
between science, politics and public opinion. Insofar as we are dealing with 
practical problems in a political context (the acceptance or refusal of 
norms), theory must concern itself with elucidating certain practical issues. 
This means that it must be directed towards a practice of communication. 
Interpretation of practical issues elaborated in the context of these theories 
cannot become immediately prescription for action. These interpretations 
can only shed light on the political if citizens are ready to welcome practi- 
cal discourses into the institutional field. For, where this is not the case, a 
theory oriented towards practice must also analyse the institutional and so- 
cial powers that limit communication. 
Habermas first examines the conditions that limit the institutionalisation 
of practical discourses in The Structural Transformation .of the Public 
Sphere (Strukturwandel der offentlichkeit). In this historical work, he sets 
out to show that the idea that one could develop the will-power in order to 
dissolve power was in fact institutionalised in the political system of the 
bourgeois society. In addition, he wanted to point out the incompatibility 
between the imperatives of the capitalist economic system and the desires 
and demands of a democratic process. Until then, this incompatibility had 
had a negative influence on practical discourses and the theoretical eluci- 
dation of practical problems. In the context in which he writes, two impor- 
tant tendencies had emerged: firstly, increased state intervention aimed at 
limiting the consequences of the social crisis; secondly, an increased inter- 
dependence between research, technique and state administration. State in- 
terventionism and planned scientific and technical progress can be used to 
regulate the imbalances and conflicts generated by the imperatives of the 
capitalist production process. As a result, there is a conflict between state 
administration and science's production potential. The conflict consists in 
the fact that, on the one hand, the priorities resulting from the economic 
imperatives do not result from the will for a political discourse, yet on the 
other hand, the occulting of certain practical issues in a depoliticised world 
must have serious consequences, for discussion of these practical issues 
provides the State with the legitimacy that it needs today more than ever in 
order to obtain and maintain the loyalty of the masses. Because of this, sci- 
ence and research on science serve an increasingly important function with 
regard to practical issues. Thus, a realised and well-founded criticism of 
science and the development of a praxeology take on increasing impor- 
tance. A practical utilisation of knowledge, especially with the help of 
praxeology, is accomplished through a transformation of practical strate- 
gies and through a communicative practice, and it is through this perspec- 
tive that the exchange between theory and practice must be achieved. 
Habermas also raises the issue of the link between theory and practice 
as an epistemological aspect of the relation between knowledge and inter- 
est. He simultaneously conceives the project of a theory of science that 
must systematise the context of the constitution and application of scien- 
tific theories. The starting point is the question of the system of basic con- 
cepts within which we build our first experiences before elaborating any 
science or any predetermination of the formation of scientific objects. 
Habermas draws a distinction between two basic systems with which ex- 
periences are built. Firstly, there is the whole realm of instrumental action 
in which we are confi-onted with things; then there are all the interactions in 
which one experiences the encounter with speaking and acting people. As 
we have already seen, the fields of empirical science and hermeneutic sci- 
ence rely on an effort to objectify the reality that we daily produce through 
the use of tools and through intersubjective understanding. According to 
their respective paradigms, basic theoretical concepts, the logical elabora- 
tion of theorems, the relation between theory and objects, as well as se- 
lected criteria of evolution differ between these two scientific traditions. 
Perhaps the most important among the effects of the differences between 
these scientific paradigms is the pragmatic function attributed to the pro- 
duced knowledge. Whereas empirical knowledge strives to find causal ex- 
planations and well-defined prognostics, hermeneutics is concerned with 
intersubjective interpretation. 
In both scientific approaches, certain interests are oriented towards a 
quasi-transcendental kind of knowledge, which is, as such, invariable. 
These interests are the result of imperatives deriving fi-om forms of socio- 
cultural life that are tied to work and language. Of these technical and 
practical interests, one can single out the preoccupation with social eman- 
cipation as a distinctive and constitutive dimension of Critical Theory. The 
emancipatory power of the subject's reflection, once he has discovered his 
origin as an individual, is the result of this preoccupation. The experience 
of reflection is articulated, at the level of content, by the concept of devel- 
opment, and methodically leads to a position in which the identity of reason 
and the will to be reasonable are the achievement. In self-reflection, pure 
knowledge and the subject's desire for autonomy interpenetrate each other. 
For the process of reflection is itself a movement of emancipation. In a 
sense therefore, the goal of critical science is to clarify science itself. This 
involves highlighting its conditions of production and utilisation, with a 
view to attaining, through self-reflection, a knowledge of change oriented 
towards emancipation. 
According to Habermas, such an orientation of science towards social 
practice is useful in order to avoid science being exploited by pressure 
groups. 
In Habermas' third contribution to the theorylpractice relation, the 
methodological aspects of a critical theory of society are examined. Re- 
flecting on the context of its own production and use, Critical Theory re- 
sults in a methodological perception of the theorylpractice relation. This 
has the advantage of modifying the relationship between theory and prac- 
tice itself. A theory of society that is organised in a practical perspective 
must take into account the fact that the subject who is searching for knowl- 
edge has a particular relationship with the world of objects. This world of 
objects is the result of the generative performances of subjects capable of 
speech and of action. At the same time, this world of objects itself exercises 
an objective power over its subjects (c. f. Bourdieu's concept of habitus). In 
order to properly consider this perspective and avoid an epistemological 
reduction of the other paradigms, Habermas develops four criteria by which 
a critical science can be distinguished from traditional science or philoso- 
phy. For example, regarding sociology, Habermas explains: 
1. 	 In contrast to the objectivism of strict behavioural science, critical sociology avoids 
reducing intentional action to behaviour. 
2. 	 In contrast to the idealism of humanist hermeneutics, critical sociology is wary of a 
causal reduction of the network of meanings objectified in societal systems to the 
contents of cultural tradition. On the basis of ideological criticism, critical sociology 
questions the consensus de facto established and analyses the implicit relations of 
power as they are expressed in the symbolic structures of language and action. 
3. 	 In contrast to the universalism of a comprehensive theory of systems, critical sociol- 
ogy is wary of reducing all social conflicts to unresolved problems within self-regu- 
lated systems. 
4. 	 In contrast to the dogmatic tradition of the philosophy of history, critical sociology 
is wary of the abuse of power exerted by philosophical concepts (Habermas 1972: 
17ff.). 
On every level that distinguishes critical sociology from the other scientific 
approaches, a certain determination of the relation between science and the 
world of objects is implied, as well as a certain relation between theory and 
practice. These reflections are not only valid for sociology, but also for 
educational science, for critical educational science also strives to avoid re- 
ducing the subject's intentional action to behaviour. It is equally wary of 
reducing to cultural traditions the meaning of situations that are manifest in 
the social and educational system. Rather, it analyses, in the logic of ideo- 
logical criticism, the very foundations on which particular cultural tradi- 
tions rest, as well as the power structures that they express through lan- 
guage and action. Thus, critical educational science is careful to detach it- 
self fiom approaches that reduce all conflicts or social problems to the flow 
of self-regulated systems. Finally, it is wary of over-investing in philoso- 
phical concepts. 
Critical Theory of Eduncatiorm 
In contrast to humanist pedagogics and empirical educational science, Cri- 
tical Theory of education is wary of the flawed self-conception of these sci- 
entific theories. Indeed, they are incapable of critically analysing the social 
development of education. The starting point for this difference is a critical 
evaluation of the historico-social character of education. What this must 
establish is the interdependence between the educational system itself and 
the structure of society. At the same time, the process that brings these 
political and economic structures to bear on education must be examined. 
Another question that is raised here relates to the function of the educa- 
tional system in society. A Critical Theory of education attempts to support 
teachers in their educational practice. It helps to shed light on the educa- 
tional system's nebulous dependence on the whole of the social system. 
However, Critical Theory cannot overcome the dependence of the educa- 
tional system on the social system. But by acting as a beacon of light it can 
perhaps reduce the social system's impact on the educational system. 
Critical Theory of education strives to elucidate the social conditions of 
education. To do so, it must use ideological criticism. This term, ideologi- 
cal criticism, means a scientific disclosure of the social conditions of pro- 
duction and the revelation of erroneous rationalisations as well as the ef- 
fects of those false interpretations, norms and theories, which are the result 
of a flawed understanding of the social situation and of the possibilities of 
intervention upon this situation. This mistaken point of view stems from 
the particular implications and specific interests of those formulating them. 
Ideological criticism must be able to differentiate between the false con- 
sciousness caused by particular social or economic conditions, and clear 
and critical scientifically well-founded consciousness. Only then can the 
difference between ideology and truth come to light. 
The relation between truth and ideology is difficult to determine. In- 
deed, ideologies that often present themselves as justifications tied to par- 
ticular interests can often contain parcels of truth that must be separated 
from their ideological dimension. Let us take an example. In certain con- 
texts, the sentence "we are doing everything in our power to establish equal 
rights in the educational system" can be justified by an ideological system 
as having the function of leading a population into believing that every- 
thing is being done to firther its interests. In reality, those speaking in such 
terms may in fact be doing nothing at all, or very little to realize their dis- 
course. The sole function of this kind of discourse is often merely to ap- 
pease people and give them the feeling that all is being done to progress in 
the right direction. It is here that ideological criticism finds its reason of 
being, in bringing to light the appeasing function of this discourse and re- 
vealing its real objective, social peace. Despite its ideological character, a 
moment of truth can be uncovered in this discourse, insofar as equal rights 
appear as a priority in the educational system just as it is one of the princi- 
pal concrete objectives of Critical Theory in education. This moment of 
truth must therefore clearly be distinguished from the ideological moment 
in the same discourse. In this example, ideology tends to have primacy over 
truth. 

The criticism of ideology plays an important part in the Critical Theory 
of education. Klafki has revealed its main perspectives: 
"a) The falseness of ideological consciousness (for example the idea that feudal society 
is a gift of God, or that the capitalist economic order is socially the fairest possible, 
or again that the majority of girls are, by nature, non political ...) is not based on 
individual mistakes but is created by particular social conditions. 
b) Ideologies reinforce and legitimise the existing power structures. 
c) They correspond to the particular interests of dominant social groups. 
d) They can also be taken as true by those who are dominated and crushed by the 
dominant social structures; furthermore, ideologies are the expression of an alien- 
ated consciousness" (Klafki 1976:50). 
With these aspects in mind, a criticism of ideologies in educational science 
must attain several objectives: 
"Objectives, theories, and establishments, plans of development, methods and media in 
the educational realm must all be analysed in order to discover the implicit social inter- 
ests that weigh upon them. The analysis must bring to light the fact that certain groups 
conceal their own interests behind universal discourses and thus create false conscious- 
ness in the adult or youth populations. Regarding content, we must consider in particu-
lar the objectives and legitimation arguments of educational institutions and the media 
.. . We do not know, for instance, whether institutions (and their employees) adhere to 
certain particular ideologies, for these establishments are separated from production 
processes and the other realms of social activity (political or cultural); the risk is that, on 
the level of their consciousness, they may remain withdrawn in relation to the develop- 
ments of society. For example, even with the best of intentions, they may retain ideas or 
professional principles that have become largely outdated" (Klafki 1976:54). 
,A critical theory of education must strive to reveal oppression, social in- 
justices, excesses of power, reification or self-alienation. It must analyse 
their social and institutional origins and envisage the possibilities of inter- 
vention and change. 
In addition to this criticism of perverse structures in the educational 
field, a critical theory of education must also be committed to construction. 
It is not enough to criticize ideology, in addition, perspectives for interven- 
tion must be found that can serve as reference points for ideological criti- 
cism and the elaboration of a theory of education. For, already the criticism 
of erroneous processes and insufficient concepts implies a founding that 
would work as a lever for the transformation of reality. In this dynamic, the 
concepts of Critical Theory, as presented previously, are used as a perspec- 
tive for a critical theory of education. The most relevant concepts here are 
that of enlightenment, emancipation, liberation fiom reification and from 
the excess of power, social justice, peace, freedom, solidarity, self-deter- 
minism, etc. Critical Theory of education here goes beyond humanist peda- 
gogics and empirical educational science because it can offer constructive 
objectives for education. 
Elaborating this constructive dimension of a critical theory of education 
begins with the definition of the objectives derived from the central con- 
cepts of Critical Theory, and with the development of strategies appropriate 
to their achievement. The goal is not only criticism, but also improvement 
of the educational practice. As such, improvement of practice as an objec- 
tive for critical and constructive theory of education has gained legitimacy. 
This has been achieved above all in the field of action-research in the edu- 
cational sphere. Paths for a new educational practice can be found with ac- 
tion-research. Practitioners can thus be helped to improve their work. The 
central goal of action-research is not only an analysis pointing to the de- 
pendence of the practical field on macrosocial structures, but also the con- 
structive improvement of the practices. To attain this objective, critical and 
constructive educational theory and the search for intervention tied to it are 
oriented towards the practitioners' level of action. 
Critical Theory of education is not only important for its ideological 
criticism applied to the field of education, nor for the development of so- 
cially well-founded objectives or for the development of research on inter- 
vention in the field of education, but primarily because of the fact that 
Critical Theory of education can influence numerous educational fields and 
can introduce new orientations to the practitioners' work. These areas of 
educational science constitute, so to speak, the material that has been inter- 
preted in a new context, and thereby changed. As a consequence, changes 
in the understanding educational science has of itself have been observed in 
all fields. And due to the fact that Critical Theory has also influenced other 
spheres of social science that had themselves influenced educational sci- 
ence, the influence of critical thought on educational science has been even 
greater. Thus we have reached a critical theory of socialization, of the 
organisation of institutions and the theory of roles and their reception by 
educational science. Through the close link between Critical Theory of 
education and other spheres of educational science, the theory of education 
has found concrete forms allowing it further developments. 
In the following paragraph, we shall describe several attempts to de- 
velop a critical theory of education. Leaving aside the contributions made 
by socialist educational theorists during the Weimar Republic (whose im- 
portance for educational science was rediscovered in the 1970s), the differ- 
ent attempts made can be classified in three categories. First of all, we must 
look into the efforts of Mollenhauer (1966), Blankertz (1966), Lempert 
(1 97 1) and Klafki (1 97 l), who formulated the premises of a critical theory 
of education. Secondly, we will consider the works of Heydom, Koneffke 
and Garnm. And thirdly, we shall examine the example of Mollenhauer, 
who provides in his Theories of the Educational Process the most detailed 
draft of a critical theory of education. 
1. Attempts Towards a Critical Theory of Education 
Mollenhauer and Blankertz tried to develop a critical theory of education 
opposed both to the traditional humanist theory and to the strictly empirical 
theory of education. A critical theory of education should have served as a 
reference point for hermeneutics and for the empirical approach to educa- 
tional science. Blankertz defined the objectives of a critical theory as fol-
lows: 
"If, despite its relation to a transcendental subject, education is a social phenomenon, 
then autonomy and emancipation must be the central objects of knowledge of a theory 
of education. Such a duty, based on the primacy of reason, identifies the subject's edu- 
cational interest with his social function. We must strive to overcome the power of real 
society for the virtuality of a truly human life" (Blankertz 1966:74). 
Perceived in this way, a theory of education is always a critical theory used 
for individual self-achievement by improving the educational practice in 
,this direction. But this theory, precisely because it is a theory, can never 
quite achieve its aim. Despite the dialectical character of this theory, there 
is a qualitative difference between theory and practice. This difference also 
results in the existing tension between theory and practice, between virtu- 
ality and reality, which must be brought to light and accepted so as to allow 
for the improvement of concrete education in accordance with the objec- 
tives of the Critical Theory of education. To achieve such improvements of 
the educational practice, Critical Theory must become more concrete 
within the different fields of education. 
According to Mollenhauer, an interest in emancipation, which must be 
the orientation of educational action, is at the centre of a critical educa- 
tional science. To the extent that the Critical Theory of education heads to- 
wards this objective, it must use the procedures of ideological criticism to 
determine, in a concrete case, what the emancipatory interest of the educa- 
tional intervention is, and what strategies are congruent to achieve it. 
For Lempert also, interest in a knowledge allowing emancipation con- 
stitutes the backbone of educational science. It is only by leaning on a criti- 
cal theory of education that educational science can answer the expecta- 
tions of society today. Insofar as a critical theory of education presents 
emancipation as the aim of education, it helps each and everyone to be the 
master of his own destiny, it helps overcome irrational powers and contrib- 
utes to freeing all sorts of energies. Overcoming material violence can be 
partially achieved in an educational action initiated by a critical theory of 
education. More realistic, however, is the criticism of prejudices and ide- 
ologies. In the course of these processes, a critical theory of education must 
try to integrate this knowledge successfully into the scope of people's un- 
derstanding, that is to say, translate this knowledge into the everyday lan- 
guage of the people concerned. For it is only when this transmission occurs 
that enlightenment can succeed. In this case, we can witness an improve- 
ment of the educational practice. The result of this improvement is Critical 
Theory of education's criterion of success. Just as in Mollenhauer and 
Blankertz, there is a series of methodological problems due to the tension 
between the critical objective and its methodical achievement. 
Klafki also tried to develop and found a critical and constructive theory 
of education. He too only partially overcame the difference between the 
Critical Theory of education and the methods so far elaborated to achieve 
this objective. According to Kla&i, a critical theory of education cannot 
limit itself to propagating negativity, as does Critical Theory. Rather, by 
using hermeneutic and empirical procedures, it must strive to bring about 
constructive change within educational practices. It must be understood as 
a theory of and for practice. In so doing, it should try to integrate the pro- 
ject of emancipation with a rationality that includes theory and praxis, so 
that the goal of emancipation does not fail to achieve what it promises. 
2. 	Proposals for a Critical Theory 
of Education and Development 
According to Heydorn, the Critical Theory of education and development is 
characterised by a radical resistance against the power structures that domi- 
nate people. Education and development aim to restore man to himself. 
This can only be achieved in the process of a long history full of contradic- 
tions. The dialectical relation between education and power, an unresolved 
contradiction, can only find its full accomplishment in the historical future. 
The goal of critical development must be to avoid power and help man find 
himself and thus progressively improve society. In Heydorn's words, "the 
&re of the universal man is likewise the liberating act which overcomes 
domination. Universality is a conscious, vast self-creation of man" (Hey- 
dorn 1970: 152). 
Critical Theory of education must resist any educational attempts that 
want to integrate the young generation into the institutional power system 
without offering help to find a critical perspective in relation to this power. 
Instead, a critical theory of education and development will take the direc- 
tion of collective autonomy. Education and development thereby become a 
continuous initiation towards liberation. They are internal processes that 
accomplish an emancipatory movement and thus help man transgress the 
limits his destiny imposes. Development is the future of the present. It fol- 
lows history whilst preparing the virtualities of man, but it is achieved in a 
way in which the future man is already present. The utopian dimension of 
education protects man's historicity and makes him visible and recogniz- 
able in his own historicity (Heydorn 1972: 148). Unfortunately, Heydorn 
was unable to resolve the issue of introducing, achieving and evaluating his 
conception of education in educational establishments or institutions. 
Koneffke's and Gamm's attempts lead in the same direction. Koneffke 
accentuates the subversive possibilities of development thanks to which it 
can resist the integration attempts that power produces. Gamm develops his 
vision of a critical educational science along similar lines. In his The Medi- 
ocrity of Pedagogics in Advanced Bourgeois Society, he examines what 
educational science is today, what it was and what it could become, seen 
from a different political angle depending on whether it chooses to affiliate 
itself to the rising generation or to the established one. 
Beginning with a criticism of educational science's lack of political en- 
gagement, Gamm tries to understand the paralysis of bourgeois pedagogics 
by relying on a criticism of capitalism. In opposition to bourgeois peda- 
gogics, he firmly demands that one take sides for the exploited classes: 
"taking sides as an educational principle". Only through such an orientation 
of educational science can the handicaps of certain social strata in the edu- 
cational system be reduced. 
3. Theories of the IEducatiounaU Process 
For Mollenhauer, Critical Theory of education is primarily a theory of 
communicative action on a symbolic level. According to him, the theory of 
education is grounded on an educational action that is put into practice 
"with intentions that are always adapted to the .contextn. This theory can 
therefore only be thought of as a theory of communicative action in the 
educational field. Thus Mollenhauer divides his book Theories on the Edu- 
cational Process into three chapters: 1. education as communicative action, 
2. education as interaction, 3. education as reproduction. 
This is how he underlines the three essential elements of his reflection, 
insisting on the interdependence that ties these three elements together: 
A theory of education can only be conceived of as theory of communi- 
cative action. Its character is determined by the structure of the educational 
field in which the educational processes are taking place. There are a few 
elements which influence communicative action in the pedagogical field, 
most notably: the relationship between generations, spontaneity, reproduc- 
tivity, social powers, traditions and the reproduction of inequality. Fur- 
thermore, communicative action is determined by educational norms that 
are the result of a historico-social process. Finally, the parts played by the 
different actors of the communication influence the educational action. 
In reference to symbolical interactionism, it is the actors' role-playing 
and interacting in the communication, that makes the communicational dy- 
namic possible. This dynamic is also symbolic. Its structure can be upset by 
numerous elements, such as one partner's domination of the communica- 
tion. Educational communication must if possible be achieved so as to en- 
able the success of the educational project. 
,An additional step towards understanding educational theory as a theory 
of symbolic and communicative action resides in the attempt to explain the 
structure of educational interaction with the help of symbolic interaction- 
ism. This suggests that mutual comprehension in the educational situation 
is exercised with the help of commonly accepted symbols that have the same 
significance for different individuals and that are capable of expressing 
universality in interpersonal relationships. Another objective is the explana- 
tion of the process of identity development in reference to the interactionist 
role-playing model. To address this, an analysis of the communicative 
situations in the field of education is necessary. This includes analysis of 
the dependence of institutional structures and the social powers implicit in 
institutions. 
This theory of communicative and symbolical action becomes a critical 
theory of education that is based not only on the shapes and contents of 
pedagogical communication according to the rules of interaction, but also 
and most importantly, according to the material and social processes of re- 
production that exist under the social conditions of a bourgeois society. 
Mollenhauer believes to have found, with the principle of the abstraction of 
the value of exchange, a criterion that on the one hand organises the struc- 
ture of the interaction, and on the other hand can be referred to the histori- 
cal structure of the society the material base of which is the means of pro- 
duction and exchange in bourgeois capitalist society. In this way, he can 
show how the educational relationship is tied to the material foundations of 
history and society. With the concept of abstraction of the value of ex- 
change, Mollenhauer lays the principle of merchandise exchange as the 
principle determiniig all types of exchange in capitalism. Apart from the 
nature of work itself, the abstraction of the exchange relation is found in a 
particular social relationship that is characteristic to capitalist society. This 
characteristic of exchange, present in all exchange, transforms it into mer- 
chandise even within the field of educational science. As this conception 
combines educational reproduction with the economic production system, it 
can serve as a basic conception for a materialist educational science. For, 
with an idealised communicative community as background, forms of com- 
munication in the educational field that have been disturbed because of this 
character of exchange (the fact that everything can be bought or sold) can 
be decried and modified. 
Mollenhauer attempts to link together the spheres of production and re- 
production by introducing the concept of masked character (Charakfer- 
maske) and applying it to the communicative practice in education. With 
reference to Marx's idea according to which the masked characters of eco- 
nomic subjects are no more than incarnations of economic relations, Mol- 
lenhauer understands the conception of masked character as a result of the 
objective components of the role-playing games at work in the situations 
and institutions in which goods only appear as exchange value. Property 
owners then mutually define each other as buyers and sellers. Mollenhauer 
believes that this basic relation, characteristic of bourgeois society, also de- 
fines other human interactions such as those lived within the educational 
system. The concept of the masked character shows that much individual 
behaviour in interactions is not due solely to the individual dimension, but 
also to the social system. A consequence, for a critical theory of education, 
is that many communicative processes are disturbed and fail, not because 
of individual responsibility, but because of structural overdeterminations of 
the economic and social context. This.objectification .due to the masked 
character also applies to many human relationships. 
No doubt none of the described attempts have achieved a sufficiently 
elaborated definition of a critical theory of education. Nevertheless, these 
efforts have brought to light important elements for a critical theory. 
Amongst these elements, the following must be underlined: a perception of 
education's socio-historical character; the necessity for an ideological 
analysis of educational phenomena; the development of educational objec- 
tives in the context of a critical theory of society; the development of the 
perspectives of a critical theory of education; the elaboration of strategies 
for the realisation of these objectives; and the new orientation of the princi- 
pal fields of educational science with reference to the objectives of a criti- 
cal theory of education. 
Summary and Outlook 
1. The starting point for critical educational science is a reference to Critical 
Theory and a scepticism with regard to humanist pedagogics and empirical 
educational science. In contrast to these two paradigms, critical educational 
science is closely tied to the norms of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt 
School. On this basis it can lay down norms and define their social value. 
2 .  Critical educational science begins with the historico-social charac- 
ter of the educational practice and educational science. It sees itself and its 
field of action as determined by socio-political and economic conditions in 
relation to which it must hold a critical stance. lnsofar as it applies criticism 
in the shape of self-criticism, critical educational science must analyse the 
social conditions of production and application that dominate its field of 
intervention. 
3. Like the Critical Theory of society, critical educational science must 
privilege practice over theory. But critical educational theory can no longer 
be based, as humanist pedagogics was, on an unquestioned evaluation of 
practice. Further, it must realise that given social conditions produce un-
satisfactory educational situations. The purpose of theory is to bring these 
situations to light, and then help to change them with the ideas of critical 
thought. 
4. Critical educational theory must also analyse educational practice in 
the light of ideological criticism. According to the implicit norms of this 
criticism, Critical Theory of education must help improve practice. This re- 
fers back to the constructive dimension of Critical Theory. On the whole, it 
must be understood that a theory of education can never indicate in ad- 
vance what the practice will be, although at the same time, a practice claim- 
ing to be reasonable must be based on theory. This means that a critical 
theory of practice is needed as a constructive theory of practice. 
5. In more precise terms, ideological criticism must elucidate to what 
extent the norms and objectives of education are tied to socially given eco- 
nomic and social conditions, how these norms and objectives are used to 
transmit a certain perception of reality, and how they hide and maintain the 
implicit structures of power. Insofar as ideological criticism protects edu- 
cational science and education fiom being at the mercy of power's inter- 
ests, it is an important part of critical educational science oriented towards 
the rational development of society. 
6. Compared with the appropriation of ideological criticism in educa- 
tional science, the constructive dimension of critical educational theory is 
more complex. In this field, critical educational theory was supposed to 
overcome the difficulties which Critical Theory had not been able to face. 
The problem was to find a better educational practice on the basis of the 
negation of reality's insufficiency and in reference to the virtuality of 
situations. At the same time, it was important to be careful not to weaken 
the transformative energy by too radical a criticism. We then need a theory 
of education, which includes criticism, without however remaining at this 
critical level. It is in the field of action-research that this constructive pro- 
ject of Critical Theory has made the greatest headway. And this all the 
more, since this movement has been able to integrate elements of the em- 
pirical and hermeneutic paradigms, despite not having achieved satisfactory 
convergence of these different paradigms. 
7. Critical Theory of education is not presented as a total and closed 
theory. This position would contradict the thrust of critical thought, which 
is rather to be conceived as the act of reflection criticising itself. Further- 
more, a total theory of education is no longer conceivable in the light of the 
diversity of current developments in the human and social sciences. The 
field of critical educational science is characterised by different positions, 
which, although they agree with regard to basic points, may still conflict 
with regard to the concept of criticism. There are, for instance, different 
ways of engaging in concrete change in the educational field. Because 
practice remains at the forefront, even though it needs the support of the- 
ory, a conception of Critical Theory is insufficient when it is reduced to a 
double negation or refusal. Seen as an objective reflection of material real- 
ity, theory is determined by practice, which constitutes an integral part of 
reality. On the other hand, theory also entails a conscious perception of the 
laws of reality that overdetermine human practice. For the theory that re- 
flects practice, the latter becomes the test of its truth. Theory then becomes 
practice's management branch. 
8. For critical educational science, a central starting point is the analysis 
of the social antagonisms within which the educational system operates. 
With the help of criticism, critical educational theory can shed light on the 
social structures that determine the educational field. Furthermore, elabo- 
rating a theory of education is necessary to help educational action find a 
way out of the contradictory situations it is confronted with, though this 
must be achieved without falling into the trap of devising educational 
"recipes". Educational action's critical orientation must protect itself from 
simplifying reductions, but at the same time, educational action seen as 
communicative and symbolic action must not be completely identified with 
critical thought. The qualitative difference between Critical Theory and 
constructive action is not always rigorously followed in critical educational 
science. This has led to a devaluation of hermeneutic procedures and ex- 
perimental research. 
9. Critical educational science targets domination, oppression, reifica- 
tion and self-alienation, by relying on the powers of enlightenment (Aufkla- 
rung), emancipation and self-determination. As opposed to humanist peda- 
gogics, education is no longer understood as a solely individual process, 
but also as a collective process which must contribute to the development 
of "reasonable" social situations for the greatest amount of people possible. 
To attain its objectives, education must help people to live out construc- 
tively the theorylpractice relation. 
10. Critical educational science requires a critical interpretation of edu- 
cationalpractice. At the same time it accepts the necessity of experimental 
research on educational practice. Many of today's unresolved methodologi- 
cal problems have been born of this effort. Furthermore, critical educational 
science demands that decisions relating to practice and their normative 
foundations in the practitioners' discourse be justified. Educational science 
cannot be reduced to a methodology; it must also confront the issues of 
truth and the right knowledge, their foundations, and the resulting conse- 
quences for educational practice. 
11. Due to the complexity of the problems to be treated, critical educa- 
tional science shares with Critical Theory a dzficulty in precisely stating its 
concepts. Even if we do not accept the strength of critical rationalism's 
demand for the precision of concepts, it must be admitted that Critical The- 
ory and, in its trail, some of the authors of critical educational science, have 
not laid enough importance on the precision and clarity of their concepts. 
This is one of the reasons for which this current has encountered difficul- 
ties in being understood by practitioners. 
' 
12. The development of critical educational science has not been exclu- 
sively influenced by the Critical Theory of society. Actually, the influence 
of neighbouring social sciences has been quite substantial, especially in 
certain fields of educational science. Social science has been influenced by 
Critical Theory; Critical Theory has had a renewed influence on educa- 
tional science through this mediation. In this process, certain categories of 
historical materialism have been imported and have led to a radicalisation 
of thought in the educational field. 
13. There has been much critical talk of the political deficit of Critical 
Theory. On this issue, and with regard to certain other controversies (such 
as the arguments around positivism, hermeneutics and systems theory), a 
number of important dimensions have been pointed out that have hrthered 
the development of Critical Theory and critical educational science. 
14. We have tried to explain that educational science cannot get around 
positioning itself in relation to the ideas of Critical Theory. This is true 
even if we must recognize that certain issues remain unresolved. Action-re- 
search is perhaps the means to overcome them. 
Conclusion: 

Educational Knowledge and Historical Anthropology 

Our presentation of the development of educational science has shown the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the currents which constitute it. Each of 
the paradigms is exclusively legitimate in its own field. It cannot therefore 
be replaced by another paradigm in its own legitimate field. This idea is 
now widespread, and there is no more discussion on this particular point. 
The relative validity of every current's legitimacy has, today, led to a kind 
of radical pluralism in the field of human sciences. This epistemological 
pluralism has found its adequate expression in the concept ofpedagogical 
knowledge, which incorporates very diverse forms of knowledge. This con- 
cept of pedagogical knowledge has been made possible as a result of a sort 
of reflexive balance-sheet, which once again has drawn attention to the im- 
portance of different paradigms for the development of educational science 
(Hofhann 199 1 ;Hannsmann/Marotzki 198 8; MarotzkiISiinker 1992). 
We have re-examined the positions developed during the 1970s and 
1980s, and have attempted to understand the different currents through an 
analysis of their contributions to the development of educational science. 
Our aim has been to establish what each current brought to light and how 
these different contributions have been used to redefine a project for the 
educational science of the future. 
At the same time, the discussion over paradigms stimulated several im- 
portant parallel discussions. Amongst them, the provocations brought about 
by systems theory (LuhmannISchorr 1990) has played an essential part. 
Moreover, the debate over postmodemism has also had a considerable in- 
fluence on educational science (Jung et al. 1986; Lenzen 1987; Wulf 1997; 
2001). 
As we have seen, these scientific development tendencies increased the 
discussion's diversity and led to the emergence of the concept of "peda- 
gogical knowledge" in the early 1990s (OelkerstTenorth 199 l). Through 
this reference to pedagogical knowledge, the diversity of forms of knowl- 
edge has become a standard programme. Science and scientific knowledge 
are now only to be conceived fiom a plural perspective. Emphasis has be- 
come placed on different forms of knowledge. 
In addition to the disciplines that traditionally address education (psy- ' 
chology, sociology ...), a place is given to novel and different approaches 
(literature, practitioners' discourses, etc.). This development has created 
new, synthesised forms of pedagogical knowledge. These forms constitute 
an expression of the fact that the normative institutionalisation of science 
has been mixed together with the diversity of administrative discourses, so- 
cial references and experiences of reality, all of them dimensions that sci- 
ence had previously tried to maintain at a distance. There is no longer a 
unique way that embraces all fields, wielding all knowledge to use peda- 
gogical knowledge. 
The concept of "pedagogical knowledge" includes such different forms 
of knowledge as politics, education as formation, ethics, technical knowl- 
edge, pragmatics or emancipatory action. This notion refers to the origins 
of the knowledge of power practices and of levels of discourse. It allows 
for differentiation in terms of the locations of practice, the use made of 
practices in social reality, and the actual structure of the knowledge and its 
content. In the concept of "pedagogical knowledge", practical knowledge 
can be distinguished fiom reflexive knowledge, from know-how, from di- 
agnostical knowledge, orientational knowledge and knowledge of action. 
Within these various ways of knowing, one can isolate utopian knowledge, 
critical knowledge, and action-related knowledge. One can also operate a 
distinction according to contexts. Culture and background influence knowl- 
edge. Indeed, "pedagogical knowledge" contains symbolic, codified, sig- 
nificant dimensions that bear on educational relationships and produce a 
temporal, material and social base for pedagogical practice. Pedagogical 
knowledge contributes to the understanding and analysis of the significance 
of this pedagogical practice. The product of this understanding and analysis 
can be put into a textual form, codified, broadcast and discussed. Pedagogi- 
cal knowledge is not structured in a simple manner and therefore requires a 
multi-referential approach. 
Ever since Feyerabend's idea that "everything is possible" in the field 
of scientific knowledge (which implies the end of any absolute value in the 
field of scientific paradigms), ever since the end of the "grand narratives" 
(Lyotard) in which individual and social development is pre-thought, ever 
since the acceptance of a radical pluralism, the epistemological situation of 
educational science has changed. This change is manifest in the concept of 
"pedagogical knowledge", and especially in its principle of equivalence , 
between different forms of knowledge, origin and register, as is constantly 
underlined by the current of ethnography. 
The rediscovev of the anthropological stance, on the basis of this in- 
tensive discussion over the establishment of a concept of pedagogical 
knowledge, has emerged in an epistemological and social context that is 
different to that of the 1960s. This anthropological posture has'also gained 
ground in other human sciences. The reasons for this are linked to a crisis 
in the assured references of these disciplines. Their hope is to find a new 
impetus within this change of perspective that has turned them towards 
anthropology. 
Anthropology no longer exists as a system consisting of normative 
knowledge. The same is true of educational anthropology. In an analogy to 
pedagogical knowledge, we could speak of an anthropological knowledge 
of pedagogics. Anthropological knowledge has played an important part in 
the knowledge of educational science, as well as in that of practical peda- 
gogics, ever since its origins. Like every researcher, every educator, every 
teacher has a certain anthropological knowledge, without which he could 
not do his work. In these different cases, the anthropological knowledge is 
implicit. Like all implicit knowledge, this anthropological knowledge can 
hardly be reflected. It cannot be altered without difficulties. Because of 
this, it is necessary for those working in educational science, as well as for 
educational practitioners, to become consciously aware of the anthropo- 
logical postulates that are at the base of their work. This is why we need to 
build an anthropological posture in pedagogics or in education (Wulf 1997; 
2001). 
In today's social science, it is no longer possible to speak of "man" in a 
general and universal sense (WulfKamper 2002), as it was in the tradition 
of philosophical anthropology (Scheler 1928; Plessner 1980; Gehlen 1986) 
or in the pedagogical anthropology that was influenced by it in the 1960s 
(Bollnow 1983; Loch 1963; Roth 1966; 1971). Indeed, it would seem fool- 
hardy to speak of "man" today. The universalistic implications of such a 
discourse on man could hardly survive the recent contributions of history, 
ethnology and constructivism. Criticism of anthropology has shown that 
anthropology can nowadays only be conceived as historical anthropology 
(Historische Anthropologie, 1989; Wulf 1997). Consequentially, pedagogi- 
cal anthropology can only be conceived as a continuation of the historical 
perspective that we may call "the historical anthropology of education" 
(Wulf 2002). 
Knowledge of the historical anthropology of education operates in a 
double historical context: on the one hand in the context of those who pro- 
duce or reveal an area of knowledge; on the other hand, in the context of 
those who in the process of research, make use of that area knowledge, ' 
produced in another context. This double historicity determines the content 
of anthropological knowledge. Likewise, however, this relationship to time 
creates a new perspective, which takes into account that there is no truth as 
such in itself, but that all knowledge must be considered in its relation to a 
context. 
Anthropological knowledge is relative. There is no longer a guaranteed 
reference system. As a result, normative anthropologies are no longer pos- 
sible. This is why anthropological knowledge can no longer claim a differ- 
ent recognition than other forms of knowledge in educational science. This 
levelling of positions is all the more justified since the interconnections 
between the anthropological knowledge of education and other disciplines 
within social science are hazy and uncertain. Anthropological knowledge is 
not tied to a fixed subject and can no longer be determined in absolute 
terms. 
Furthermore, anthropological knowledge raises new issues, perspectives 
and themes for educational science. The end of the era in which self-en- 
closed anthropological systems dominated, has created new opportunities 
to produce new objects. The following theses present some of the new per- 
spectives that arise out of this situation, in which the paths cross between 
anthropology and other disciplines that focus on education. 
1. Pedagogical anthropology becomes historical anthropology of edu- 
cation.that takes into account the historicity of the researcher and his ob- 
ject. Historical anthropology of education also seeks to relate its perspec- 
tives and methods to those of its object. Its objective is no longer the search 
for "Man" or "Child" as universal beings, but as concrete men, women and 
children in historically and socially determined contexts. The idea of a con- 
cept that totalises humankind is diluted in such a perspective. Historical 
anthropology of education does not limit itself to certain cultures or times. 
In principal, it should be able to overcome the Eurocentrism of social sci- 
ence and a purely historicist interest in history through a reflection of its 
own historicity, and then engage with the unsolved problems of the present 
and the future. 
2. The tasks of pedagogical anthropology are the following: to criticize 
the fantasies of omnipotence or helplessness of pedagogics; and to thema- 
tize the tension between the possibility ofperfecting humans, the opposite 
hypothesis of the impossibility of changing humans, and the possibilities 
and limits of education and development. All these goals lead to an over- 
emphasis on human perfectibility, and an examination and increasing 
awareness of the biological, social and cultural limits to the developmental 
process for man that education is. In recent years, the limits of human per- 
fectibility have been gradually perceived. In popular language these are, for 
instance, the "limits of expansion", "genetic technology", "risk society". 
The world's humanisation seems to increase simultaneously the danger of 
its destruction. 
3. Educational anthropology must incorporate anthropological criticism 
in its self-conception that thematizes its field of competence as well as its 
limits. Criticism of anthropology, for instance, must work on the simplifi- 
cations that result from the human vs. animal comparisons of traditional 
anthropology. It must also take into account mistakes in the popular dis- 
tinction between nature and culture. It must, further, avoid man's objectiv- 
ist reductions. Anthropological criticism examines central concepts, mod- 
els, and procedures of educational anthropology, and reflects on the condi- 
tions of legitimacy of the knowledge of educational anthropology. 
4. The purpose of educational anthropology is to analyse, organise the 
knowledge produced by human science, as well as deconstruct educational 
concepts from an anthropological perspective. This could be, for instance, a 
deconstruction of Rousseau's negative education or of Pestalozzi's ele- 
mentary education or Humboldt's concept of universal education. Through 
such procedures, one can see for example how, thanks to the new anthro- 
pological stance, new dimensions can be found to old problems. Thus, his- 
torical .contexts can be examined from a different angle: new reference 
points for educational thought and action can then be drawn from this de- 
construction movement. 
5 .  Educational anthropology involves a reflection on the competence 
and limits of its own knowledge. It analyses the difficulties that stem from 
the collapse of universal references for man's self-definition and education. 
Educational anthropology brings to light the dependence of their results on 
the conditions of their production. It is, therefore, reJlexive. 
6. The anthropological knowledge of education is constituted withii dif-
ferent and sometimes contradictory discourses. "Discourse" is here taken to 
mean consistent forms of thought and language that emphasise particular 
educational contexts. Discourses contribute to the construction of percep- 
tion, and to the structures and concepts of education. These discourses 
express the practice of power in society, the practice of power in the sci-
entific world, as well as that within educational institutions. In the context 
of educational knowledge, anthropological discourses express questions, 
perspectives and important knowledge for thought and educational action. 
7. Educational anthropology is plural. This is why it is distrusthl of . 
hasty consolidations of its knowledge and is open to receiving what is "dif- 
ferent". Thanks to this pluralism (which diverges fiom an attitude that levels 
everything), an "out of principle" opening onto inter-disciplinary work 
allows it to be interested in a complexification rather than a reduction of 
anthropological knowledge. Historical educational knowledge is consti- 
tuted on specific conditions that are dictated by culture and language, espe- 
cially in a conjuncture where the international and the intercultural take on 
increasing importance. 
8. Nowadays, a great deal of the knowledge transmitted by the educa- 
tional system raises the issue of the appropriateness of educational knowl- 
edge in relation to social, institutional and educational reality. Insofar as 
educational knowledge contributes to the production and development of 
the following generation, it implies human self-understanding, which is it- 
self called into question by the issue of human perfectibility or imperfecti- 
bility. In the context of educational knowledge, this issue is at the centre of 
anthropological research. 
9. In the field of the historical anthropology of education, the borders 
between the different forms of knowledge have dissolved and new forms of 
knowledge and formation have been invented. Amongst them, aesthetical 
education and intercultural education are particularly important. The first 
relates to the emergence of new media and the resulting social conse- 
quences; the second refers to the new economic and demographic contexts 
that characterise Europe today, and to the consequences that result fiom 
this new context for education and formation, apprenticeship and the con- 
frontation with practical experience. 
10. Educational anthropology is to a great extent a constructivist an- 
thropology. This means that in its research and its reflection, it does not 
believe itself capable of understanding the being of man. However, it 
knows its conception of humanity depends on particular conditions. Its 
conception of man depends on historical data and can only be understood 
as a construction. Insofar as deductive and normative systems of anthropo- 
logical knowledge in the realm of education are outdated, there is a clear 
need for the historical anthropology of education to be developed in a con- 
structivist and reflexive movement (Wulf 2002). 
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European Studies in Education 
edited by Christoph Wulf 
The political, economic, and social developments in the European Union pose 
new challenges to education in Europe, where each country has its own system. 
Under these circumstances, the relation between national, regional, and local 
traditions on the one hand and supraregional, transnational aspirations on the 
other must be conceived. The field of education is seeing the rise of new issues, 
responsibilities, and research requiring scholars from different European 
cultures to work together. 
European Studies in Education constitutes an international forum for the 
publication of educational research in English, German and French. The 
multilingual nature of this series mirrors that of Europe and makes it possible to 
portray and express cultural diversity. 
Christoph Wulf (ed.): Education,in Europe. An Intercultural Task 
1995.554 S. DM 48,- (EWO24,54). ISBN 3-89325-258-4. 
Dieser Band enthiilt die Materialien des Budapester Kongresses des Network 
Educational Science Amsterdam vom Herbst 1993. Das Netzwerk umfasst mehr 
als 30 erziehungswissenschaftlicheFakulCiten aus allen Teilen Europas und aus 
einigen auBereuropitischen Ladern. Die Materialien enthalten kurze 
Positionspapiere und Diskussionsbeitriige zur Theorie und Geschichte der 
Erziehung, Medien, Lehrerbildung, Sonderptidagogik, Transitionsprobleme in 
'Mittel-Ost-Europa, Interkulturelle Bildung, Frauenstudien, Europiiische 
Perspektiven. 
~joerd Karsten, Dominique Majoor (eds.): Education in East Central 
Europe. Educational Changes after the Fall of Communism 
1995. 180 S. DM 29,80 (EWO15,24). ISBN 3-89325-259-2. 
Dieser Band umfasst drei Fallstudien iiber die gegenwartige Situation des 
Bildungswesens in Ungarn, der Tschechischen Republik und Polen sowie eine 
Vergleichende Analyse. Die einzelnen Studien sind 8uBerst material- und 
informationsreich und erarbeiten Perspektiven fiir zukiinftige Entwicklungen. 
Stephsn Sting, Cb~istopb Wulf (eds.): Education ha Period of Social 
Upheaval. EducationaE Theories and Concepts in Central East Europe 
1995. 174 S. DM 29,80 @WO 15,24). ISBN 3-89325-260-6. 
Hier wird ein aerbl ick iiber die aktuelle Problemlage der 
Erziehungswissenschafl in Ostmitteleuropa gegeben. In einer Situation des 
gesellschaftlichen Umbruchs werden aus der Sicht der betroffenen 
Gemeinsamkeiten sowie historische und Mturelle DifFerenzen in der 
ptidagogischen Tradition aufgespilrt, die neue Perspektiven filr ptidagogische 
Theorien und Konzepte bieten. Die Beitrtige beschMgen sich mit den 
Entwicklungen in Bulgarien, Deutschland, Estland, Litauen, Polen, R h e n ,  
Russland, Tschechien und Ungarn. 
B e d a r d  Diechann,  CglPiSfoph Wulf, Micbae! Wimmer (eds.): Violence. 
Nationalism, Racism, Xenophobia 
1997.332 S. DM 38,- (Euro 19,43). ISBN 3-89325-487-0. 
The escalation in violence over the last few years expressed in xenophobia, 
racism and nationalism in several European countries is analized in the 
contributions of the book. Representatives of disciplines of the various social 
sciences dedicated to understanding violence attempt to determine possible 
causes and motives for this increase. The European aspect, with its particular 
economic and sociopolitical problems, is examined using case study results from 
several countries. In addition, an analysis is presented that investigates the 
question wheather violence is a problem specific to youth and therefore an issue 
to be addressed by educationalists. The book seeks to contribute to research in 
the fields of nationalism and racism by dealing predominantly with 
anthropologial considerations. But it also wishes to address the questions of the 
manifestation, causes and motives of youth violence being discussed in 
educational science. 
Stephen Lawton, Wodney Reed, Fons van Wieringen (eds.): Restructuring 
Public Schooling: Europe, Canada, America 
1997.206 S. DM 38,- (Eur019,43). ISBN 3-89325-518-4. 
This volume offers an overview of educational restructuring, its aimsand 
possibilities in the European and North American context. A conceptual 
analsysis of educational policy systems and development in both continnents is 
provided and empirical cases are presented within this h e w o r k .  Overviews 
are given of the national stage in Canada. Problems with the public debt are 
driving change in Canada, but the issue of developing an internationally 
competitive work force is the main objective. A synthesis of continental 
European development is provided in which the distinctly different perspectives 
in northern and southern Europe are compored. Assessments of reformas in the 
United States are presented. Some reforms are driven by a vision of 
decentralization and democratic localism, and others by pragmatism and a desire 
to do the least harm to the classroom as cutbacks are made. Analysis of the 
impact of school-site management complement these system-wide analyses. 
Christoph Wulf (eds.): Education for the 21" Century. Commonalities and 
Diversities 
1998.700 S. DM 48,- (EWO 24,54). ISBN 3-89325-619-9. 
The expansion of the European Union in the 21st century will bring with it new 
tasks in education. Among the predominant ones are issues related to 
commonalities and diversities found within each nation's own education system. 
Until now the European states have focused on diversities found within their 
own national educatioanl systems. The ongoining integration process in Europe 
will mean transnational perspectives need more attention. Processes of 
globalisation, economic integration, social mobility, migration and political 
integrationwill persist into the next century and produce new forms of 
commonalities, inside and outside nation states. The relationsship of these 
processes of commonalities and diversities is a major problem and challenge for 
all education systems not only within Europe, but in the whole world. This 
volume deals with issues related to this development in seven fields: History and 
Theory of Education, Ethnicity, Teacher Education, Youth Care aand Special 
Educational Needs, Media Based Education, Woman and Gender Studies, 
Higher Education. The 43 articels are written by more than 50 authors from 15 
Europein countries. 
Georgios Tzartzas: Schule im gesellschaftlichen Umbruch. Die Entwicklung 
des modernen griechischen Bildungswesens (1833-1862) 
1998.491 S. DM 48,- (Euro 24,54). ISBN 3-89325-654-7. 
Bei der Konstituierung des modernen griechischen Erziehungs- und 
Bildungswesens wurden zahlreiche Gedanken der Au&lihug und des 
Neuhumanismus wirksam. Es verbanden sich Vorstellungen von der 
Notwenigkeit der V e r ~ o l k o n U m ~ g  und Versittlichung der Menschen durch 
die Macht der Erziehung. Vorstellungen vom Wert griechisch antiker 
Traditionen und von der Schaffung einer neuen Identittlt. Die Schule entwickelte 
sich m einer Institution nicht nur des Lernens, sondern auch der iiberwachung 
und Hierarchisierung, mit deren Hilfe die Domestizierung des Kdrpers bzw. 
Disziplinierung des Schiilers bezweckt wurde, urn seine Brauchbarkeit und 
Effizienz zuerhijhen. Die Orientierung an den Bildungssystemen 
westeurop~scher Staaten erfolgte nicht wegen deren Eflizienz, sondern 
aufgrund eines ausgebliebenen Selbstverst&dnisses der, Piidagogik innerhalb 
des neugriechischen Staatswesens. 
Mbukeni WerbePd Mn@: Education as a Social Unstitution land 
IIdeologicaP Process. From Ndgritude Education in Senegal to Banh 
Education in South Africa 
1999. 188 S. DM 38,- @WO 19,43). ISBN 3-89325-696-2. 
The author has attempted to raise some problematic issues and concerns around 
formal education in Afiica and particulary South Afiica, which is in stage of 
creating an inclusive education system. The author argues that a necessary 
starting point is to first recognize the voices of those who are excluded and 
marginalized, and then to develop strategies which will ensure their inclusion. 
Understanding what indigenous people think about education and the knowledge 
transmitted to their children will ensure their full participation in decision- 
making. 
Beat& V6lez: Geogmphie de la chair maternelle. Conps, culture et sociCtC 
em Colornbie 
1999. 176 S. DM 29,80 (ELUO 15,24). ISBN 3-89325-722-5. 
Les diffkrences anatomique entre hommes et femmes ont dtd A la base des 
systemes d'kchange symbolique dans toutes les sociktks. L'auteur essaie de 
survoler la constellation de cette problkmatique dans 1es cas de la Colombie ou 
l'ordre des rapports entre hommes et femmes a et6 fortement determine par 
l'image juddo-chrktienne de la Vierge Marie. Mdme si, au XXieme siecle, la 
skcularisation de la socittk colombienne a provoquk des changements dans le 
systkme sexe et genre, la plupart des femmes engagdes dans la politique, 
Iteducation supkrieure et les sports, demeurent pikgkes dans la "double 
dktermination" de m&es et de travailleuses. 
Silvia Wedenigg: Mndheitsbegriffe japauischer Stnr&oazeptionen. Zur 
Rezeption westlicher Modelle der Reformeniehung in der Meiji-&?it 
1999. 170 S. DM 29,80 @WO 15,24). ISBN 3-89325-724-1. 
An der Schnittstelle von Erziehungswissenschaft und Japanologie behandelt die 
Studie die historisch-anthropologischeFragestellung von Kindheits- und 
Erziehungsbegriffen in japanischen Strafkonzeptionen. Geleitet von 
mentalitiitsgeschichtlichen t%erlegungen sind es Strafhandlungen und deren 
mgrundeliegende Strafkonzeptionen, die imHinblick auf Wahrnehrnungs- und 
Verstlindnisformen von Kindheit als Untersuchungsgegenstand herangezogen 
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werde. Den leitenden Referenzbezug bildet dabei Foucaults Analysemodell der 
"Machtzum Leben". 
Doug Bougthon, Rachel Mason (eds.): Beyond Multicultural Art Education. 
International Perspectives 
1999.360 S. DM 38,- DM (Euro 19,43). ISBN 3-89325-783-7 
Multiculturalism is a term that has been much used in educational texts in recent 
years. Its usage is frequently taken for granted in the rhetoric of cuniculurn 
literature. However, it has recently become clear that there are sigdicant 
variations of interpretations of multiculturalism in different world regions. This 
book takes a new and deeper look at the notion of multiculturalism through the 
lens of art education. In educational terms art is a unique tool for the 
investigation of cultural values because it transcends the barrier of language and 
provides visceral and tacit insights into cultural change. 
In order to address the educational interpretations and methods of implementing 
multiculturalism in different regios of the world, this book contains discussion 
and analysis of perspectives on art education theory and practice fiom thirteen 
countries. The authors of each chapter are respected multicultural experts in 
their geographic locations who are well equipped to provide unique insights into 
the particular issues of multiculturalism viewed fiom the perspective of art in 
educational contexts. 
The book as a whole provides tools for the conceptual analysis of contemporary 
notions linked with multiculturalism, such as interculturalism, internationalism 
and globalisation. It also provides strategies for art teaching in relation to these 
ideas. This book presents conceptual frameworks that should assist educators to 
examine their own teaching on issues of equity and diversity that are central to 
the multicultural education debate. 
Niklas Luhmann, Karl-Eberhard Schorr: Problems of Reflection in the 
System of Education, translated by Rebecca A. Neuwirii, 
2000, European Studies in Education, 412 Seiten, br., 48,OO DM (24,54 Euro), 
ISBN 3-89325-890-6 
From the perspective of system theory this text traces the way in which the 
system of education reflects its own unity and its own position in modem 
society. Concerning the problems of reflection (autonomy of the system of 
education, instruction technology and the contradiction between education and 
selection) sociological analysis and the availability of analytical instruments for 
system reflection may make a contribution to increase the reflection level of 
Jann &re1 Koppean, Ingrid lLunf Christoph Wulf (4s.): Education in 
Europe. Cultures, Values, IInstitutions in Transition 
2002, European Studies in Education, 320 pages, br., EUR 19,50, ISBN 3-8309- 
1110-6 
This book deals with three major fields of contemporary education in Europe: 
intercultural education, values in education and educational institutions. In each 
of these central areas education is currently co&onted with rapid changes, 
related to the process of European unification and globalimtion, which is 
considerably altering the h  e  of reference for nation-based cultures and 
educational systems. The enlargement of Europe in the years to come constitutes 
one of the most challenging developments in the European Union. This 
development will make the comrnonalities and differences between European 
nation states, cultures and religions play an important role. How to handle these 
will be among the central tasks of the future. In the European Union, education 
is destined to become an increasingly intercultural task. 
CPnnistoph Wulf, Brigitte Qvarsell (eds.): Culture and Education. 2003. 
MichaeP Gutmann: Die dialogische Piidagogik des S o h t e s .  Einm Weg m 
Wissen, Weisheit und Selbsterkenntnis. 2003. 
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